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Abstract 
 
Phishing attacks are one of the most prevalent forms of cybercrime worldwide. 
Cybercriminals use phishing for various illicit activities such as identity theft and fraud 
as well as installing malware on unsuspecting end user systems to gain access to the 
victims' systems. Phishing attacks have also been responsible for many sophisticated 
attacks perpetrated against financial institutions, government agencies, healthcare 
providers and businesses. In particular, email-born phishing attacks in which the 
phishers send fake emails pretending to be from a legitimate organization to extract 
sensitive information such as account numbers, passwords, or other personal 
information from victims or trick them into downloading malicious software embedded 
in documents or links have turned out to be a challenging problem. Although there exist 
many phishing email filtering approaches, email-born attacks continue unabated to 
plague Internet users and causing considerable economic losses worldwide. This calls 
for the development of effective countermeasures against email-born phishing attacks in 
order to safeguard critical infrastructures such as financial institutions. This is especially 
paramount as email is a critical communication medium for most organizations. 
Furthermore, with the widespread use of new technologies such as smart phones for 
emails and various Internet-based activities as well as social networks, phishing emails 
are more active than ever before and putting the average Internet users and 
organizations at risk of significant data, brand and financial losses. This thesis addresses 
phishing attacks problem with emphases on email-born phishing attack detection and 
prevention. Firstly, a hybrid feature selection approach for use in the detection of email-
viii 
 
born phishing attack is developed. The proposed method is based on the combination of 
content-based and behaviour-based approaches. The hybrid feature selection approach 
includes various attribute are extracted from structural and behavioural components of 
the emails. Secondly, a new email-born phishing detection approach that is based on 
profiling and clustering techniques is developed. The phishing profiling algorithm takes 
into account various features present in the phishing emails as feature vectors and 
generate profiles based on clustering predictions. Following, we apply clustering 
techniques based on modified Two-Step clustering algorithm to generate the optimal 
number of clusters. Thirdly, a phishing trackback framework in order to find the origin 
of an attack either it is coming from the single or the collaborative attack is developed. 
First, the proposed phishing trackback framework grouped the phisher by using a 
clustering algorithm in email analyser phase. Then, similarity measurement is used in 
forensic backend to group the phisher into single or collaborative attack. Generally, the 
phisher may work alone or in groups. Typically, single attacker is hard to detect because 
they always changing their modus operandi. The proposed trackback framework is a 
simple solution to trace phisher and easy to implement where it allows automated 
detection of phishing email. Finally, we carried out extensive experimental analysis of 
the proposed approaches in order to evaluate their effectiveness in detection of email-
born phishing attacks on large datasets. Next, the sensitivity of the proposed approaches 
to various factors such as the type of features, number of split and misclassification 
issues are studied. The results of the experiments show that the proposed approaches are 
highly effective in the detection of email-born phishing attacks as well as in the 
identification of a group and origin of phisher. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction  
In recent years, much concern has been paid in securing the network infrastructure 
subject to various kinds of network-based attack. Phishing is among the active attack 
launch that can cause financial lost. Phishing is a combination of social engineering and 
web spoofing technique to lure users into revealing confidential information [1][2]. 
Phisher used various method involving the web, email and malicious software to steal 
personal information and account credentials. Hence, the phishing email detection has 
drawn a lot consideration for many researchers and the installation of malicious 
detection devices in email servers as a safety measure. However, phishing has become 
more and more complicated and attack can detour the filter set by anti-phishing 
techniques. It is strategic importance for information security to trace back the origin of 
internet attack. A number of trace back methods have been proposed where most of 
them deal with Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. 
However, it is particularly challenging due to the evading techniques that attacker used. 
In this chapter, we discussed the research motivation and scope, significance, problems, 
objectives, methodology, contributions and the organization of the thesis.  
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1.1 Motivations and Scope 
Phishing scams have flourished in recent years due to favourable economic and 
technological conditions. The technical resources needed to execute phishing attacks 
can be readily acquired through public and private sources. Some technical resources 
have been streamlined and automated, allowing use by non-technical criminals. This 
makes phishing both economically and technically viable for a larger population of less 
sophisticated criminals. A report by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) found 
that the number of unique phishing emails reported by consumers rose 20% in the first 
half of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 [3]. There was also an increase by 
73% in the number of unique phishing websites detected, in the first half of 2012 as 
compared to 2011. As phishing attacks are serious threats to security and economy 
worldwide [4], there is a strong need for automated phishing attack detection 
algorithms. Based on Gartner survey, approximately 109 million U.S adults have 
received phishing e-mail attacks with an average loss per victim estimated to be $1,244 
[5]. These illustrate the essential of new phishing detection approach in this research as 
phishing is a highly profitable activity for criminals.  
Over the year, there has been an increase in the technology, diversity, and 
sophistication of phishing attacks in response to increased user awareness and 
countermeasures, in order to maintain profitability. The ability to detect phishing email 
may help other individual particularly email users and organization in identifying 
normal email. The efficiency in profiling the attacker may significantly contribute into 
an accurate decision between normal or malicious email. 
The scope of the research will be focusing on solving phishing problem 
including detection and profiling attackers. We also focus on the trace back mechanism 
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in order to track the attacker. Our aim is to provide a solution with accuracy and 
efficiency to detect phishing attacks.  
 
1.2 Research Significance 
Phishing email detection has drawn a lot consideration for many researchers. 
Yet, phishing has become more complicated and attacker can detour the filter set anti-
phishing techniques. A number of phisher implement new techniques such as by 
embedding hyperlinks from the original website, encoding or obfuscating website URL 
or redirecting victims to phishing website using malware to install the malicious 
software. 
Existing classifications of phishing are based on simple features of phishing 
attacks such as URLs. Many of the currently available tools for combating phishing are 
based on simple rules, such as a blacklist consisting of reported phishing URLs. These 
tools are not effective for profiling, even though they may be effective at blocking. 
Thus, it is an urgent demand to identify phishing behaviour in a computer network to 
detect phishing email.  
The next problem that we are going to tackle is how to profile phishing email. 
Knowing our enemy is a critical component of computer security. Therefore, identifying 
and understanding the attacker and the motivations behind phishing activities are just as 
crucial as the technical skills, techniques, and tools used to uncover them. Phishers 
normally have their own signatures or techniques. Thus, a phisher’s profile can be 
expected to show a collection of different activities. We aim to develop an attacker 
profile by looking at the specific signature of the attacker. 
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We also focused on assessing anomalous behaviour in computer systems that 
would benefit user agencies and allow them and their clients to maintain secure 
computer network operation even under attack. Again, this is to ensure the user receives 
genuine emails from reputable sources. Therefore, a trace back mechanism will aid in 
determining the source of attacks and enable appropriate action, including possible legal 
action.  
 
1.3 Research Problems 
This thesis deals with phishing email problems which aim to detect the phishing 
email based on its behaviour. This research also looks at how to profile attackers based 
on their special traits and identify them by tracking the source of the attack. In particular 
we address the following three research issues in this thesis: 
1. How to detect phishing email in an efficient manner: Detection is a vital aspect 
to fight against phishing. Numbers of anti-phishing solutions have been 
proposed in order to solve the phishing problem at various levels. However, the 
number of attacks increased each month showing that the phisher has become 
more and more complicated, and they can detour the filter set by anti-phishing 
techniques. Therefore, a new approach for phishing detection is compulsory 
where hybrid feature selection by combining the content based approach and 
behavioural approach which cannot be disguised as legitimate behaviour by an 
attacker is proposed. 
2. How to profile attacker an inaccurate way: Knowing our enemy is a critical 
component of computer security. Therefore, identifying and understanding the 
attacker and the motivations behind these activities are just as crucial as the 
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technical skills, techniques, and tools used to uncover them. Here, the attacker’s 
profiling for phishing email is presented. There is still an open problem what is 
the best method that can be used to do the phisher profiling due to lack of 
research in this area. Our goal is to propose phishing email profiling and filtering 
algorithm that could improve accuracy the accuracy of phishing detection. 
3. Trackback mechanism: The phishing trackback mechanism is one of the hardest 
parts in Information security. Several novel trackback techniques have been 
proposed to trace the approximate spoofed source of the attack. Each technique 
has some unique advantages and disadvantages over the others. Most of the 
trackback effort focusing on the implementation of phoney token to detect the 
phisher. However, this method unable to capture the attacker unless the phisher 
interacts with the honeypot. So, utilising the phishing email features and 
suggests forensic techniques are vital in an attempt to trace the phisher. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
To achieve the research aim, four main research objectives are identified and 
need to be fulfilled: 
1. To develop the taxonomy of phishing detection that contributes understanding 
towards current approaches, issues and challenges related to the topic. 
2. To develop approaches to detect phishing email based on the hybrid feature 
selection approach. 
3. To propose a phishing email profiling and filtering algorithm that could improve 
accuracy of phishing detection. 
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4. To proposed trace back mechanism to trace the attacker back to their origin in 
order to analyse the strategies. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The proposed work will be carried out based on the experimental computer 
science method. This method examines the research work to demonstrate two vital 
concepts: proof-of-concept and proof-of-performance.  
To demonstrate the proof-of-concept, some significant steps were performed. 
First, the research area within phishing detection is critically reviewed to provide the 
overview that leads to the formulation of valid problem statements. From this review, 
the research work in is justified. Then, the proposed approach of phishing detection is 
designed and analytically analysed. 
Proof-of-performance is demonstrated by conducting the implementation for the 
phishing detection algorithm using simulations. In those simulations, various parameters 
and workloads were used to examine and demonstrate the viability of the proposed 
solutions compared to the similar baseline solutions. Also, analytical analysis of some 
proposed algorithms is performed to evaluate the correctness. 
 
1.6 Research Contributions 
We detail the thesis contributions as the following: 
1. Phishing email taxonomy. This thesis presents a taxonomy of Phishing email. It 
investigates related concepts, describes the design themes and identifies 
implementation components required. The presented taxonomy is mapped to the 
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current phishing detection system to demonstrate its accuracy. Also, the mapping 
assists to perform a gap analysis in this research field. 
2. Phishing detection.  The thesis introduces an approach to detect phishing email. 
The phishing email is detected based on its behaviour by looking at the attacker 
sending email pattern. The approach is compared with the other baseline method 
and proves that its performance is superior to others.  
3. Profiling attacker. The thesis presented an efficient profiling algorithm to profile 
the attackers. The proposed algorithm used various types of features to the 
cluster type of attacker.  
4. Trackback mechanism. The thesis presents a mechanism to trackback the 
attacker back to their origin. The trackback mechanism is extremely important to 
trace the attacker involved in phishing email and analyse strategies deployed by 
the attacker. 
To summarize, the work presented in this thesis is in line with the current trends 
that detect phishing email without having to build a dedicated. Therefore, it is our thesis 
to present phishing detection solutions that are scalable and efficient. 
 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
The chapters of this thesis are derived from various papers published during the 
PhD candidature. The remainder of the thesis is organized as the following: 
1. Chapter 2: Phishing Email Taxonomy. This chapter provides an in-depth 
analysis and overview of existing phishing email detection approaches, 
presented within a comprehensive taxonomy.  
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2. Chapter 3: Phishing Detection Framework. This chapter offer overview   
framework for detecting and trackbacking phisher based on profiling and 
clustering technique. The framework consists of three phases: phishing 
detection, phishing profiling and phishing trackback. 
3. Chapter 4: Phishing Detection. This chapter presents an approach to detect 
phishing email. This chapter is derived from the following publications:  
1. I.R A Hamid and J. Abawajy. (2011). Hybrid Feature Selection for Phishing 
Email Detection. The 11th International Conference on Algorithms and 
Architectures for Parallel Processing (ICA3PP-11). Melbourne, Australia. 
24-26 October 2011. 
2. I.R A Hamid and J. Abawajy. (2011). Phishing Email Feature Selection 
Approach. The 10th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and 
Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-11), 
Changsha, China, 16-18 November, 2011. 
3. I.R A Hamid, J. Abawajy and T.H Kim. (2013). Using Feature Selection and 
Classification Scheme for Automating Phishing Email Detection. Studies in 
Informatics and Control 22 (1), pg 61-70. 
4. Chapter 5: Profiling Attacker. This chapter presents an algorithm to profile 
attacker in phishing email based on various types of features. This chapter is 
derived from the following publication: 
1. I.R A Hamid and J. Abawajy. (2013). Profiling Phishing Email Based on 
Clustering Approach. The 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, 
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-
12), Melbourne, Australia, 16 July, 2013. 
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2. I.R A Hamid and J. Abawajy. (2014). An Approach for Profiling Phishing 
Email Attacks, Computers & Security, 45 (2014), pg 27- 41. 
5. Chapter 6: Trackback Mechanism. This chapter presents an approach to 
trackback attacker and group them into a single or collaborative attack. 
6. Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Directions. The concluding chapter provides 
a summary of contributions and a future research challenges.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, a comprehensive literature review of phishing attacks will be discussed. 
There are various techniques used to detect phishing messages. The chapter includes in-
depth analysis on existing approaches, listing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. A taxonomy that classifies phishing detection into a well-defined category is 
presented. The taxonomy can be used by researchers to understand the current 
undertaking of phishing detection, the challenges and expectation in the future. 
 
2.1 Introduction to Phishing 
Cybercrime is a growing problem nationally and internationally, as organised 
crime gangs and continue to consolidate their highly profitable operations in identity 
theft and fraud. In today’s information driven world, cyber criminals are more active 
than ever before and putting the average computer user and organizations at risk of 
significant data, brand and financial loss. Recently, one method that is commonly 
employed is phishing.  
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 Phishing is an illegal deceptive attack in which victims are sent emails that 
deceit them into providing account numbers, passwords, or other personal information 
to an attacker. Phisher attracts user into revealing confidential information by using fake 
emails that usually appear as a reliable entity coming from popular social websites, 
auction sites, online payment processors or IT administrators such as eBay, PayPal, 
Suntrust and others. Generally, the email content wants the victim to update their 
personal information to avoid losing access rights to services provided by the 
organization. Unfortunately, they lure users to a bogus web site implemented by the 
attacker.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of phishing website and phishing email from 2010 to 2014 
 
 As the Internet playing significant role in business and commerce activities, 
phisher gain motivation to launch attacks in high return online scams. The graph in 
Figure 2.1 shows the number of phishing attacks which are collected worldwide 
between first half of the year 2010 and first half of the year 2014, analysed from the 
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APWG’s (Anti-Phishing Working Group) phishing trend report [6]. The APWG is an 
industry association focused on eliminating the identity theft and fraud that result from 
the growing problem of phishing and email spoofing. The phishing attacks are shown in 
two ways, email and website phishing. Throughout four years, the number of phishing 
attacks through email decrease gradually from about 170000 reports to about 120000 
reports in the first half of the year 2013. The number of phishing email increased 
drastically from about 12000 to 34000 attacks.  
 Phishing website increased dramatically between the first half of the year 2010 
and first half of the year 2012 before a slight decrease in the second half of the year 
2012. Next, the number of phishing website increased considerably in the first half of 
the year 2013. In conclusion, even though there is a slight decrease about 47000 
phishing website report later in 2012, the phisher become more complicated and they 
manage to detour the filter set. Thus, the number of email phishing report raises 
radically to its highest peak in the first half of the year 2014 for about 340000 reports. 
 The rapid increase in the number of email users and the low cost of distributing 
emails via the Internet and other electronic communications networks has made 
marketing and communications with existing customers via email an attractive 
advertising medium. Therefore, email is frequently used as the medium for unsolicited 
communication known as phishing. This contributes a big negative impact on consumer 
confidence about e-commerce because it is a very lucrative business for the phisher. It 
costs Internet users billions of dollars a year. Survey by Consumer Reports National 
Research CenterNet shows that phishing attacks are almost as dominant today. The 
number of U.S. phishing attacks has increased significantly since last year, costing 
consumers billions in damages, according to the Anti-Phishing Working Group. Table 
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2.1 shows the U.S national incidence and total damage caused by Internet threat for 
years 2010 [7]. 
 
Table 2.1: Internet threat [7] 
Internet 
threats 
Scenario Total 
damage 
Attack 
frequency 
National incidence 
Spam 12 million households 
received suspicious e-mail. 
N/A Down 
from last 
year. 
1:3 users had heavy of 
spam. 
Virus 1.8 million households 
replaced infected personal 
computer. 
$2.7 
billion 
Up from 
last year. 
1:5 users had a serious 
virus attack. 
Spyware 617,000 replaced slow or 
impaired personal computer. 
$1.2 
billion 
No 
change. 
1:11 users had a serious 
spyware problem. 
Phishing 28.897 attack in December 
2009. 
$650 
million 
No 
change. 
1:167 user lost money 
 
According to a Gartner survey, more than 5 million U.S. consumers lost money 
due to phishing attacks in 2008. It was a 39.8 percent increase over the number of 
victims in 2007. Approximately, 3985 U.S online adults have been victimized by 
phishing attack. The average consumer loss per victim has grown from $220 to $351 per 
victim in 2008, a 60 percent decrease from the year before [5]. 
Based on National Consumer Reports survey, in spite of a rash of high-profile 
data breaches and cyber threats, an alarming 62 percent of U.S. online consumers have 
done nothing to protect their privacy on the Internet. Therefore, it is not surprising if the 
number of victims is still on the rise. In 2013, approximately one in seven online 
consumers was alerted that their personal data had been breached. It was a 56 percent 
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increase from 2012. Moreover, 11.2 million people were projected to fall for e-mail 
phishing scam which is a 22 percent increase from the year 2013. 
 
2.1.1 Phisher 
Phishing is a term used to define various scams that use fraudulent email 
messages or spoofed website, send by phisher to lure victims into revealing personal 
information. Phisher on the other hand, is a criminal (person) who used this information 
to take credential information, steal money from the victim’s bank account or hijack 
victim’s computer. They gather any personal data from their targeted victim to advance 
their criminal activities.  
Phishers have used a number of phishing procedures to gain personal 
information from users. A phishing message may point out that the user had problems 
with their computers or data and they need to verify their account information in order 
to ensure they could continue using the services. Others phishing message might 
suggest situation that a suspicious purchase was made using the user’s credit card. They 
have to make further action by contacting them using the link given in the email if they 
want to cancel the transaction. There is also phishing message by using email claiming 
that the user has won the lottery. Then, they should click on to the secure web link 
provided, enter bank account information and the winning money will be deposited into 
their account. Another phisher’s modus operandi is sending an email claiming to be 
from the tax company requesting the victim to refund tax money due to an accounting 
error. They query for the victim banking information to process the reimbursement. 
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2.1.2 Phishing Attack 
As technology becomes more advanced, the phishing techniques being used are 
also more inventive. Internet users should have knowledge of various types of phishing 
techniques and be aware of anti-phishing techniques to protect themselves from getting 
phished. Phishing attacks take advantage of software and security weaknesses on both 
the client and server sides.  
Phishing attacks can be divided into two groups: flash attacks and non-flash 
attacks. Flash attacks are characterized by a large volume of similar phishing messages 
sent within a short period of time. Non-flash attack messages are spread over a 
relatively long time span, but maintain their identifiable similarity. The interaction 
between phishing message and receiver could happen by following malicious link, 
filling deceptive forms or replying with useful information which are relevant for the 
message to succeed. All phishing attacks fit into the same general information flow. The 
phishing process involves five phases: planning, setup, attack, collection and identity 
theft or fraud. 
 
2.1.2.1 Planning 
Firstly, phishers will determine the targeted company or user to be their victim. 
Then, they will decide how to get personal information such as password, account 
number or e-mail addresses from their victim. Generally, mass-mailing and address 
collection techniques are commonly used for personal information from the victim. 
These two techniques are best known as spammers. 
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2.1.2.2 Setup 
After phishers have decided which company to spoof and who their victims are, 
they will prepare for the attack. In the setup phase, the phisher will create techniques for 
sending the phishing message and collecting the valuable data. Normally, this involves 
e-mail addresses and a developing a web page. 
 
2.1.2.3  Attack 
In attack phase, a malicious payload arrives through three common propagation 
vectors either by spam email, phony message or establishing a rogue website. Normally, 
the phishing messages appear to be coming from a trustworthy source. Then, the victim 
may take action that makes them vulnerable to an information compromise. The user is 
prompted for confidential information, either by a remote web site or locally by a Web 
Trojan. 
  
2.1.2.4  Collection  
The confidential information is then transmitted from a phishing server to the 
phisher when it is compromised. Phishers will record every information that is entered 
by the victims into Web pages or popup windows. 
 
2.1.2.5  Identity Theft and Fraud 
Finally, the phishers gathered the confidential information from the victim. This 
information is used to impersonate the victim and making illegal purchases or otherwise 
commit fraud. Next, the success and failures of the completed scam are evaluated.  This 
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step is important for the phisher if they wish to organize another attack. Then, they have 
to start the phishing process again. 
 
2.2 Email System Components 
A typical email system components consist of three components: Mail Transport 
Agent (MTA), Mail Delivery Agent (MDA) and Mail User Agent (MUA) as shown in 
Figure 2.2. MTA handles message transportation and acts as a sorting area and mail 
carrier. On the other hand, MDA acts as an incoming mail server and MUA is 
represented as a software program that user used to retrieve email.  
 
internet
`
`
MTA
MTA
MUA
MUA
MDA
To :alex@yahoo.com
From :donie@hotmail.com
Subject :Hi
….
...
To : alex@yahoo.com
From: donie@hotmail.com
Subject:Hi
….
….
Messageid:123.345.fde.dfr@hotmail.com
Donie
Alex
 
Figure 2.2: Email system component 
 
Every email sends from sender to receiver will go through the MTA. MTA will 
act as the post office where all emails are received, sorted and carried out to the 
receiver. These emails will be stamped with an email header information, including 
message-ID tag. When an email is sent, the message is routed from sender’s server to 
the recipient's email server through the MTA. MTA handles the message transportation 
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and acts as sorting area and mail carrier. The communication between MTAs are using 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) which are logically known as SMTP servers. 
This server handles all outgoing mail servers from the sender to the recipient. The 
recipient's MTA then delivers the email to the MDA that acts as an incoming mail 
server.  
MDA is a computer software that in charge of message delivery to the 
recipient’s mailbox until the user accepts it. Within the email system component, local 
message delivery is accomplished through the message handling process from MTA and 
storing email into the recipient’s mailbox. A user’s email is managed by MUA which is 
an email client such as Mozilla Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook and Eudora Mail. The 
email client is only active when a user runs it. Users of the email system need to log-in 
and run a mail client on the computer that hosts their mailboxes to retrieve the email 
message.  
 
2.3 Structure of Email 
Commonly, an email has two basic parts: i) email header and ii) message body. 
The header contains information about the sender’s address, the recipient address and 
message route. Most email programs allow full headers to be displayed, but many 
header fields are not shown by default. After the email header is the body of the 
message which contains whatever the sender wish to send to the recipient. 
A header is a set of lines containing information about the message's setting, 
such as the sender's address, the recipient's address, or timestamps showing when the 
message was sent by intermediate servers to the transport agents (MTAs) as depicted in 
Table 2.2. The header begins with a from line and changed each time it passes through 
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an intermediate server. The header also shows the exact path taken by the email and the 
time taken for each server to process. However, this part of the email header is not 
visible to most users, but it is a useful indicator in determining phishing email. The 
message-ID tags found in email headers is a globally unique identification and can be 
used for mining the email sender behaviour.  
 
Table 2.2: Email’s header field 
Header tag Description 
From The sender’s email address. This can be easily forged and can be 
the least reliable. 
To The recipient’s email address, but may not contain the recipient’s 
address 
Date Show the date when the email was sent by the sender.  
Received Contains information about the intermediate servers and the date 
when the message was processed. The received tag is the most 
reliable part to detect forged email. The last “Received” line show 
where the mail originated. 
Reply-To The email address for return mail. 
Subject The message's subject that sender place as a topic of email content. 
Message-ID A unique identification of the message. This could be forged, but 
need skill to intrigue recipient. 
 
The body of an email message contains a simple and short piece of the plain text 
message which is sent from a sender to a recipient. Some of the message body, include 
signatures or automatically generated text that is inserted by the sender’s mailing 
system. An attachment and any separated files could be part of the email message. In 
this thesis, we consider to mine different features from the email header and email 
messages to detect phishing email. 
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2.4 History of Phishing Detection Approach 
Early work in this area focused on recognizing different type of email fraud such 
as phishing, Nigerian scam and lottery scam based on linguistic structure, terminology, 
knowledge and system engineering [8]. There have been many approaches to detect and 
prevent phishing attacks like using multi-tier classifier [9], anti-phishing toolbars [10] 
and scam website blockers [11]. Further, machine learning approaches based on features 
such as hyperlink, number of words, subject of emails and others have been proposed in 
the literature [12][13][14]. This increase in difficulty and depth allowed attackers to 
always change their modus operandi in order to evade from being detected.  
In early 2003, classic phishing attack focused on text-based email [15]. Then, 
the attacker improvises it by embedding websites, complete with the returned address 
and logo of targeted company to make the email looks real. In Mid-2004, the attacker 
employs the use of HTML coding to modify the presence of the victim’s address bar by 
replacing the URL of the phishing site with the company being impersonated 
[16][17][18] . This is a major breakthrough in phishing attack. 
Later, phishers started to insert the message into attached image known as image 
phishing to bypass usual text-based filtering techniques. Invisible hyperlink or 
malicious content is often inserted into the attached image to evade from being detected 
by the anti-phishing tools. Due to this, some work investigates the layout of phishing 
sites in order to detect the malicious contents [19]–[22]. 
To date, phisher started to launch sophisticated attack using malicious content or 
malware where this tool managed to steal victim’s personal information such as email 
address, password or completely take over the victim’s computer. The examples of 
malware are keystroke, logger, spyware, ransomware, shareware, adware, Trojan horses 
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or worms. Some of these malware can be downloaded into the computer by clicking the 
attachment or hyperlink given in phishing message. Despite these issues, a large amount 
of work in phishing detection has led to many perceptions. More recent work by 
[23][24][25][26][27][28] in phishing detection has focused on many approaches, which 
is discussed in the next section 
 
2.5 Phishing Detection Taxonomy 
In the literature there are taxonomies on phishing detection that discussed 
specifically for mobile devices [29]. Our taxonomy definitely focused on phishing 
detection, which is very important topic in phishing because it determines the system i) 
reliability and ii) efficiency. The reliability of the system depends on the detection 
process accuracy and the efficiency of the system depends on how the detection process 
is carried out. Our phishing detection taxonomy is divided into two categories which is 
feature selection and detection approaches as depicted in Figure 2.3.  
 
Phishing Detection
Feature Selection Approach
Phishing Detection Approach
 
Figure 2.3: Phishing detection taxonomy 
 
2.5.1 Feature Selection Approach 
Adequate selection of features may improve accuracy and efficiency of classifier 
methods. There are two main approaches for feature selection that are wrapper and filter 
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method. Wrapper methods is where the features are selected using the classifier, and 
filter methods select features is independent of the classifier used. Although the wrapper 
approach may obtain better performances, it requires greater computational resources. 
For this reason, currently a new hybrid approach, that combines both filter and wrapper 
methods has emerged. However, in this thesis, we work on a filter method which focus 
on detection phishing email based on heuristic based features. 
 
Phishing Email
Features
Heuristic-based feature
Blacklist-based features
 
Figure 2.4: Feature selection approach 
 
2.5.1.1 Heuristic-based Features 
Anti-phishing tools use heuristic approaches that employ features such as the 
host name, checking the URL for common spoofing techniques, and checking against 
previously seen images or for detecting phishing sites. The work of Khonji summarizes 
the literature’s phishing detection features into five subsets based on characteristics of 
emails: email body features, email headers features, URL features, Javascript features 
and external features extracted from SpamAssasin datasets [30]. A quite similar feature 
list is used by Bergholz et al. where they review five basic features: Structural features, 
Link features, Element features, Spam filter features and Word list features [31]. Toolan 
et al. [26] grouped the features into five: body-based features, URL-based features, 
subject-based features, script-based features and sender-based features. They divided 
the header features into subject-based features and sender-based features and discard 
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external features, SpamAssassin features [27]. Following, features are categorized into 
more general group: content features, orthographic features and derived features [2].  
These representations of email messaging were established to classify sets of 
features that would be dependable in determining phishing email attack. All features 
play important roles in order to detect phishing email. Not all collections of feature 
vectors were used in the testing contributes the most or the least, which leaves 
opportunity a better combination, may be achievable. Moreover, the increasing number 
of phishing attacks shows that there is still essential to find features that could increase 
the phishing detection rate.  Based on listed features [2], [30], [31], [27], the phishing 
email feature can be determined into heuristic-based features: Content-based feature, 
Header-based feature, URL-based feature, Spam filter feature and Derived Features as 
shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Heuristic-based features
Content-based feature
Header-based feature
Link-based feature
Spam filter feature
Derived feature
Figure 2.5: Heuristic-based features characteristics 
 
a) Content-based Feature  
Content-based features are extracted from the body parts of email messages. 
These features include data type in binary or continuous data which are listed in Table 
2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Email body features 
Features Data Type 
The existence of the words “dear” or “suspension” Binary 
The existence of phrase “verify your account”  Binary 
Email content-type such as HTML or multipart Binary 
Contain form Binary 
Total number of characters Continuous 
Total number of function word. Example: account, log, access, minutes, bank, 
password, credit, recently, click, risk, identity, social, inconvenience, security, 
information, service, limited, suspended, urgent [14] 
Continuous 
Existence of unique words Binary 
Richness of body’s content Continuous 
 
b) Header-based Feature 
The header-based features listed in Table 2.4 are extracted from email header 
field. The email header contains information about the sender’s address, the recipient 
address and message route. It shows the exact path taken by the email and the time 
taken for each server to process.  
 
Table 2.4: Header-based feature 
Feature Data Type 
Weather sender and reply-to address are different Binary 
Existence of function word in the subject field (e.g. bank, debit, verify, FW, RE) Binary 
Total number of character in subject field Numerical 
Total number of words in subject field Numerical 
Weather domain sender in not the same as modal domain. Binary 
The richness of email subject Continuous 
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c) Link-based Feature 
Link-based features are extracted from the URLs and anchors in the phishing 
email. The link based features are shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Link-based features 
Features Data Type 
The URL contains an IP address Binary 
The URL contains suspicious symbol such as “@”, ”-”, “%”, “&” Binary 
The URL contains dots more than 5 Binary 
Age of the domain using WHOIS search  Continuous 
Nonmatching URL Binary 
Number of links Continuous 
Existence of keywords such as “click”, “here”, “apply” link to unmodal domain. Binary 
Contain javascript Binary 
Script attempt to open a pop-up window  Binary 
Script attempt to change the status Binary 
The script contains an onClick javascript event Binary 
Weather an attempt is made to load an external Javascript from an unmodal 
domain 
Binary 
The URL contains port numbers Binary 
Total number of periods in URL Continuous  
Total number of “@” sign in URL Continuous 
Total number of internal/external link Continuous 
Total number of linked images in URL Continuous 
Total number of domain names in URL Continuous 
URL redirects to a different page Binary 
 
d) Spam Filter Feature 
The spam filter features are carried out from SpamAssassin where it was run 
against email with disabled network [110]. Heuristic part of SpamAssassin is used as 
the network and the blacklist was deactivated. Test scores are accumulated where if 
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exceeded certain threshold, the email message is considered as spam. Two features that 
could be considered from SpamAssassin is listed in Table 2.6 
 
Table 2.6: Spam assassin features 
Features Data Type 
SpamAssassin class prediction either ham or spam Binary 
SpamAssassin score Continuous 
 
e) Derived Features 
Derived features were developed from other available features. Example of 
derived features is shown in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7: Derived features 
Feature Data Type 
Weather visible link is the same as hidden link Binary 
Weather sender email is the same as return-to email Binary 
 
2.5.1.2 Blacklist-based Features 
Another method which is commonly used is blacklist-based feature that lists all 
reported phishing URLs. This feature can be categorized into two types: i) URL 
blacklisting features, and ii) behavioural blacklisting features. URL blacklisting features 
focused on IP address of sender domain while behavioural blacklisting features focused 
on analysis of data moving from phishers to the victim. Behaviour based features keeps 
track of the sensitive information the attacker poses and what the user enters into the 
web forms.  
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a) URL Blacklisting Features 
URL blacklisting features are determined without looking at the email content. 
The advantage of URL blacklisting is this feature is lightweight where we do not have 
to analyse the large size of an email’s content. Moreover, this feature can identify 
phishing email based on IP address if the phisher used fixed IP address. However, most 
phishing email today is sent through fake web hosting or email servers that allow the 
phisher remain undetected. Features characteristic that are considered as IP blacklisting 
are listed in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8: URL blacklisting features 
Feature Data Type 
Sender IP address belongs to mail exchange server Binary  
Destination IP address does not match with the domain it is from Binary  
Existence of sender domain name for detection abnormal activities Binary 
Weather name added to the front of original email address Binary 
Number of domain names used by a single sender by looking at the sender IP 
address.  
Binary 
Weather amount of destination IP is equal to the domain name Binary 
 
b) Behavioural Blacklisting Features 
Behavioural blacklisting features classify email senders based on their sending 
pattern. The phisher will be having difficulty to avoid from being detected merely by 
changing their IP address because the behaviour blacklisting is based on their attacking 
scheme. However, the behavioural blacklisting must have been given previous 
information about the activity of an IP address because a conventional blacklist will not 
be able to block spam from that address. The examples of behavioural blacklisting 
features as depicted in Table 2.9 [28]. 
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Table 2.9: Behavioural blacklisting 
Feature Data type 
Total number of spam does a particular IP address send in a day Numerical 
How does set of IP address changes over time? 
x Number of IP addresses that never seen before sending spam at a particular 
day. 
 
Numerical 
Amount of distribution of spam across target domains for a particular IP address Numerical 
How the distributions of spam across target domains change over time? 
x Total number of “low and slow” volume of IP address to particular domain. 
x Total number of “loud” volume of IP address to particular domain 
 
Numerical 
Numerical 
 
2.5.2 Phishing Detection Approach 
Protecting Internet users from phishing attacks is a significant research issue 
[32]. The nature of Internet offers an easy method for phisher to cover their tracks and 
changed their modus operandi which could lure Internet user to give their credential 
information. The types of phishing attacks have been applied violently include phishing 
through emails [27][2], online transaction [33], banking websites [34], short messaging 
[29], [35] and mobile environment [36]. Among all these, phishing emails are on the 
rise as attackers could send phishing message from a very simple to sophisticated 
phishing messages.  
 
Phishing Detection
Approach Client based technique
Server based technique
 
Figure 2.6: Phishing detection approach 
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Phishing detection can be classified into two natures namely server-based 
technique and client-based technique as depicted in Figure 2.6. Server-based techniques 
typically are implemented by service providers such as the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP), e-commerce stores or other financial institutions. On the other hand, client-based 
techniques are implemented at the users’ end point through browser plug-ins or emails 
analysis. These techniques can be divided into two categories which are emails level 
approaches, including authentication and content filtering and browser integrated tools, 
which usually use URL blacklists, or employ webpage content analysis. Table 2.10 
shows the description advantages of both phishing detection approaches. 
 
Table 2.10: Server-based technique and client-based technique description 
Phishing Detection 
Approach 
Description Advantages 
Server-based 
technique 
Located on a computer server or 
firewall displayed as logos, icons, 
seals of the brand in the browser 
window to attract users’ attention. 
No software to install on the 
client machine, ease of 
management and ease of updates 
Client-based 
technique 
Implemented at the user’s end point 
through browser plug-ins or email 
clients 
Use filters and content analysis. 
If trained regularly, the filter 
could detect phishing message 
effectively 
 
2.5.2.1 Server-based Technique 
Server-based technique is located on a computer server or firewall. It has lots of 
benefits such as i) no software to install on the client machine, ii) ease of management 
and iii) ease of updates. Customers are aware of the threats and can take preventative 
action themselves without any cost. Moreover, customers will be able to trust their 
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relationship with the organisation because the organisation provides a low tech solution 
to a complex threat. Normally, it is displayed as logos, icons, seals of the brand in the 
browser window to attract users’ attention.  
By carrying out this work from the server-side, organisations can take large 
phases in helping to protect against phishing threat. It is essential that organisations 
continuously notify their customers and other application users of the dangers from 
phishing attacks and what preventative actions are available. In particular, information 
must be noticeable about how the organisation communicates securely with their 
customers. For instance, a posting similar to Figure 2.7 will help customers identify 
phishing emails sent in the organisation's name.  
 
Figure 2.7: Example of server-based posting 
 
Server-based techniques consist of several approaches that could be used to 
encounter phishing attack from the server side as portray in Figure 2.8.   
******************************************************************** 
(PP) Disclaimer: 
This message is intended only for the use of the person to whom it is expressly addressed 
and may contain information that is confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the 
intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, reliance on, reference to, review, 
disclosure or copying of the message and the information it contains for any purpose is 
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by reply 
emails of the misdelivery and delete all its contents. 
============================================================ 
Opinions, conclusions and other information in this message that do not relate to the official 
business of Malayan Banking Berhad shall be understood as neither given nor endorsed by 
it. 
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Server based
technique
Behaviour Detection
Brand Monitoring
Security Event Monitoring
Strong Authentication
Visual Similarity
 
Figure 2.8: Server-based techniques approaches 
 
Brand monitoring techniques sneaks on website to identify clones who mimicry 
the authentic brand. The suspected websites are then added to a centralized blacklist. 
Next is behaviour detection, which detects anomalies in the behaviour of users to 
identify user profile. Security event monitoring on the other hand, using registered 
events provided by several sources such as operating system, application and network 
device to identify anomalous activity. It is also acts as post mortem analysis follows an 
attack or a fraud. Further technique, which is strong authentication, is using more than 
one identification factor. There are three universally recognized factors for 
authenticating individuals: something you know, for example password, something you 
have, such as a security token and something you are for instance a fingerprint. The 
latest technique is visual similarity. This technique uses an image which is shown for 
every login process. 
Server-based technique does have several drawbacks which are its poor 
scalability and its timeliness. Normally, phishing sites have short average lifetime [31] 
because they are cheap and easy to build. Due to this, the server-based technique fails to 
monitor secure traffic protocol used by many financial websites. Moreover, this 
prevents the software from adding secure pages to the white list and examining the 
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contents of secure websites. Besides that, care must be taken to ensure that 
communication between the organization and customer are conducted consistently. A 
deprived decision can end the effort. Customers also could not be loaded with too much 
information and make them unpleasant of using the organization’s online transaction. 
 
2.5.2.2 Client-based Technique 
We categorized client-based technique into four categories: i) email analysis, ii) 
network-based, iii) similarity of layout and iv) hybrid approach. The email analysis 
approach uses origin based filtering and content based filtering to identify phishing 
email. On the other hand, network-based approach refers to collections of Internet 
Protocol (IP) blacklisting and behavioural blacklisting to classify phishing or normal 
messages. The blacklist is queried by the browser run-time whenever a page is loaded. 
If the currently visited URL is included in the blacklist, the user is advised of the 
danger, otherwise the page is considered legitimate. The behavioural blacklisting keeps 
track of the sensitive information that the user enters into web forms. It will raise an 
alert if something is considered unsafe. The next approach is the similarity of layout. 
Phishing and legitimate messages are compared based on its size, colour, visual or 
logos. The last approach is a hybrid approach where it is a combination of previous 
approach either email analysis, network-based or similarity of layout. 
 
Client-based
technique
Email Analysis Approach
Network based Approach
Similarity of layout Approach
Hybrid Approach
 
Figure 2.9: client-based techniques approaches 
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a) Emails Analysis Approach 
Commonly, the email analysis techniques are quite popular in anti-phishing 
solutions because it attempts to stop phishing emails from reaching target users by 
analysing email contents. The challenge in designing such techniques lies in how to 
construct efficient filter rules and simultaneously reduce the probability of false alarms. 
There are two categories of email analysis: i) Origin based filtering and ii) Content 
based filtering. Origin based filtering focuses on the source of the emails and verifies 
whether this source is on a white verification list or on a black verification list. 
Generally, origin based filtering focused on the email’s header. In contrast, content-
based filters focused on subject and body of the email.  
 
Email Analysis
Content based filtering
Origin based filtering
 
Figure 2.10: Email Analysis 
 
x Origin-based Filtering 
Origin-based filtering can be distributed into: i) white verification list, and ii) 
black verification list. White list verification is a list of contacts that are safe to receive 
email from. All non-exclusive emails will be sent to the junk mail folder by the spam 
filter. On the other hand, the black verification list is a list of contacts or Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) that are harmless. The browser based schemes embed whitelist 
and blacklist verification measure into web browsers for blocking access or warning the 
user about web pages identified as phish sites. The whitelist and blacklist concentrates 
on checking web addresses when it is rendered in a web browser. Each requested page 
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is checked against the list of blacklist known phishing websites or whitelist safe sites. 
These browsers regulate web pages’ visual behaviours to prevent cheating.  
E-mail based scheme employs the spam filter to set incoming mails into 
whitelist or blacklist emails. All mails from the listed email addresses, domains and 
Internet Protocol (IP) whitelist emails will be allowed. Some internet service 
providers have whitelists to filter email to be delivered to their customers. Only emails 
listed in the whitelist will get through or else, these emails will be deleted or sent to junk 
mail folder. Normally, the end user has to set the spam filter manually weather to delete 
all sources which are not on the whitelist, internet service provider or email services. 
The effectiveness of 10 popular anti-phishing tools based on various features 
including whitelisting and blacklisting data [37]. A total of 200 verified phishing URLs 
from two sources and 516 legitimate URLs are selected as the dataset. The 10 web-
based anti-phishing tools are: CallingID Toolbars [10], Cloudmark Anti-Fraud Toolbar 
[38], EarthLink Toolbar [39], eBay Toolbar [40], Firefox 2 [41], GeoTrust TrustWatch 
Toolbar [42], Microsoft Phishing Filter in Windows Internet Explorer 7 [43], Netcraft 
Anti-Phishing Toolbar [44], Netscape Browser 9.0 [45] and SpoofGuard [11]. Other 
anti-phishing tools include SiteAdvisor [46], AntiPhish [47], and PhishHook [48]. 
These are summarized in Table 2.11.  
Most of these toolbars rely only on black list information and might not 
correctly identify new phishing attacks. Compared with all tools, SpoofGuard was very 
effective in detecting phishing sites. The result shows that only SpoofGuard was able to 
constantly detect more than 90% of phishing URLs correctly [37]. However, it did have 
a high false positive rate because it does not rely on any black list or white list 
information. SpoofGuard determines valid page based on a series of domain and URL-
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based tests. It is a signature-and-rule based detection system which analyses the host 
name, URL, and the images used in the current web page to detect the phishing websites 
[11]. Of these remaining tools, Microsoft Phishing Filter in Windows Internet Explorer 
7 correctly identified over 60% of phishing URLs from both sources. The performance 
of these web based tools varied considerably depending on the source of the phishing 
URLs and the freshness of the phishing URLs tested. 
 
Table 2.11: Web-based anti-phishing detection approaches 
Tools Features Notification Limitation 
CallingID 
Toolbars  
Heuristic method: 
examining the origin 
site’s country, length 
of registration, 
popularity, user 
reports, and blacklist 
data. 
Visual indicators: green 
(known-good site), yellow (low 
risk site), and red (high risk 
site)  
Suitable for e-
commerce and e-
banking only 
Cloudmark 
Anti-Fraud 
Toolbar  
Based on user 
reporting the site as 
good or bad. 
Toolbars display coloured icon: 
green (legitimate site), red 
(fraud site) and yellow (unsure 
site) 
Have a limited 
number of user rating 
makes this toolbar 
not applicable to a 
million users per day. 
EarthLink 
Toolbar  
Used heuristic, user 
rating and manual 
verification. Then 
added to the blacklist 
Block pop-up as user surf. Phishing site which 
is not on user rating 
will not list in 
blacklist site. 
eBay 
Toolbar  
Heuristic and 
blacklist approach 
The icon displayed: green (a 
site operated by ebay or 
PayPal), red (phishing site) and 
grey (site not operated by ebay, 
PayPal and not a phishing site). 
Applicable only to 
Ebay and PayPal 
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Table 2.11: continued 
Tools Features Notification Limitation 
Firefox 2  Based heuristic and 
blacklist URL that is 
updated periodically  
Display popup with a 
choice of leaving the sites 
or ignoring the warning. 
Have software 
maintenance issues such 
as difficult to update and 
install in multi-user 
without write access. 
Geo trust 
Trustwatch 
Toolbar  
Work with third-
party's reputation 
service and certificate 
authorities to verify 
the site. They will 
update frequently and 
alert the user the 
potential phishing 
sites.  
Label sites: green (trusted 
site), yellow (unsure site), 
red (untrusted site), white 
(the site was approved 
previously and in the white 
list) and black (site is 
blocked and placed in user 
personal black list). 
Unsure site (yellow) is 
not listed in the blacklist 
database of disreputable 
sites. The user will be 
vulnerable to a phishing 
attack. 
Microsoft 
Phishing 
Filter - 
Windows 
Internet 
Explorer 7  
Based on blacklist 
hosted by Microsoft 
Yellow (warning to user 
site contain similar like a 
phishing site) and red 
(block site from the user 
because it confirms 
phishing site)  
Legitimate websites are 
always missed since the 
client never checks with 
the server. Only 
unknown websites that 
are suspicious were 
checked. 
Net craft 
Anti-
Phishing 
Toolbar 
Blacklist Green (safe site) and red 
(fraudulent site) 
The techniques involved 
using database of sites 
and might not recognize 
phishing site successful. 
Netscape 
Browser 9.0  
Blacklist maintains by 
AOL and updated 
frequently 
Built-in warning page. The 
user is shown the original 
URL and asked whether 
they want to proceed or not. 
Sole depend on blacklist 
URL maintains by AOL. 
SpoofGuard  Did not use blacklist 
and whitelist but use 
series of heuristic. 
Traffic light indicator in 
browser toolbar: green (safe 
site), yellow (unsure site) 
and red (spoof site).  
Browser plug-in for 
Internet Explorer only 
where it looks for 
obfuscated URL. 
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Table 2.11: continued 
Tools Features Notification Limitation 
SiteAdvisor  
 
Heuristic method; 
based on tests 
conducted by McAfee 
looking for all kinds 
of threats 
Visual indicators: green 
(safe site), yellow (minor 
risk site), and red (serious 
risk site) and grey 
(unknown site).  
A phishing sites may not 
be caught if it is not rated 
in their database. 
 
AntiPhish  Keeps track of a 
user's sensitive 
information and 
prevents this 
information from 
being passed to a web 
site that is not trusted. 
Alert message.  This system requires 
cooperation from the user 
and occasionally raises 
false alarms. 
PhishHook  Heuristic method: 
Converting text, 
image and hyperlink 
to normal form. 
Warning and visual 
notification  
Slower process because 
have to convert 
everything to normal 
form  
 
Although whitelist and blacklist could assist in filtering unwanted emails, there 
are still drawbacks. Email whitelist and blacklist are used to reduce the false positive 
rate, which is based on user expectations where most valid mail will be from the small 
and fixed set of senders. Besides that, email filter has to be constantly updated to 
encounter sender attacking tactic. Moreover, URL whitelisting and blacklisting crucial 
to exact match with the whitelisted or blacklisted entries makes it easy for attackers to 
evade .The effectiveness of the black list approach is limited due to phishing website 
short lifetime. The average time for phishing sites to be online is three days, but most of 
them disappear in an hour [31]. Whilst black list approach concentrates on checking the 
new web pages with the blacklist or whitelist phishing sites, most of the phishing 
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website has already been offline. Due to this, blacklist approach is not the best solution 
to filter phishing website in real time environment. 
In terms of visual notification, many users may not give enough attention to the 
toolbar at the right times to notice an attack. As toolbar is a small display in the browser 
compared to the large main window that shows the web content. Although, a security 
toolbar shows security-related information, most of them neglect it while browsing 
because the content looked so good. User doubtful the toolbar’s alert if it fails once to 
identify phishing sites. The majority of them relied on the web content to decide 
whether the site is authentic or phishing because it is more convincing. Others 
disregarded or explain away the toolbars’ warnings because they did not know how to 
interpret the sign [50]. Additionally, web based toolbar reduced the amount of 
contextual information and failed to defend the user from the decision making process 
[51].  
 
x Content-based Filtering 
Content based filtering can be divided into three classes which are i) textual 
features, ii) linguistic features and iii) structural features. The textual features and 
linguistic features identify phishing emails based on the word composition and their 
grammatical construction. On the other hand, structural features focus on identifying the 
presence of obvious sign present in the email body, which implicate it to be spoofed.  
 
1) Textual and Linguistic Features 
Textual content filters classify emails using Bayesian classifiers, heuristic rules, 
or a combination of them. Conversely, non-textual content filters examine the links 
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embedded in emails by different techniques such as checking whether the links belong 
to white and black verification lists, analysing the appearance of the alphanumeric string 
of links or look for well-known phishing schemes. Moreover, there are efforts which 
used a combination of internal and external information relative to both textual content 
and links in emails to build an effective email filter. 
Previous researches [52][13] were focusing on textual features in order to 
classify emails as normal or phishing. Previous attempts by [14] presents an approach 
based on natural structural characteristics in emails. These features included number of 
words in the email, the vocabulary, the structure of the subject line, and the presence of 
18 blacklist keywords. They applied Simulated Annealing as an algorithm for feature 
selection. Then they used Information Gain (IG) to rank the feature based on its 
importance. At that time, they tested on 400 data which then divided into five sets with 
different type of feature selection.  Their result shows the best when more features used 
to classify phishing email using Support Vector Machine classifier. However, the 
significance of the results is difficult to assess because the email collection size was 
small.  
CANTINA [52] uses the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-
IDF) information retrieval algorithm to retrieve the key words of the current web page. 
Then, a Google search result is used to decide whether the current website is normal or 
phishing. This approach successfully reduces false positives and detects approximately 
95% of phishing sites. However, this approach, falsely detects legitimate sites that have 
form, using new domain and contain a URL with many dots as phishing sites. 
Moreover, this approach failed to detect phishing sites with domains that have been 
registered more than 12 months and logos which are not in the database. 
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Abu-Nimeh et al. [13] study the performance of different classifiers used in text 
mining such as Logistic Regression, Classification and Regression Trees, Bayesian 
Additive Regression Trees, Support Vector Machines, Random Forests and Neural 
Networks. The experiment used a public collection of about 2889 phishing and 
legitimate mails collected from private mailboxes. They extracted 43 variables from 
email subject and email body using TF-IDF approach similar to work by [52]. These 
features represent frequency of “bag-of-words” that appear in the dataset. Random 
Forest outperformed other classifier with the lowest error rate, 7.72%, but achieved 
worst false positive rate, 8.29%. The results have been just on error rate which does not 
really provide understanding concerning false positive. 
 
2) Structural Features 
Previous work on non-textual content filters have been done by [53][51][54]. 
Most of them examine the URL properties to identify phishing email. Work by [54] 
categorizes the URL-based features into four groups: Page Based, Domain Based, Type 
Based and Word Based features. They notice that the phishers tends to use URL with IP 
addresses, name of the organization being phished and misspelled versions of well-
known domain names. They discover that the login and sign in features are very famous 
in black list.  
On the other hand, [51] considered 10 features which mostly examine URL and 
presence of JavaScript to flag emails as phishing. Nine features were extracted from the 
email and the last features obtained from WHOIS query. They follow a similar approach 
as [53] but using larger datasets about 7000 normal emails and 860 phishing emails. A 
URL-based property is not the best approach because attacker could use tools to 
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obfuscate URL such as using TinyURL [55] to make it look valid. Their filter approach 
manages to score 97.6% F-measure, false positive rate of 0.13% and a false negative 
rate of 3.6%. 
Previously, the content-based approach examined the HTML code, sender, links 
and text contain in a web page or email to detect phishing pages. These filters are 
dynamic where verification lists are updated when new attacks are reported. They work 
on application layer, which lead to huge cost while applied on a large-scale net. 
Content-based filtering might be effective if phishing sites have a long lifetime and a 
large amount of duplication [56]. However, phishers became more advanced to 
overcome this challenge by compiling phishing pages with non-HTML components 
such as images, flash objects and Java applets. They come out with a false page which is 
composed entirely of images even though the original page contains text information. 
This makes the phishing pages become difficult to analyse by content based anti-
phishing tools.  
Other typical tools that have been developed non-textual based features are 
SpamAssassin [18], PILFER [51], Spamato [57] and Vipul’s Razor [58]. All these tools 
analyse the incoming emails by applying predefined rules and characteristics often 
found in phishing emails. SpamAssassin [18], for instance, has a number of rules that 
try to detect features common in spam email that go beyond the text of the email. Such 
test includes statistical analysis, network analysis and learning Bayes filter. First, any 
email and attachment are rated via regular expression to mask out spam content. Then, a 
checksum of the email and content is created and compared to Razor network [58]. 
Spamassasin also check sender address with black list and white list address in the 
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server. Lastly, word or group of words undergo a statistical analysis and are rated 
according to spam probability. 
Spamato [57] is another extensible filtering platform that ships with a number of 
advanced filters. Message characteristics and bad links are filtered using a combination 
of a local Bayesian filter with community filters. Further rules-based filters use black 
and whitelists look for spam filtering done by the ISPs. Vipul’s Razor [58] on the other 
hand is a collaborative algorithm using both URLs and message hashes to detect spam 
emails. Next, PILFER [51] is an approach that focused on learning to detect phishing 
(semantic attacks). PILFER can easily be used in combination with existing spam filters. 
The solution significantly reduces the amount of phishing emails with minimal cost in 
terms of false positives [51]. Features used in PILFER are IP Base URL, aged of link to 
the domain name, nonmatching URL, “Here” link to non-modal domain, HTML emails, 
number of links, number of dots, number of domains, email contain javascripts and 
Untrained SpamAssassin Output. They were able to accurately classify over 92% of 
phishing emails, while maintaining a false positive rate on the order of 0.1% using this 
tool. 
Yet, the updating rate of filters is often defeated by the changing rate of the 
attacks because phishing emails are continuously modifying senders and link strings. 
Moreover, many websites are only available one day [31]. Therefore, continuous 
updating implies a high economic cost. Furthermore, the phishing sites are nearly 
identical to normal sites which make it difficult to distinguish between the fake and the 
real sites. There is still a considerable amount of anomaly existing on the Internet after 
the deployment [59]. Therefore, this remains an open problem to be solved.  
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b) Network-based Approach 
Network-based filtering screen emails based on how it is sent, as well as what is 
sent. Network-based filtering approaches are divided into two: i) URL blacklisting 
approach and ii) behavioural blacklisting approach. URL blacklisting focused on IP 
address of sender domain while behavioural blacklisting approach primarily built on the 
analysis of data moving from phishers to the victim. The behaviour based features are 
keeping track of the sensitive information the attacker poses and what the user enters 
into web forms. It will raise an alert if something is considered unsafe. 
x URL Blacklisting Approach 
URL blacklisting approach examines features that can be determined without 
looking at email content [59]. Zhang et al. [59] detects abnormal mass mailing host in 
network-based approach by mining the traffic in session layer. They focused on 
fundamental mailing behaviours and the mail header of mass-mailing spam. They put 
forward a new approach to detecting abnormal host by mining mailing traffic data using 
the theory of decision trees.  
x Behavioural Blacklisting Approach 
Recent works in behaviour blacklisting approach have been proposed in session 
layer and application layer. Some works look at malicious URL [61][17][62][63], while 
others focused on sending and receiving mailing behaviour [28][64][27][14] to detect 
phishing contents. Work by [61], explain on how to detect malicious Web sites from the 
lexical and host-based features of their URLs without examining the actual content. 
Ying Pan et al. [60] invented a phishing website detection system which examines based 
on DOM [65] object anomalies detection. They looked on the discrepancy between a 
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web site’s identity and its structural features and HTTP transactions focusing on URL-
based features. 
Guan et al. [63] recommended novel approach for detecting Internet Messaging 
malicious URLs in a timely manner based on the anomalies of URL messages and 
sender's behaviour using the scoring model. They proposed Internet Messaging 
malicious detector which contains three modules: feature extraction module, the 
malicious behaviour matching module and the anomalous feature scoring module.  
Ramachandran et al. construct a spam filtering system named SpamTracker that 
use behavioural blacklisting to classify email senders based on their sending pattern 
[28]. Then, SpamTracker uses these sending patterns to build blacklist clusters requires 
from IP address. Their evaluation over 115 independent domains shows that 
SpamTracker successfully uses these sending patterns to build blacklist clusters. 
However, the smaller set of domain makes the result may be insufficient to improve the 
behavioural classification algorithm. 
Xun Dong et al. [64] developed a User-Behaviour Phishing Detection (UBPD) 
system which detect phishing websites based on analysis users’ online behaviours. User 
behaviour features such as the websites users have visited and the data users have 
submitted to those websites. However, UBPD system can only handle static type 
authentication credentials such as user name, password and security questions.  
The work by Toolan et al. [27] is closely related to our work. They investigate 
40 features that have been used in recent literature and proposed new behavioural 
features such as number of words in the sender field, total number of characters in the 
sender field, difference between sender’s domain and reply-to domain and difference 
between sender domains of the email’s modal domain. They figure out that the dataset 
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with the best feature outperformed all of the others. However, they only consider 
features extracted from the email’s body. Our approach differs significantly from theirs 
in scope where we proposed new behaviour-based features. 
Ross presented a tool PwhHash [65] that tries to protect a client’s identity and 
password information by providing different username, password and email address for 
different servers it visits. This tool is to improve password authentication on the web 
with no modification to existing server configurations. Their solution enables secure 
user password inside the browser window. Though, the implementation of this tool in a 
modern browser is still challenging.  
To address this problem, we shift our focus to behaviour-based detection 
approach to phishing detection. Our work focuses on identifying features which detect 
phishing behaviour in a computer network and which cannot be disguised as legitimate 
behaviour by an attacker by considering features that will be derived from different 
types of phishing attacks. 
 
c) Similarity of Layout Approach 
To overcome usual text-based filtering techniques phishers started to insert the 
message into attached image known as image phishing. In addition, invisible text is 
often inserted into the body of an email to evade from being detected by the anti-
phishing tools. Some work investigates the layout of phishing sites in order to detect the 
malicious contents [21][20][22][66][67]. 
 Dhamija et al. present a Dynamic Security Skins technique [19]. This technique 
applies a shared secret image that allows a remote server to verify its identity to a user. 
It supports easy verification by humans and is tough to spoof by attackers. Yet, this 
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protocol does not offer security for situations where the user login is from a public 
terminal which is easy for the attacker to manipulate.  
Web Wallet [21] creates a unified interface for authentication. Once it detects a 
login form, it will ask the user to clearly specify the intended site to login. If the 
intention matches the current site, it automatically fills web page input fields. Otherwise 
a warning will be presented to the user. Though, the study also found that spoofing the 
Web Wallet interface itself was not an effective attack. Moreover, it was not easy to 
totally stop the user from typing sensitive information directly into web forms.  
Work by [22] proposed detecting phishing pages based on the similarity between 
the phishing and authentic pages at the visual appearance level, instead of using text-
based analysis. However, the proposed approach is susceptible to significant changes in 
the webpage’s aspect ratio and colours used. 
Herzberg et al. [67] propose creating a Trusted Credentials Area (TCA) which 
located at the top of every browser window. It contains highly visible logos and other 
graphical icons for credentials identifying a legitimate page. Nonetheless, an attacker 
can create look alike TCA since the logos on the website do not change dynamically.  
Liu et al. [66] propose a SiteWatcher system. There are two processes in 
SiteWatcher system. The first processes run on local email servers and monitor emails 
for keywords and suspicious URLs. While the second process, then matches the 
potential phishing pages against actual pages and evaluates visual similarities between 
them in terms of block level similarity, layout similarity and overall style similarity. 
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d) Hybrid-based Approach 
The hybrid - based approach is a combination of existing filtering techniques. 
Most of them combine existing technique such as content based, URL-based, keyword-
based and behaviour-based in order to detect phishing sites [68][69]. Ma et al. [2] 
claimed they classify phishing email based on hybrid features. They used seven features 
derived from three types of email features that are content feature, orthographic feature 
and derived feature which also can be considered as content-based approach as well. 
They achieved more than 99% accuracy for both training and training set using 10-fold 
cross validation. 
Xiang et al. [68] proposed hybrid phish detection method based on identity-
based detection components and keyword-retrieval detection components. The first 
phase discovers inconsistencies between real page and fake page. Then, the second 
phase employs well-formulated keywords from the DOM and exploit search engine to 
crawl, index and rank properties detect phishing sites. They tested on 11449 pages and 
achieved a true positive rate of 90.06% and false positive rate of 1.95%. However, this 
approach did not consider using existing phishing signatures which make it hard to 
detect previous phishing attacks modus operandi. 
Castillo et al. filter email using hybrid approach by integrating three different 
classification methods to multiple data sources. The three filters are Bayesian filter that 
classifies the textual content, a rule-based filter that classifies the non-grammatical 
content and, a filter based on an emulator of false accesses which categorizes the replies 
from the websites mentioned by links enclosed in emails [69]. The advantages of this 
approach are its modular and flexible design and direct upgrading as when new features 
have been identified. Their approach correctly classified 96% as phishing email and 
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94% as legitimate emails. However, they tested the system on economic topics consists 
of finance institution which make the results are specific to certain condition. 
 
2.6 Phishing Profiling  
Recently, the concept of profiling phishing emails with the aim of tracking, 
predicting and identifying phishing emails has been discussed in [71][72]. Profiling is a 
process of categorizing suspects or prospects from a large data set, and gathering a set 
of characteristics of a particular group based on the past knowledge. The potential usage 
of profiling has been identified in many domains such as customer buying pattern 
profile and market product profile. Market Basket Analysis [73] profiles customers 
based on their buying patterns. This information is then used by companies to learn the 
nature of competitive markets. Recently, mobile user browsing behaviour patterns 
profile is used to help Cellular Service Providers (CSPs) to improve service 
performance, thus increasing user satisfaction. The profile offers valuable insights about 
how to enhance the mobile user experience by providing dynamic content 
personalization and recommendation, or location-aware services [74]. Also, there have 
been studies in profiling behaviour of Internet backbone traffic where significant 
behaviour from massive traffic is discovered and anomalous events such as large scale 
scanning activities, worm outbreaks, and denial of service attacks are identified [75]. 
 
2.6.1 Profiling Approach  
Previous work on profiling by [71][72] and complements these studies in many 
ways. Dazeley et al. [70] presented an approach based on unsupervised consensus 
clustering algorithms in combination with supervised classification methods for  
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profiling phishing emails. They used k-means clustering algorithm to cluster the data 
and then several consensus functions are used to combine the independent clusters into 
a final consensus clustering. The final consensus clustering is used to train the 
classification algorithm. Finally, they are used to classify the whole data set. They used 
tenfold cross validation to evaluate the accuracy of these algorithms. Our work differs 
from [70] in that we focus on identifying phishing emails whereas their objective is to 
produce classification of phishing emails for subsequent forensic analysis based on the 
resulting individual clusters. Also, the work in [70] did not address the question of how 
to choose the most appropriate number of clusters whereas we do. 
Yearwood et al. [71] discussed profiling of phishing activity based on hyperlinks 
extracted from phishing emails. The authors used three groups of features, namely the 
text content which is shown to the email's reader; a characterization of the hyperlinks in 
the email; and the orthographic features of the email. They used several clustering 
techniques to individually assign each instance of an email to a cluster according to its 
clustering criteria and the three feature set. The clusters were then ensemble using the 
clustering consensus approaches. Our work differs from [71] in such a way that we 
concentrate on identifying phishing emails whereas [71] focus on identifying a specific 
number phishing groups. Also, we represent phishing emails by using a vector space 
model. Moreover, the technique proposed in [71] depended on the phishing emails with 
embedded hyperlinks only, whereas, many of the phishing email attacks are created 
without hyperlinks, therefore, this technique still shows flaw in its classification role.  
Work by [72] discussed method for obtaining profiles from phishing emails 
using hyperlink information as features, and structural and whois information as classes. 
Profiles are generated based on the predictions of the classifier. They employ a boosting 
50 
 
algorithm (AdaBoost) as well as support vector machine (SVM) to generate multi-label 
class predictions on three different datasets created from hyperlink information in 
phishing emails and use four-fold cross-validation to generate our predictions. These 
predictions are further utilized to generate complete profiles of these emails. Our work 
differs from [72] in that we determine the optimal number of clusters based on 
information gain ratio size as described later. Moreover, the actual profiling is not 
carried out in [72] whereas we do, since our main focus is on phishing emails 
identifications. Also, we exclusively concentrate on structural characteristics found 
within the phishing emails. 
 
2.6.2 Clustering Algorithm 
K-means clustering algorithm have been used by many authors [70][71]. As k-
means is the user-defined cluster, the number of ݇ clusters is pre-fixed as an input 
parameter for their algorithm. However, the drawback of K-means clustering algorithm 
is it does not automatically determine the final number of clusters (i.e., k) that is the 
most appropriate. The user has to partition into k clusters in which each observation 
belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean, serving as a prototype of the cluster.  
Over the last few years, several approaches have been proposed to improve K-
means algorithm. Bagirov et al. [76] proposed Modified Global K-means (MGKmeans) 
which will be able to automatically compute the number of cluster based on stopping 
criterion. The performance is evaluated by MGKmeans objective function value ሺ݋݂ݒሻ 
on the feature subset. ܱ݂ݒ which is represented as ௞݂  is a mean value of distance 
between features and centroid value, ݃௜ for all data. Bigger cluster size will have 
smaller ݋݂ݒ value because it is denser to centroid value. Then, calculate the ݋݂ݒ over a 
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range of tolerance value ሺݐݒሻ and discovered the value when ݐݒ achieved constant 
value. Based on that, the best number of clusters is assigned. These indicate that a good 
clustering has good balance between objective function values ሺ݋݂ݒሻ, tolerance value 
ሺݐݒሻ and the number of clusters. However, the number of clusters is not automatically 
selected because it still depends on pre-defined value for tolerance value ሺݐݒሻ. 
The other possible clustering algorithm is Two-Step clustering algorithms. This 
algorithm offers option either pre-determines or automatically determines the number of 
clusters. Unlike k-means, this algorithm computes the distance similarity using the log-
likelihood function which probability based on the distance between two clusters. Then, 
the cluster membership for each object is assigned deterministically to the closest 
cluster according to the distance measure used to find the clusters. The deterministic 
assignment may result in unfair estimates of the cluster profiles if the clusters overlap. 
The number of clusters can be automatically determined using two phase estimator in 
Two-Step clustering algorithms, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). Finally, the optimal number of clusters is selected if 
ܴ ratios (ratio of distance measure) are more than the threshold value Otherwise, choose 
the largest number of clusters as the optimal number of clusters. 
 
 
Table 2.12: Two-step clustering  
࢑ ࡮ࡵ࡯ሺ࢑ሻ ࢊ࡮ࡵ࡯ሺ࢑ሻ ࡾ࡮ࡷሺ࢑ሻ ࡾሺ࢑ሻ 
1 85389.657 
2 63367.912 -22021.745 1.000 1.648 
3 50004.675 -13363.237 0.607 1.385 
4 40356.122 -9648.553 0.438 0.816 
5 28536.087 -11820.035 0.537 1.421 
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We now illustrate the concept using the information given in Table 2.12. The 
two largest values of ܴሺ݇ሻ are (ܴሺʹሻ ൌ ͳǤ͸Ͷͺሻ and (ܴሺͷሻ ൌ ͳǤͶʹͳሻ. Therefore the ܴ 
ratios are calculated as, ோሺଶሻோሺହሻ ൌ
ଵǤ଺ସ଼
ଵǤସଶଵ ൌ ͳǤͳ͸. Assume that the threshold value, ߠଵ ൌ
ͳǤͳͷ. Therefore, the ܴ ratio 1.16 is larger than the threshold value ͳǤͳͷ. As a result, 2 is 
selected as the optimal number of clusters. 
 
Table 2.13: Comparison between k-means and two-step clustering algorithm 
Clustering 
Algorithm 
Advantages Disadvantages 
K-means x Simplest unsupervised clustering 
algorithm. 
x If variables are huge and the number 
of clusters (k) is small, the 
computation time is faster than 
hierarchical clustering. 
x Allow to handle continuous variable. 
x Difficult to predict the number of 
clusters (k). 
x Does not work well with a global 
cluster of different size and 
different density. 
x Different initial partitions can 
result in different final clusters. 
Two-step  x Allow to handle categorical and 
continuous variables. 
x Predetermined or automatically 
determined number of clusters. 
x Define the relationships among 
items, and improves the weaknesses 
of applying the single clustering 
algorithm. 
x Complex computational. 
x Sensitive to the choice of threshold 
value value ሺߠሻ to determine the 
initial number of clusters. 
x Number of clusters defined is not 
diverse for a large number of data.  
 
Table 2.13 summarized the comparison between k-means and two-step clustering 
algorithm. Both algorithms sensitive to the choice number of cluster and threshold value 
ሺߠሻ to determine the initial number of clusters. Moreover, the numbers of clusters 
defined by both algorithms are not diverse for a large number of data. However, the 
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two-step clustering algorithm allows handling multivariate variable as compared to k-
means clustering algorithm. This algorithm also defines the relationship between item 
which improves weakness of the single clustering algorithm. Therefore, two-step 
algorithm is selected as baseline algorithm to profile the phishing data. 
 
2.7 Phishing Trackback  
 Typically, phishers have diverse ways of attack. In one circumstance, phishers 
may lure their victims by inserting images, malicious file or link in the form which can 
safely detour anti-phishing techniques. When the user clicked the hyperlink, this will 
lead them to a bogus site. Different group of phisher might insert a different fake link 
and when clicked will redirect the user to a phishing site. Therefore, various group of 
phishers has diverse behaviour to lure their victims. Thus, it is possible to group attacker 
based on their features which could be extracted from the emails characteristics. These 
characteristics are then reflected as features that will correspond to the proposed 
trackback framework. 
 The phisher’s behaviour features can be extracted from the structure of the 
emails that are simple and effective. We believed that the phisher’s profiles should be 
able to distinguish between different groups. For example, an email may have the 
attachment files, hyperlink and others. However, there are also groups of phisher may 
have different subclasses of this feature. This problem that has been considered in 
[72][2]. Preliminary analysis shows that there are many difficult problems in clustering. 
Different algorithms give different cluster results. Work by [72] choose hyperlink 
information as feature set and try to predict a set of classes or labels of new emails.  
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Previous work on tracing phisher used honeypot in order to detect the phisher 
[77][78][79]. However, honeypots can only track an activity that interacts with it. It 
cannot capture attacks against other systems unless there is contact with the honeypots. 
Chandrasekaran et al. [77] submitted false credential to phishing sites as phoneytokens. 
The author’s main idea is to identify phishing sites based on the response of fake input. 
The PHONEY prototype sits between a user’s mail transfer agent (MTA) and mail user 
agent (MUA) where it processes each arriving email from phishing attacks. They tested 
on 20 different phishing emails focusing on URL and form features. For instance, 
phoneytoken can only track activity that interacts with it which makes it static selection 
of features that need to be set earlier. Moreover, the technique proposed in [77] 
depended on phishing emails with URL and form features only, whereas many phishing 
emails manage to bypass anti phishing tools to make it look legitimate. Furthermore, 
many phishing email attacks are created without hyperlinks which shows that this 
technique still have flaws in classification.  
Gajek et al. [78] discussed forensic framework for profiling and tracing phishing 
activity in phishing network. The main idea is to fill their database with fingerprinted 
credentials (phoneytokens) which could lure phishers to a fake system that simulate the 
original service. Then, the phoneypot pretends to be the original service in order to 
profile phishers’ behaviour. This approach causes phishers to spend more time and 
resource to acquire financial benefit and increases the risks to track phishers. They are 
interested in tracing the phisher’s agents and not in the technical means used by 
phishers.  
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is an open protocol where the user can 
state any envelope sender and construct all the headers they want. This makes SMTP 
55 
 
too open and less secure. Due to this problem, Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [81] 
[82]is proposed to tighten the rules. Sender Policy Framework is DNS-based lookup 
where one mail server can check whether another server really is associated with the 
address the mail claims to be from. SPF tests the domain of the envelope sender, also 
known as the return-path. However, this framework is not the best in solving spam 
problem.  
 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
The literature shows different approach to detect, profile and trackback phishing 
email. Filtering email can be done by analysing the email messages. Although lots of 
work focused detecting phishing email, numbers of phishing email keep on increasing. 
The phishing detection and phishing profiling approaches in the literature will be used 
in our research for the proposed solution in combating phishing email. Besides, we also 
provide solution for trackback phishing email by using a clustering algorithm. The next 
chapter explains the phishing detection and the trackback mechanism framework. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Phishing Detection Framework 
In this chapter, a framework for detecting and trackbacking phisher based on profiling 
and clustering technique is proposed. The framework consists of three phases: phishing 
detection, phishing profiling and phishing trackback. We formulate the profiling 
problem as a clustering problem using various features present in the phishing emails as 
feature vectors and generate profiles based on clustering predictions. These predictions 
are further utilized to generate complete profiles of the emails. Finally, the profiles 
generated are sent to trackback phase in order to trace the phisher back to its origin. The 
chapter includes in-depth description of each phase with an appropriate model. The 
framework can be used to detect phishing messages and trackback phisher back to its 
origin.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
At present, phishing attack is a common threat to the Internet users. Phishing 
email's contents convince users to give up their credential information such as 
passwords or bank account number. Some of the phishing modus operandi lures users to 
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click on a malicious link or bogus websites. Previously, the most common phishing 
email detection and analysis apply manually checking where users need to know, find, 
identify and report suspicious content to phishing report services such as Phishtank [83] 
and Anti-Phishing Working Group [84]. Users have to be alert with a slight 
modification to the website either the logo is smaller or the specific bar is missing. 
Therefore, it is difficult for general users to distinguish between legitimate and phishing 
pages.  
The other phishing detection method is comparing links to phishing sites by 
examining based on the URL characteristics. Normally, phishing URL redirects user to 
fake sites or malicious link. The detection method based on the URL is not the best 
approach where it could easily defeat by modifying the contents of emails and link 
strings. Moreover, an attacker could use free tools such as TinyURL [55] to obfuscate 
URL to make it look valid. The last phishing detection method is by examining 
suspicious features such as misspelled words, link confusion, redirection link or 
different value between hidden URL with the presentation link. This method is 
proposed by [85] where they concentrate on analysing the real page. However, they 
only look for suspicious content that look the same to an innocent user. Our work is 
motivated by this framework where we analyse phishing email feature automatically 
rather than checking it manually. We concentrated on different suspicious email feature 
that were extracted based on structural of emails; header-based, body-based, URL-based 
and behaviour-based features.  
Two problems need to be solved herein. Firstly, a good feature selection is 
needed to improve phishing detection approach in the phishing email. It should have 
accurately predicted the accuracies value of successfully detecting phishing email. 
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Secondly, the model must be able to maintain accuracy even under various group of 
attacker that can adapt changes introduce by others. Therefore, finding a reliable 
phishing detection model is essential, and thus applying the model to build up a 
detection system. The current detection system is lack of profiling part where some 
features may be good at detection but not for profiling the attacker. To satisfy these 
requirements, the following section addresses the need to be considered.  
In this chapter, we proposed a phishing detection framework which capable to 
detect and generate phishing profile in order to determine whether the email is phishing 
or normal email. These phishing profiles were then stored for trackback mechanism 
purposes. The purposes of this framework are to detect phishing email dynamically, 
generate attacker profiles and trackback the origin of attackers. The motivation behind 
the current work is to enhance the phishing detection framework and allow the use of 
generated phishing profiles to trackback the attacker. 
 
3.2 Overview of Phishing Email Framework 
The framework encompasses of three main components; phishing detection, 
phishing profiling and trackback mechanism as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
3.2.1 Phishing Detection Phase 
The phishing detection phase consists of three components such as pre-
processing process of emails, email processing and feature selection. Data pre-
processing describes a processing performed on raw email data to prepare it for the next 
processing procedure. Data pre-processing component converts the data into more 
easily and effectively determined by the user. Five assorted tools and methods are used 
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for preprocessing, including, i) sampling, chooses a representative subclass from a large 
data, ii) transformation, employs raw data to generate a single input, iii) denoising, 
eliminates noise from data, iv) normalization, manages data for more well-organized 
access, and v) feature extraction, pulls out specified data that is important in some 
particular context.  
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Figure 3.1: Phishing detection framework overview 
 
In a pre-processing procedure, we used open source software named mbox2xml 
[86] as a disassembly tool. We modified a python scheme; mbox2xml.xls provided by 
the mbox2xml to export the information from mbox format to xml format. Next, we 
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parse the extracted feature and stored it in a feature.xml table for later analysis in the 
feature extraction process.  
The next step in the processing procedure is to generate components of a feature 
vector by analysing the database. The Information Gain (IG) values of the extracted 
features are calculated. Based on the output of the feature extraction step, a feature 
selection step is performed to select a subset of relevant features to be used in the 
construction of the model. In this step, the most informative features are selected using a 
learning model and classification algorithms.  
 
3.2.1.1 Information Gain (IG) 
Information Gain (IG) algorithm is used to decide which attribute in a given set 
of training feature vectors is most valuable for discriminating between the classes to be 
learned. Consider an email message represented by feature vector, ܨ in the form of  
ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௡ǡ ݕሻ where ݔ௔ א ݒ݈ܽሺܽሻ  is the value ofath attribute of feature 
vector ݔ and ݕ is the corresponding class label. Each message can belong to two classes: 
phishing (or malicious) messages, and normal messages. In general, the information 
gain is defined as, 
ܫܩሺܨǡ ܽሻ ൌ ܪሺܨሻ െ ܪሺܨȁܽሻ       (1) 
where ܪ denotes the information entropy, ܨ denotes feature vector in the form of 
ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௡ǡ ݕሻ where ݔ௔ א ݒ݈ܽሺܽሻ  is the value ofath attribute of feature 
vector ݔ and ݕ is the corresponding class label and ܪሺܨሻ is entropy defined as follows: 
ܫܩሺܨǡ ܽሻ ൌ ܪሺܨሻ െ σ ȁሼ௫אிȁ௫ೌୀ௩ሽȁȁிȁ௧א௩௔௟ሺ௔ሻ ή ܪሺሼݔ א ܨȁݔ௔ ൌ ݐሽሻ  (2) 
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Table 3.1: Attributes from multiple email messages 
Sendunmodaldomain (SUD) Senddiffreplyto (SDR) Subjectbankword (SBW) Class 
1 1 1 h 
0 1 0 h 
1 1 0 h 
0 0 1 p 
0 0 0 p 
 
h
h
h p
p
h p
p h h
SUD
1
SUD0
 
Figure 3.2: Split on attribute sendunmodaldomain (SUD) 
 
Given the example of features for five emails showed in Table 3.1. The IG value 
of all features are calculated. Assume that sendunmodaldomain is the best attribute. So, 
this data would be further split based on a formula (1). The entropy value for SUD1 is 
calculated where, 
ܪௌ௎஽ଵ ൌ െ൬
Ͳ
ʹ൰ ଶሺͲȀʹሻ െ ൬
ʹ
ʹ൰ ଶሺʹȀʹሻ 
ܪௌ௎஽ଵ ൌ െͲ െ ሺͳሻ ଶሺͳሻ 
ܪௌ௎஽ଵ ൌ Ͳ 
Then, the entropy value for SUD2 value is calculated as follows, 
ܪௌ௎஽ଶ ൌ െ൬
ͳ
͵൰ ଶሺͳȀ͵ሻ െ ൬
ʹ
͵൰ ଶሺʹȀ͵ሻ
ܪௌ௎஽ଶ ൌ െሺͲǤ͵͵͵͵ሻ ൈ
ሺ ͲǤ͵͵͵͵ሻ
 ʹ െ ሺͲǤ͸͸͸͹ሻ ൈ
ሺ ͲǤ͸͸͸͹ሻ
 ʹ 
ܪௌ௎஽ଶ ൌ ͲǤͷʹͺ͵൅ͲǤ͵ͺͻͻ
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ܪௌ௎஽ଶ ൌ ͲǤͻͳͺʹ
After that, the information gain value is calculated. 
ܫܩሺܷܵܦሻ ൌ ͳȂሺʹȀͷሻሺͲሻȂሺ͵ȀͷሻሺͲǤͻͳͺʹሻ 
ܫܩሺܷܵܦሻ ൌ ͳȂ ͲȂሺͲǤͷͷͲͻʹሻ 
ܫܩሺܷܵܦሻ ൌ ͲǤͶͶͻͳ 
Next, calculate the entropy value if sendifferentreplyto (SDR) is selected as the 
best attribute. Figure 3.3 shows how data would be further split using 
sendifferentreplyto (SDR) feature. 
 
h h
h
p p
h p
p h h
SDR
1
SDR0
 
Figure 3.3: Split on attribute sendifferentreplyto (SDR) 
 
Then, the entropy value for SDR1 and SDR2 are calculated where,  
ܪௌ஽ோଵ ൌ െ൬
͵
͵൰ ଶሺ͵Ȁ͵ሻ െ Ͳ 
ܪௌ஽ோଵ ൌ Ͳ 
ܪௌ஽ோଶ ൌ െ൬
ʹ
ʹ൰ ଶሺʹȀʹሻ െ Ͳ 
ܪௌ஽ோଶ ൌ Ͳ 
After that, the information gain value for SDR is calculated where, 
ܫܩሺܵܦܴሻ ൌ ͳȂሺ͵ȀͷሻሺͲሻȂሺʹȀͷሻሺͲሻ 
ܫܩሺܵܦܴሻ ൌ ͳȂ ͲȂሺͲሻ 
ܫܩሺܵܦܴሻ ൌ ͳ 
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Finally, we determine the entropy value if subjectbankword (SBW) is selected as 
the best attribute. Figure 3.4 shows how data would be further split using 
subjectbankword (SBW) feature. 
 
h p
h h
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h p
p h h
SBW
1
SBW0
 
Figure 3.4: Split on attribute subjectbankword (SBW) 
 
The entropy value for SBW1 is calculated as follows,  
ܪௌ஻ௐଵ ൌ െ൬
ͳ
ʹ൰ ଶሺͳȀʹሻ െ ൬
ͳ
ʹ൰ ଶሺͳȀʹሻ 
ܪௌ஻ௐଵ ൌ ͲǤͷ ൅ ͲǤͷ 
ܪௌ஻ௐଵ ൌ ͳ 
and SBW2 where, 
ܪௌ஻ௐଶ ൌ െ൬
ͳ
͵൰ ଶሺͳȀ͵ሻ െ ൬
ʹ
͵൰ ଶሺʹȀ͵ሻ 
ܪௌ஻ௐଶ ൌ ͲǤͷʹͺ͵ ൅ ͲǤ͵ͺͻͻ 
ܪௌ஻ௐଶ ൌ ͲǤͻͳͺʹ 
Lastly, the information gain value for SBW feature is calculated. 
ܫܩሺܵܤܹሻ ൌ ͳȂሺʹȀͷሻሺͳሻȂሺ͵ȀͷሻሺͲǤͻͳͺʹሻ 
ܫܩሺܵܤܹሻ ൌ ͳȂ ͲǤͶȂ ሺͲǤͷͷͲͻሻ 
ܫܩሺܵܤܹሻ ൌ ͲǤͲͶͻͳ 
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Table 3.2 shows the information gain (IG) value for the three attributes. The 
result shows that sendifferentreplyto (SDR) is the best feature while subjectbankword 
(SBW) is the least effective features.  
 
Table 3.2: Information Gain value for each feature 
Rank IG value Feature  
1 1 sendifferentreplyto 
2 0.4491 sendunmodaldomain 
3 0.0491 Subjectbankword 
 
3.2.1.2 Feature Selection Algorithm 
In phishing detection phase, the Hybrid Feature Selection (HSF) algorithm is 
proposed. HSF algorithm aims to determine the feature matrix for predicting either 
email message is a phishing message or not. A methodology on how to extract selected 
features from each email is developed. The algorithm is demonstrated over a 
generalized Hybrid Feature Selection algorithm as shown in Table 3.3. For a given data 
set, E the algorithm starts from subset, ܦ଴ and examines over the feature space. Each 
generated subset D is evaluated by an evaluation function, A and recorded as the current 
subset. The independent function is determined by types of feature to be extracted. The 
search iterates until ܰ number of emails. The algorithm outputs the current subset 
ܦ௛௬௕௥௜ௗ for each email as the final result. In addition, we can plan different individual 
algorithms within the hybrid feature selection model by varying the feature selection 
strategies and evaluation function used in steps 3 and 4.  
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Table 3.3: A generalized hybrid selection feature algorithm 
Algorithm HSF 
INPUT: ܧሺݔ଴ǡ ݔଵǡǥ ǡ ݔ௡ିଵሻ // a training dataset with ܯ features 
              ܦ଴  // a subset to start the selection
OUTPUT : ܦ௛௬௕௥௜ௗ // a hybrid feature subset 
BEGIN 
1: FOR ܧ ൌ ܧ଴ ൅ ͳݐ݋ܰ begin 
2:     FOR  ൌ Ͳ െ  begin 
3:     ܵ ൌ ݃݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݁ሺܧሻǢ 
4:     ܿ ൌ ݁ݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݁ሺܦǡ ܧǡ ܣሻǢ //evaluate the current subset S by function A 
5:     ܿ௛௬௕௥௜ௗ ൌ ܿǢ 
7:     ܦ௛௬௕௥௜ௗ ൌ ܦǢ 
8:     return ܦ௛௬௕௥௜ௗ; 
9:     end; 
10:     END HSF 
 
3.2.1.3 Constructing Feature Matrix 
In this section, the constructing feature matrix for the datasets process is 
discussed. Let ܧ and ܨ denote the emails and the feature vector space respectively: 
ܧ ൌ ሼ݁ଵǡ ݁ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݁ேሽ        (3) 
ܨ ൌ ሼ ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ǥ ǡ ெ݂ሽ        (4) 
where ܰ is the total number of emails and ܯ refers to the size of the feature vector. Let 
ݔ௜௝ be the value of jth feature of ith document. Therefore, the presentation of each 
document, ܦ is given as follows: 
ܦ ൌ ൛ݔ௜௝ൟȁͳ ൑ ݅ ൑ ܰǢ ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ܯǢ      (5) 
 
3.2.2 Phishing Profiling Phase 
The second phase is profiling the phishing dataset based on the clustering 
algorithm. Data profiling is the method of inspecting the data presented in phishing 
dataset and gather information about the data. The profiling process helps to understand 
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the frequency distribution of different values, types and use of each data. Moreover, 
profiling could increase data quality and understanding of data for the users. Although 
data profiling is effective, an appropriate balance between groups created is critical in 
order to avoid analysis paralysis issues. Therefore, the best number of groups created 
could evade inaccurate outcomes and accomplished better result. 
In this phase, we formulating the profiling problem as a clustering problem 
using various features in the phishing emails as feature vectors. Then, profiles based on 
clustering predictions are created by the profiling algorithm. A cluster turns out to be a 
group profile. After that, this profile is trained on the classification algorithm. The 
choice of the optimal number of clusters is essential at this stage to increase the 
accuracy and efficiency of the classification result.  
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Figure 3.5: Phishing email profiling and classification model 
 
Figure 3.5 explains the profiling phase. In the previous phase (phishing detection 
phase), a Hybrid Feature Selection algorithm was performed to select a subset of relevant 
features to be used in the construction of the model. The most instructive features are 
selected using a learning model and a classification algorithm. Then, the data set is split 
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into selected training and testing ratios. The training data is used to train the clustering 
algorithm while the testing data to estimate the error rate of the train classifier. Next, the 
clustering algorithm generates profiles from the training data. The profile generated is 
used to train the classification algorithm where it is supposed to forecast the 
unidentified class label based on the input data using a classification algorithm. The 
detailed description of these steps is discussed later in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2.3 Trackback Mechanism Phase 
In this section, we discuss the final phase of phishing detection, which is 
trackback mechanism phase. The purpose of trackback mechanism phase is to identify 
either attacker originate from single or collaborative attack. Normally, the trackback 
process can be done by checking the Internet Protocol (IP) address. However, this 
information can easily be forged by the attacker to hide their identity. In trackback 
process, we manage to get information about the origin of the attacker, domain server 
used, traces of an IP packet’s path over the network as well as the attacker’s behaviour. 
The architecture of phishing trackback mechanism consists of two main steps. The two 
steps are email analysis and forensic backend. The implementation of email analysis on 
phishing email data with respect to trackback phishing email system is shown in Figure 
3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: Trackback mechanism phases 
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3.2.3.1 Email Analyser  
In this work, Maximum Dependency Algorithm [87] is selected as data 
clustering technique. The uniqueness of this trackback mechanism exist in the fact that 
we did not employ any phoneytoken to draw the attacker's attention. Initially, the 
similarity value for each attribute is computed. The similarity classes of the set of 
objects N can be obtained using the attribute relationship ܽ௜ א ܣ in information system 
ܵ ൌ ሺܰǡ ܣǡ ܸǡ ݂ሻ where ܰis non-empty predetermined set of objects, ܣ is a non-empty 
predetermined set of attributes, ܸ is a value set of attribute and ݂ is the information 
function [88]. Next, the dependency degree of each attribute is determined for selecting 
clustering attributes. The highest maximum dependency degree value is chosen as 
greater degree of dependency of attributes which will create more accurate group of 
attributes. At that point, we split the phishing email into a group of phisher based on the 
highest maximum dependency degree value. Further, we generate the group of phisher 
based on the clustering prediction. Finally, phisher groups that have been determined are 
submitted to the forensic backend for further action. 
 
3.2.3.2 Forensic Backend 
The group of phisher information will be passed by the email analyser to the 
forensic backend. Upon receiving these profiles, the forensic backend process will apply 
the selected collaborative filtering algorithm to the generated analysis data. The 
similarity measurement is used to smooth the phishing profile in order to categorize the 
phisher into single or collaborative attack. We did not apply standard passive 
fingerprinting techniques [89][16][82] to process the data. Our work differs in such a 
way that we extracted email header information which is then used to track the attacker. 
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The email header features that can be considered as forensic features are time of attack, 
date of attack, country (based on time zone), domain name server, attacker IP address, 
attacker email and attachment name. Alternatively, each group of phisher will be refined 
into two categories either single or collaborative attacker. Finally actions are taken 
based on the clustering result in the previous step. The action may comprise having 
trackback server to alert the email system regarding the violation. Such feedback is 
advantageous for facilitating self-management by users.  
 
3.2.3.3 Collaborative Filtering Algorithm 
In trackback mechanism phase, the collaborative filtering algorithm is 
implemented to classify the phisher into single or collaborative attack. Collaborative 
Filtering (CF) uses the known group of attackers to make predictions the unknown 
preferences for another attacker. The main guess by using CF is that two attackers who 
have similar behaviours will act on other items similarly.  
 
Algorithm: Collaborative Filtering algorithm 
Input: phishing profiles without class attributes 
Output: Class attributes 
Begin: 
Step 1: Compute the average deviation, ߙ௜௝ of item, ܰ 
Step 2: Produce prediction 
End 
Figure 3.7: Generalized collaborative filtering algorithm 
 
The generalized collaborative filtering algorithm is shown in Figure 3.7. This 
algorithm consists of two steps. First, the average deviation is calculated. For both user-
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based CF and item-based CF, the measurement of similarity between users or items is a 
significant step. Pearson correlation coefficients, cosine-based similarity, vector space 
similarity and Euclidean distance are widely used in similarity measurement in CF 
methods [91]. Then, the prediction based on the similarity measurement result is 
produced. The detailed description of these steps is discussed later in Chapter 6. 
 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter offers a framework to detect, profile and trackback phisher by 
analysing email features and profile attributes. It proves that feature selection from 
structural of email could be used to reveal phisher’s information. These features are 
used to create the phishing profiles, which contain phisher method of attack. Phishing 
profiling information could be used to predict attacker’s behaviour and provide valuable 
information for tracking the attacker back to its origin. This framework also could 
identify the type of phisher either single attacker or collaborative attacker. Phisher may 
attack alone or in groups. Normally, single attacker is hard to detect because they are 
always changing their modus operandi. On the other hand, group of attacker has a 
tendency to reveal similar pattern such as sending email from the same server, same 
origin or using the same luring method. We will consider enhancing the framework 
using various clustering algorithm and similarity measurement method as part of 
penetration testing. 
 
71 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Phishing Email Detection 
In this chapter, a hybrid feature selection approach based on a combination of content-
based and behaviour-based is proposed. The approach could mine the attacker 
behaviour based on email header. We carried out an experimental setup on a publicly 
available test corpus where our hybrid feature selection is able to achieve a high 
accuracy rate. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Phishing emails have become a common problem in recent years. According to 
Islam and Abawajy [92], “phishing attacks continue to pose serious risks for consumers 
and businesses as well as threatening global security and the economy”. This calls for 
the development of effective countermeasures against email-born phishing attacks in 
order to safeguard critical infrastructures such as banking. Normally, phishers send a 
large number of fake emails pretending to be from a legitimate and well-known 
business organization. Generally, the email content insists the victim to update personal 
information to avoid losing access rights to services provided by the organization. 
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Unfortunately, they lure users to a bogus web site implemented by the attacker. 
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group phishing trend report, the number of 
phishing attacks through email increased from about 170000 in 2005 to about 440000 in 
the 2009 [84]. Based on Gartner survey, approximately 109 million U.S adults have 
received phishing e-mail attacks with an average loss per victim estimated to be $1,244 
[5].  
The main problem addressed in this chapter is how to identify behaviour-based 
features in phishing emails which cannot be disguised by an attacker. Several anti-
phishing techniques have been proposed in recent years to detect and prevent the 
increasing number of phishing attacks. El Ferchichi et al. [93] propose a wrapper 
approach to select features involving the Support Vector Machines (SVM) combined 
with a metaheuristic optimization algorithm: Tabu Search and Genetic Algorithms. The 
proposed process is based on the use of the rate of misclassification as an evaluating 
criterion. They apply the tabu algorithm to guide the search of the optimal set of 
features first and then a genetic algorithm is used to reach the same goal. Unlike our 
work which is focussed on phishing email detection, the work of El Ferchichi et al. [93] 
is applied on data from regulation of urban transport network systems. 
Various feature selection approaches have been recently introduced to assist 
phishing detection mechanism. Most of previous researches [94][13] were focusing on 
email content in order to classify the emails as either abnormal or normal. Previous 
attempts by [94] presents an approach based on natural structural characteristics in 
emails. The features included number of words in the email, the vocabulary, the 
structure of the subject line, and the presence of 18 keywords. They tested on 400 data 
which then divided into five sets with different type of feature selection. Their result 
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shows the best when more features used to classify phishing email using Support Vector 
Machine classifier. However, the significance of the results is difficult to assess because 
of the small size of the email collection. 
 In terms of detecting phishing using content, text-based classification does not 
seem to be the best approach. This is because phishing messages are nearly identical to 
the normal emails. Content-based filtering might be a more effective technique if 
messages have a long lifetime and a large amount of duplication. However, attackers 
tend to use more sophisticated techniques from time to time that make them difficult to 
detect. Yet, the updating rate of filters is often defeated by the changing rate of the 
attacks because phishing e-mails are continuously modifying senders and link strings. 
Recently, behaviour-based approach to determine phishing message has been 
proposed by [27][95]. Zhang et al. [59] works on detecting abnormal mass mailing host 
in the network layer by mining the traffic in session layer. Toolan et al. [27] investigates 
40 features that have been used in recent literature and proposed behavioural features 
such as number of word in send field, total number of characters in sender field, 
difference between sender’s domain and reply-to domain and difference between 
sender’s domains from the email’s modal domain. Ahmed Syed at.al [95] proposed 
behavioural blacklisting using 4 features which is log-based on live data. Ma et al. [2] 
claimed they classify phishing email based on hybrid features. They used 7 features 
derived from 3 types of email features that are content feature, orthographic feature and 
derived feature which also can be considered as content-based approach as well.  
Our study differs from the previous work on feature selection in several ways. 
First, we propose a hybrid feature selection by combining content-based and behaviour-
based features. We considered analysing email header information, particularly the 
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sender email and email message-ID tags in order to evaluate the attacker behaviours. 
We mine attacker behaviours by considering whether the sender sends emails from 
more than a single domain and if the domain name is used by more than one sender’s 
domain. We then choose to use a Bayes Net algorithm as our classifier because they are 
a powerful knowledge representation and reasoning mechanism. 
In this chapter, an approach to detect phishing email using hybrid features that 
combine content-based and behaviour-based approaches is proposed which cannot be 
disguised by an attacker. By analysing attacker’s patterns, it is observed that phishing 
email that has a tendency to come from more than one domain could indicate abnormal 
activity. Domain server that handles more than one type of domain email could show 
abnormal email as well. This information is done by analysing email header, which is 
usually neglected by others. We considered analysing the message-ID tag and sender 
email in order to mine the attacker’s behaviour. This study applies the proposed hybrid 
feature selection to 6923 datasets which come from Nazario [96] phishing email 
collection ranging from 2004 to 2007 and SpamAssassin [97] as ham emails. The result 
shows that the proposed hybrid feature selection approach is effective in identifying and 
classifying a phishing email. Our major contributions are summarized as follows: 
1. We proposed a hybrid feature selection (HFS) algorithm for extracting 
behaviour-based feature from email header information. 
2. We explain the basic system components and general processing steps which is 
an extended work from [98]. 
3. We discuss the classification outcome of the selected classifier for different sets 
of data with a varying split percentage number of phishing and ham emails. 
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4. We provide empirical evidence that our proposed features are more robust and 
achieved high accuracies and reduce the false positive and false negative rates 
only by using the least number of features. 
 
4.2 Feature Selection  
Exiting email filtering approaches can be divided into origin-based filtering and 
content based filtering. Origin-based filtering focuses on the source of the e-mail and 
verifies whether this source is on a white verification list or the black verification list. In 
contrast, content based filters focus on the subject and the body of the email. Phishing 
emails can be detected by filtering it based on text feature, linguistic feature or 
structural feature. The textual features and linguistic features identify phishing emails 
based on the word composition and grammatical construction. Instead, structural 
features focus on identifying the presence of obvious sign present in the email body, 
which implicate it to be spoofed. 
 
4.2.1 System Model 
An email message consists of three components, the message envelope, the 
message header, and the message body. The message header contains control 
information, including, sender's email address and one or more recipient addresses. 
There are other descriptive information is also added, such as a subject header field, 
message-id, a message submission date or time stamp and other information about the 
email.  
Our feature selection approach could be deployed offline on the recipient’s local 
machine as shown in Figure 4.1. When an email is sent, the message is routed from 
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sender’s server to the recipient's email server through a Mail Transport Agent (MTA). 
MTA will stamp the email messages with email header information, including message-
id. This part of the email header is not visible to most users, but it is a useful indicator in 
determining phishing email. Then, MTAs communicate with one another using the 
SMTP protocol. The recipient's MTA then delivers the email to the Mail Delivery Agent 
(MDA) that acts as an incoming mail server. Finally, the user can retrieve the email 
from a Mail User Agent (MUA) such as Mozilla Thunderbird, Microsoft Outlook or 
Eudora Mail. 
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Figure 4.1: Hybrid feature selection approach 
 
Although different types of feature selection and classification algorithms for 
filtering phishing have been proposed in the literature, the scale and sophistication of 
phishing attacks have continued to increase steadily [92]. It is important to select the 
most relevant email features, which would contribute in increasing the performance of 
the detection algorithm by reducing dimensionality and processing time. This is because 
irrelevant and redundant features will impact the performances of classifiers and also 
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slow the prediction process [99]. Thus, appropriate email feature subset selection, which 
aims at choosing the most pertinent and representative features to increase accuracy 
rates and reliability of prediction models, is an essential step in the process of phishing 
email prediction. 
 
4.2.2 Message-Id Field Validity 
The "Message-ID:" field is a unique message identifier that refers to a specific 
version of the message. The uniqueness of the message identifier is guaranteed by the 
host that generates it. This message identifier is machine readable and not necessarily 
meaningful to humans. However, it could be used as an indicator to classify phishing 
email.  According to RFC2822 [100] Internet Message Format, Message-IDs have a 
specific format which is a subset of an email address and to be globally unique. 
Message ID consists of two parts, a local part and a domain, separated by an at-sign and 
enclosed in angle brackets: message-id: "<" local-part "@" domain ">". A common 
technique used by many message systems is to use a time and date stamp along with the 
local host's domain name, e.g., abc@example.com. 
Each mail user agent (MUA) generates their own standard format of message-id 
field. Some of the attackers could forge the message-id field by deleting the message-id 
domain or change the domain name to make it look legitimate. Based on the attacker 
behaviour, we analyse the message-id field, whether the message-id value have been 
deleted or changed. We believe the phisher cannot modify the complete header, though 
he can forge certain fields. Therefore, email header messages with blank message-id 
field and have an uncommon domain name are considered as fake email. Common 
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domain message-id name should have general top level domain such as .net, .com, .org 
and other registered domain. 
 
4.2.3 Hybrid Feature Selection System 
Basic system components and general processing steps which are extended from 
[98] is shown in Figure 4.2. The processing phases include: pre-processing of the email, 
feature extraction and selection, feature assessment, classification, and finally the 
evaluation of the classification result. We used Bayes Net algorithm as our classifier as 
it is a powerful knowledge representation and reasoning mechanism. Moreover, it is the 
simplest and most widely used classification method because of its manipulating 
capabilities of tokens and associated probabilities according to the user’s classification 
decisions and empirical performance. 
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Figure 4.2: Hybrid feature selection system 
 
In this pre-processing phase, we used open source software: Mbox2xml as a 
disassembly tool. A python module mbox2xml exported the information from mbox 
format to XML format. We modified some scheme in order to extract all features and 
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store in the database. The next step in the process is to generate components of a feature 
vector by analysing the database. After that, we constructed 5 sets of datasets with 
various split percentage of ham and phishing emails. The training set was used to train 
the classifier and the test set to estimate the error rate of the train classifier. We use the 
same sets of data for training and testing the classifier as our main focused in this 
chapter is to propose new behaviour based feature selection approach. 
 
4.2.4 Feature Extraction and Selection 
Generally, email consists of header and message body. Email header contains 
common identification such as from, to, date, subject and route information an email 
takes as it is transferred from one computer to another. It travels through a Mail 
Transfer Agent (MTA) where it is stamped with a date, time and recipient. This part of 
the email header is not visible to most users, but it is a useful indicator in determining 
phishing email. We find that message-ID tags found in email header are globally unique 
identification and can be used for mining the sender behaviour.  
The features that we identified in email header are: i) Subject-based features: 
These features are related to the presence or absence of blacklist word in the email 
subject; ii) Sender-based features: These features are extracted from the sender email 
address; iii) Behaviour-based features: These features are extracted from the email 
header including information as sender email and email message-ID. 
The body-based feature includes the following: i) URL-based: These features are 
extracted from email HTML; ii) Keyword-based: These features are related to the 
presence or absence of blacklist word in the email body; iii) Form-based: These features 
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are related to the presence or absence of from in the email body; iv) Script-based: These 
features are related to the presence or absence of a script in the email body. 
 
4.2.5 Feature Define in Email 
In our analysis, we considered the “message-ID” and the “from tag” in the email 
header. We experimented with five features belong to email structure and additional two 
features which are extracted based on sender behaviour. The features which have been 
proposed in the literature are domain_sender, subject_blacklist_word, URL_IP, 
URL_dots and URL_symbol. The remaining three features are behaviour features newly 
proposed in this chapter. All these features are described as follows:  
 
4.2.5.1 Domain_sender 
This binary feature represents the similarity of domain name extracted from an 
email sender with domain message-ID. We think the email is normal if it is similar and 
set the value 0. If not, we set the value 1 to indicate the email is abnormal. This feature 
has been proposed by [27]. 
 
4.2.5.2 Subject_blacklist_words 
This binary feature represents the appearance of blacklist words in the subject of 
an email which included in bags of words in [94]. If the email subject contains the 
blacklist word, the email is abnormal and set the value 1. This feature has been used in 
[2]. 
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4.2.5.3 URL_IP 
This numerical data shows number of links that are using IP address. This 
feature has been used in [101].  
 
4.2.5.4 URL_dots 
This numerical data represent the number of links in email that contains dots 
more than 5. This feature has been used in [94] but they calculate maximum number of 
dots in every link.  
 
4.2.5.5 URL_symbol 
This numerical data represent the occurrence of links in emails that present 
symbol. This has been used in [102] but we incorporate other symbol such as “%” and 
“&”to detect obfuscation URL. 
 
4.2.5.6 Unique_sender (US) 
This binary data represent sender behaviour, whether the sender sends emails 
from more than a single domain. If it is more than 1, we think the sender is phisher and 
set value 1 or else the value is 0 to indicate that the sender is not phisher. 
 
4.2.5.7 Unique_domain (UD) 
This binary data denotes if the domain names are used by more than one sender 
domain email. If it is more than 1, we think the email is abnormal or else the email is 
normal and set the value to 0, and 
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4.2.5.8 DMID_validity (DMID) 
The binary data denotes if the message-id field has been forged by the attacker. 
Note that this feature is an extension work from the one we discussed in [103]. Unlike 
the previous work that used 7 feature selection, in this approach the number of 
behaviour-based feature selection has been increased. 
 
4.2.6 Mining Sender Behaviour 
The data mining for sender behaviour is analysed from email headers. The 
dataset we selected from the email header has a structure as shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Dataset for sender behaviour 
Email sender Message-ID Domain 
Message-ID 
U
S 
U
D 
service@paypal.com q4-6$c--0--$-w@ qmb02q qmb02q 1 0 
service@paypal.com YYBTXKLGFQVFPTNKCG@hotmail.
com 
hotmail.com 1 0 
mark@talios.com 2060000.1012684767@spawn.se7en.org spawn.se7en.org 0 0 
mark@talios.com 2060000.1012684767@spawn.se7en.org spawn.se7en.org 0 0 
 
After all the features are defined, we extracted all seven possible features from 
each email. The values of all features are in various types. Sender domain, subject 
blacklist word, unique sender and unique domain are in binary. All URL-based features 
are in numerical however in vastly different ranges. For example, the URL dots could 
number of links under five. In order to treat all the original features as equally 
important, the value of each feature needs to be normalized before the classification 
process. Features with numerical values are normalized using the quotient of the actual 
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value over the maximum value of that feature so that numerical values are limited to the 
range [0, 1]. 
 
4.2.7 Hybrid Feature Selection 
In this section, we describe the proposed hybrid feature selection (HFS) 
algorithm. In the algorithm, we use domain_email_sender (DES), 
subject_blacklist_word (SBW), URL_dots (URLD), URL_symbol (URLS), URL_IP 
(URLIP), Unique_sender (US), Unique_domain (UD) feature values and DMID_valid 
(DMID) feature values. Table 4.2 contains description commonly used notation in this 
algorithm. The HFS algorithm aims to determine the feature matrix for predicting an 
email message is a phishing message or not. We then developed a methodology to 
extract seven features from each email.  
 
Table 4.2: Lists of notations 
Notation Description 
ES Email sender 
SE Email’s subject 
DES Domain email sender 
MID Message id 
DMID Domain message id 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
 
First, the email messages are partitioned into four components containing ES, 
SE, MID and URL. The inputs to HFS algorithm are DES, SBW, URLD, URLS, 
URLIP, US, UD and DMID as shown in Figure 4.3. In step 1, reading count for each 
email is done. For step 2 to 5, each incoming emails will run functions to verify sender 
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domain, identify an email’s subject blacklist word, URL feature matching and identify 
sender behaviour to extract features and finally construct the feature matrix. Unlike the 
previous algorithm, in this algorithm the number of behaviour-based feature selection 
has been increased where we proposed new feature: DMID_validity. 
 
Algorithm HSF 
1: FOR (each incoming EMAIL) DO 
2:   FOR (i=1 to K) DO 
3:      Verify sender domain; 
4:      Identify blacklist word; 
5:      Perform URL feature matching; 
6:      Identify sender behaviour; 
7:      Identify Message-id validity; 
8:      Constructing feature matrix; 
9:    ENDFOR 
10: ENDFOR 
END HSF 
Figure 4.3: Hybrid feature selection algorithm (HFS) 
 
4.2.7.1 Verify Sender Domain. 
In the verify sender domain, we compare the value of DES and DMID. If DES 
value is the same with DMID, 0 if , otherwise 1 if . The relationship DES and DMID 
are defined as follows (1): 
DMIDDESif
DMIDDESif
if z
{ ®¯­1
0
      (1) 
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4.2.7.2 Identify Blacklist Word 
In the identify email’s subject contain blacklist word, we analyse the email 
subject, whether it contains 18 blacklists word as proposed in [94]. If the subject email 
has the feature value ijSBW , it gets the corresponding score ijf . Then the total score is 
(2): 
¦  
18
1t
SBWijijf   (2) 
And if 0!ijf , the email’s subject is labelled as phishing email; if 0dijf , the email’s 
subject is labelled as a normal email. 
 
4.2.7.3 URL Feature Matching 
The URL feature matching determines whether a URL message is malicious or 
not. URL-based features are IP address, dots more than 5, and symbol: ‘%’, ‘&’ and 
‘@’. We check these 3 features of a tested URL message, and give the corresponding 
score. Finally, total score for each feature is calculated. If 0dF , the email message is 
labelled as phishing message, otherwise it is a normal message. Firstly, we construct the 
frequency distribution of each feature ,,,i,iF 31 for all data sets. iFD denotes the 
frequency distribution of feature values that iF appears in all datasets. We decide a set 
iR which request to score, where it could contain one value or multiple values. If the 
features do not exist in the iR , we set the value to zero. 
The URL feature matching algorithm:  iR,iFDScore  have iFD  and iR as 
inputs, and the output is the scoring tabulation of feature values within the iR . For each 
element in iR , recursively calculate the corresponding score as follows: 
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1. Calculate the number of all datasets ( in ) that have the feature value iR . Where 
ijR is an element in iR which may contain feature value zero, one or multiple 
value. 
2. After j rounds, the number of elements within iR , a scoring model ( ijR ; ijSc ) of 
the feature iF  is produced. If a URL message has the feature value ijR , it gets 
the corresponding score ijSc . Then the total score is (3): 
¦  
3
1t
ScijSc   (3) 
Because the number of each features will be varies. For example, the URL dots 
could be multiple linking values. Therefore, each feature value needs to be normalized 
before the classification process. Features with numerical values are normalized using 
the quotient of the actual value over the maximum value of that feature so that 
numerical values are limited to the range [0,1]. Then the value of each feature (4): 
ijScinx
ijSc
ijF 
 max             (4) 
 
4.2.7.4 Identify Sender Behaviour 
In this section, we present sender behaviour (SB) algorithm to determine unique 
sender and unique domain behaviour. The data mining for sender behaviour is analysed 
from email header has a structure as shown in Table 4. DES value is extracted from ES 
and DMID value is extracted from MID value. Figure 4.4 shows the pseudo-code of the 
SB algorithm. The inputs to the SB are lists of email sender (ES) and domain message-
id (DMID).  
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In step 2 to 15, each incoming email will compare email sender values and 
domain message-id for all email messages. If the same email sender sends email using 
the same domain, the unique sender (US) and a unique domain (UD) value are set to 
current US and UD value. If the same email sender sends an email using different 
domain, both US and UD value are incremented. Moreover, if different email sender 
sends email using the same domain, US are set to the current US value, while UD value 
is incremented by 1. If it did not satisfy all conditions, we set US and UD to current US 
and UD value. In step 18 to 24, if US and UD value is more than 1, both US and UD are 
set to 1. If it did not satisfy both conditions, both US and UD are set to 0. 
 
Algorithm SB 
INPUT: ES, DMID 
BEGIN 
1: FOR (each incoming EMAIL) DO 
2: FOR (i to K) DO 
3: FOR (j to K) DO 
4: IF (ES[i] = = ES[j] && DMID[i] = = DMID[j]) THEN 
5: GIVE US value US 
6: GIVE UD value UD 
7: ELSEIF (ES[i] = = ES[j] && DMID[i] ≠ DMID[j]) THEN 
8: GIVE US value US++ 
9: GIVE UD value UD++ 
10: ELSEIF (ES[i] ≠ ES[j] && DMID[i] = = DMID[j]) THEN 
11: GIVE US value US 
12: GIVE UD value UD++ 
13: ELSE 
14: GIVE US value US 
15: GIVE UD value UD 
16: ENDIF 
17: ENDFOR 
18: IF US >0 THEN 
19:       GIVE US VALUE 1 
20: ELSEIF UD>0 THEN 
21:      GIVE UD VALUE 1 
22: ELSE 
23:      GIVE US VALUE 0 
24:      GIVE UD VALUE 0 
25: ENDFOR 
END SBA 
Figure 4.4: Algorithm for mining sender behaviour 
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4.2.7.5 Identify Message-ID Validity 
Figure 4.5 shows the pseudo-code of the DMID algorithm. The input to the 
DMID is lists of domain message-id (DMID). In step 2 to 8, each incoming email will 
mine DMID value for all email messages to determine whether the email is phishing or 
normal email. If the DMID’s value has null value or contain uncommon generic top 
level domain name, the email is considered as forge email. The DMID’s value is set to 1 
if it satisfies either condition. 
 
Algorithm DMID 
INPUT: DMID 
SET US value to 0 
BEGIN 
1:    FOR (each incoming EMAIL) DO 
2:       FOR (i=1 to K) DO 
3:          IF (DMID[i] = = null + DMID[i] = =“”***.com","***.net","***.org", 
             "***.co","***.biz","***.edu","***.int","***.info") THEN 
4:                GIVE DMID value 1 
5:          ELSE 
6:               GIVE DMID value 0 
7:          ENDIF 
8:       ENDFOR 
9:     ENDFOR 
END DMID 
Figure 4.5: Algorithm for mining message-id validity 
 
4.2.7.6 Constructing Feature Matrix 
In this section, we construct the feature matrix of 8 features ܨ௜ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ͺǡ for 
all phishing and normal datasets. The values of all features are in various types. Note 
that ܨଵ, ܨଶ, ܨ଺, ܨ଻ and ଼ܨ  are in binary while ܨଷ, ܨସ and ܨହ are in numerical value 
ranging from 0 to 1. Example numerical data, such as URL_dots could consist of a 
number of links less or more than five. In order to treat all the original features as 
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equally important, the value of each feature needs to be normalized before the 
classification process. Features with numerical values are normalized using the quotient 
of the actual value over the maximum value of that feature so that numerical values are 
limited to the range [0, 1]. The iR value for each feature is summarized in Table 4.3. 
  
Table 4.3: iR value of each feature used in hybrid scheme 
Features Descriptions iR value 
ܨଵ: Similarity of domain email sender and domain message-id ܴଵ={0,1} 
ܨଶ: Email’s subject blacklist word ܴଶ={0,1} 
ܨଷ: IP-Based URL ܴଷ={0~1} 
ܨସ: The URL contains dots more than 5 ܴସ={0~1} 
ܨହ: The URL contains the symbol ܴହ={0~1} 
ܨ଺: Unique sender behaviour ܴ଺={0,1} 
ܨ଻: Unique domain behaviour ܴ଻={0,1} 
଼ܨ : Message-id validity ଼ܴ={0,1} 
 
Let ¿¾
½®¯­ |E|e...,,.........e,eE 21  and ¿¾
½®¯­ |F|f,......,f,fF 21  denotes all the emails 
and a feature vector space respectively. So, |E| is a total email and |F| refer to size of 
feature vectors. Let ika  be the value of a kth feature of ith document. Therefore, the 
presentation of each document is ¹¸
·
©¨
§ |E|ia,....ia,iaAi 21 , and each document is ^ `ikaA  
where |F|,,i 21 and |E,....|,k 21 .  
 
4.3 Performance Analysis 
In this section we explain the experimental setup and discuss the results derived 
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from the experiments. In the first part we will explain the experimental setup and then 
followed by results and discussions 
 
4.3.1 Experimental Setup 
This section presents our experimental setup. In our study, the classification was 
performed using Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA). For our 
preliminary experiment, we used freely available pre-classified phishing datasets from 
[96]. These datasets consist of 4550 phishing emails that have been used in previous 
research by [104][26][27][51][105][53][14][13]. In order to provide non-phishing 
datasets, we used the SpamAssassin Project [97] from the easy ham directory. This 
collection provides 2364 hams emails.  
 
Table 4.4: Phishing dataset file summary 
Set Ham : Phishing Ham Phishing Total 
1 50 : 50 1000 1000 2000 
2 60 : 40 1200 800 2000 
3 70 : 30 1400 600 2000 
4 80 : 20 1600 400 2000 
5 90 : 10 1800 200 2000 
 
We generated 5 sets of datasets randomly containing a varying split percentage 
number of phishing and ham emails from the overall datasets as shown in Table 4.4. In 
order to treat the set equally, we fixed the number for each set to 2000 data. The first set 
consists of 50:50 split percentage numbers of phishing email and ham email. The 
second set contains about 60:40 split percentages. The third set has 70:30 while the 
fourth set comprises of 80:20. Finally, the fifth set has the biggest percentage of ham 
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email which is 90:10. Datasets which contained unreadable symbol, Chinese language 
and Nigerian online scam are neglected.  
 
4.3.2 Performance Metric 
In order to measure the effectiveness of the classification, we refer to the four 
possible outcomes as:  
(a) True positive (TP): a classifier correctly identifies an instance as being positive. 
(b) False positive (FP): a classifier incorrectly identified an instance as being 
negative, in fact an instance is instances hypothetical to be positive. 
(c) True negative (TN): a classifier correctly identifies an instance as being 
negative. 
(d) False negative (FN): a classifier incorrectly identifies an instance as being 
positive, in fact an instances hypothetical to be negative. 
To measure the effectiveness of our approach, we use four metrics that are also used in 
previous work [51][2][94]: 
(a) Precision (P) - this is the fraction of correctness; 
(b) Recall (R) - these measures the portion of the completeness of correct categories 
that were assigned; 
(c) Accuracy (A) - these measures the percentage of all decisions that were correct; 
and 
(d) Error (E) - this relates to the number of misclassifications of instances. 
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4.4 Results and Discussions  
 This section presents the classification outcome of the Bayes Net algorithms on 
the extracted features. We decided to test the feature selection approach using Simulated 
Annealing search algorithms with 10 folds cross validations. 
 
4.4.1 Feature Selection 
Table 4.5 (a) and (b) presents the experimental results according to the selected 
classifier for five sets of data. Our result shows that, the hybrid based feature selection 
by combining content-based and behaviour-based feature selection shows quite a 
promising result. This is evidence that features based on sender and domain behaviour 
could be considered to determine phishing email. We tested on 5 sets of data with 
various split percentages of phishing and ham messages. Data for set 2 and set 3 
achieved the highest accuracy. In contrast, data set 5 showed the lowest accuracy among 
other datasets. 
 
Table 4.5: Classification result of five data sets 
Set TP FN FP TN  Set Acc Pre Err Recall 
1 0.92 0.08 0.08 0.92  1 92% 0.92 0.08 0.923 
2 0.94 0.06 0.07 0.94  2 94% 0.94 0.06 0.939 
3 0.95 0.06 0.07 0.93  3 94% 0.93 0.06 0.945 
4 0.95 0.06 0.15 0.85  4 90% 0.86 0.10 0.945 
5 0.97 0.03 0.26 0.74  5 86% 0.79 0.14 0.969 
(a)  (b) 
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4.4.2 Comparative Analysis 
In Table 4.6, we compare our result with existing works that used the same 
dataset from [14] and achieving at least 80% accuracy. Fette et al. [51] proposed 10 
features mostly based on URL and script presence achieved 96% accuracy. They used 
Random Forest (RF) as a classifier. 
 
Table 4.6: Comparison of the approaches 
 Feature 
Approach 
Sample Classifier Accuracy 
Fette et al. [51] URL-based and 
script-based 
7810 RF 96% 
Abu-Nimeh et 
al. [13] 
Keyword-based 2889 NN 
RF 
SVM 
LR 
BART 
CART 
94.5% 
94.4 % 
94% 
93.8% 
93.2% 
91.6% 
Toolan et al. 
[27] 
Behavioural-
based and 
content-based 
6097 C5.0 Decision 
Tree Learning 
Algorithm 
Dataset 1 (97%) 
Dataset 2 (84%)  
Dataset 3 (79%) 
Our Approach Hybrid feature 6923 Bayes Net Set 1 (92%), Set 2 (94%), Set 
3 (94%), Set 4 (90%), Set 5 
(86%) 
 
Abu Nimeh [13] examined 43 keywords generated using Term Frequency-
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) as an indicator to determine the best machine 
learning technique for phishing email detection. They compare the accuracy between 
several machine learning methods including Logistic Regression (LR), Classification 
and Regression Trees (CART), Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART), Support 
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Vector Machines (SVM), Random Forests (RF), and Neural Networks (NNet) for 
predicting phishing emails. They found that Neural Net algorithm performs the best 
among others with 94.5% accuracy. 
Toolan et al. [27] used content-based and behaviour-based approach to classify 
phishing email similar to the one described in the current work. They used 22 features to 
test on 3 datasets comprising 6097 samples. They achieved approximately 97% 
accuracy. Finally, we include our work who aimed to propose a hybrid feature selection 
using 8 features. We successfully achieved 94% accuracy covering 6923 samples. Even 
though the accuracy is quite low, we manage to test it only by using more robust 
features and least feature selection compared to others. 
 
4.4.3 Other Finding 
Experiments were conducted with four different types of the classification 
algorithm to identify which machine learning method performs the best. We have 
implemented using Bayes Net (BN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), AdaBoost and 
Random Tree. Figure 4.6 shows that Bayes Net generated the highest accuracy which 
builds a good classifier. Comparing to other classification algorithm, the highest 
accuracies of other classification algorithms are AdaBoost (-0.02%), Support Vector 
Machine (-0.02%), and Random Tree (0.00%). This result recommends that Bayes Net 
and Random Tree achieved the highest accuracy and work well in discrete and small 
vector space data. The performance degrades for dataset set5 because it has the smallest 
percentage of phishing email which is just 10% from all data sets. 
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Figure 4.6: Accuracies for different type of classification 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
We propose behaviour-based features to detect phishing emails by observing 
sender behaviour. We extract all features using Mbox2xml as a disassembly tool. We 
then mine the sender behaviour to identify whether the email came from legitimate 
sender or not. We take into account behaviour of senders who tends to send email from 
more than a single domain and a domain that handle different kind of email sender 
domain. Other than that, the attacker also used to forge the message-id field information 
to cover their tracks. By combining these datasets, we used a Bayes Net algorithm to 
classify the datasets into phishing or ham emails. This hybrid feature selection approach 
produces promising result using 8 features with 94% accuracy. The feature selection we 
used in this chapter does not work on graphical form as some attacker bypasses the 
content based approach using images. The result motivates future works to explore the 
attackers’ behaviour and profile their modus operandi. As future work, we would like to 
investigate further on the message - id field to understand the attacker strategies to cover 
their tracks. 
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
set1 set2 set3 set4 set5
BN
SVM
Adaboost
Random Tree
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Profiling Phishing Activities 
In this chapter, an approach for email-born phishing detection based on profiling and 
clustering techniques is proposed. We formulate the profiling problem as a clustering 
problem using various features present in the phishing emails as feature vectors and 
generate profiles based on clustering predictions. These predictions are further utilized 
to generate complete profiles of the emails. We carried out extensive experimental 
analysis of the proposed approach in order to evaluate its effectiveness to various factors 
such as sensitivity to the type of data, number of data sizes and cluster sizes. We 
compared the performance of the proposed approach against the Modified Global K-
means (MGKmeans) approach. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The email services are used daily by millions of people, businesses, 
governments and different organizations to communicate around the globe. Email is 
also a mission-critical application for many businesses [92]. However, e-mail born 
phishing attacks is an emerging problem nowadays and solving this problem has proven 
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to be very challenging. While phishing attacks can take several forms and the tactics 
used can vary such as emails, websites, SMS, forum posts and comments, the phisher 
main goal are always to lure people into giving up important information. For example, 
in an email-born phishing attacks, phishers send emails that mislead their victims into 
revealing credential information such as account numbers, passwords, or other personal 
information to the phisher. In some cases, the phishers implant malicious software that 
controls a computer so that it can participate in future phishing scams. As most phishing 
emails are nearly identical to the normal emails, it is quite difficult for the average users 
distinguish phishing emails from non-phishing once. Moreover, phishing tactics have 
become more and more complicated and the phishers continually change their ways of 
perpetrating phishing attacks to defeat the anti-phishing techniques.  
The main problem addressed in this chapter is how efficiently distinguish 
phishing emails from non-phishing emails. There have been many approaches to detect 
and prevent phishing attacks like using multi-tier classifier [4], anti-phishing toolbars 
[51] and scam website blockers [106][32]. Recently, the concept of profiling phishing 
emails with the aim of tracking, predicting and identifying phishing emails has been 
discussed in [71][72]. The present work is motivated by the work of [71][72] and 
complements these studies in many ways. Yearwood et al. [71] discussed profiling of 
phishing activity based on hyperlinks extracted from phishing emails. The authors used 
three groups of features, namely the text content which is shown to the email's reader; a 
characterization of the hyperlinks in the email; and the orthographic features of the 
email. They used several clustering techniques to individually assign each instance of an 
email to a cluster according to its clustering criteria and the three feature set. The 
clusters were then ensemble using clustering consensus approaches. Our work differs 
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from [71] in that we concentrate on identifying phishing emails whereas [71] focus on 
identifying a specific number of phishing groups. Also, we represent phishing emails by 
using a vector space model. Moreover, the technique proposed in [71] depends on the 
phishing emails with embedded hyperlinks only, whereas, many of the phishing email 
attacks are created without hyperlinks, therefore, this technique still shows flaw in its 
classification role. Work in [71] used k-means clustering algorithm to cluster the data 
and they do not automatically determine the final number of clusters (i.e., k) that is the 
most appropriate, whereas we use the Two-Step clustering algorithms and develop an 
algorithm that determines the optimal number of clusters to be used. Also, we use the 
profile to train the phishing detection algorithm, whereas work [71] did not do.  
In this chapter, a novel algorithm based on clustering and profiling approaches 
to detect email-born phishing activities are proposed. Phishing attack related research is 
usually concentrated on the detection of phishing emails based on significant features 
such as hyperlink, number of words, subject of emails and others. In contrast, we focus 
on profiling phishing emails which are different from the detection of phishing emails. 
Phishers normally have their own signatures or techniques. Thus, a phisher’s profile can 
be expected to show a collection of different activities. In the proposed approach, we 
apply clustering techniques based on modified Two-Step clustering algorithm to 
generate the optimal number of clusters. Moreover, we split the data into training and 
testing ratios as discussed in [108][109]. Next, our model generates profiles from the 
training data to train the detection algorithm. Our major contributions are summarized 
as follows: 
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1. We propose a method for extracting features from phishing emails. The method 
is based on a weighting of email features and selecting the features according to 
a priority ranking. 
2. We propose phishing email profiling and filtering algorithm. We show that, 
general profiles can improve accuracy of the phishing detection. 
3. We discuss the implications and the relative importance of the number of 
clusters to ensure that the phishing email profile generated is generalized. 
4. We provide empirical evidence that our proposed approach reduces the false 
positive and false negative in regards to over fitting issues. 
 
5.2 Email-Born Phishing Profiling Approach  
In this section, we discuss the proposed phishing profiling classification model. 
We will first introduce the architecture and the feature extraction and selection processes.  
 
5.2.1 Feature Extraction and Clustering Process 
A high level description of the feature extraction and clustering process is shown 
in Figure 5.1. The first step is to extract features from the phishing emails. Based on the 
output of the feature extraction step, a feature selection step is performed to select a 
subset of relevant features to be used in the construction of the model. In this step, the 
most informative features are selected using a learning model and a classification 
algorithm.  
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Figure 5.1: Phishing email profiling and classification model 
 
The next step is profiling of the phishing dataset based on the clustering 
algorithm. We propose different classification model by formulating the profiling 
problem as a clustering problem using the various features in the phishing emails as 
feature vectors. Further, we generate profiles based on clustering predictions. Thus, a 
cluster becomes an element of the profile. This profile, then becomes the training data 
set to train the detection algorithm. The selection of the optimal number of clusters is 
crucial at this stage to increase the accuracy and efficiency of the filtering results.  
The next step is classification where the data set is split into training and testing 
ratios. The training data is used to generate profiles by clustering algorithm. Later, the 
profile generated in the profiling stage is used to train the classification algorithm where 
it is supposed to predict the unknown class label based on the input data using a 
classification algorithm. The detailed description of these steps is discussed later. 
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5.2.2 Feature Extraction and Selection 
Several email features could be used as a basis for comparison and clustering of 
the email datasets. These email features include the actual text content displayed to the 
user, the textual structure of this content, the nature of the hyperlinks embedded within 
the message, or the use of HTML features such as images, tables and forms. A basic 
approach is to represent each email message in terms of the email features and then 
apply a clustering algorithm to these features. However, there are two drawbacks to this 
simplistic approach. Firstly, the nature of the features is heterogeneous in that some 
features are numerical while others are binary or categorical. Thus, combining the 
features together in a single clustering algorithm is problematic. Secondly, clustering 
algorithms always produce a set of clusters, even if there is no evidence of any 
underlying structure in the data. In our case, there are no ground-truth labels to use as a 
basis for testing the clustering results, as the actual source for any of the emails is 
unknown. Therefore, it is important that methods to validate the clusters produced by 
the system are found.  
 
5.2.3 Information Gain 
 Information gain (IG) is used to determine which attribute in a given set of 
training feature vectors is most useful for discriminating between the classes to be 
learned. IG informs how important a given attribute of a feature vector is. In general, 
information gain is given as follows: 
ܫܩሺܨǡ ܽሻ ൌ ܪሺܨሻ െ ܪሺܨȁܽሻ        (1) 
102 
 
where ܪ denotes the information entropy, ܨ denotes feature vector in the form of 
ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௡ǡ ݕሻ where ݔ௔ א ݒ݈ܽሺܽሻ  is the value ofath attribute of feature 
vector ݔ and ݕ is the corresponding class label and ܪሺܨሻ is entropy defined as follows: 
ܫܩሺܨǡ ܽሻ ൌ ܪሺܨሻ െ σ ȁሼ௫אிȁ௫ೌୀ௩ሽȁȁிȁ௧א௩௔௟ሺ௔ሻ ή ܪሺሼݔ א ܨȁݔ௔ ൌ ݐሽሻ      (2) 
Table 5.1 shows the ranking of 20 email features and the corresponding 
information gain values for the classification scenario extracted from Khonji’s anti-
phishing studies website. These datasets were publicly available from SpamAssassin’s 
ham corpus [97] and Jose Nazarios phishing corpus [96]. The dataset consists of both 
continuous and categorical values. Features with continuous values are normalized using 
the quotient of the actual value over the maximum value of that feature so that 
continuous values are limited to the range [0, 1]. This will split the data more evenly and 
improves the results achieved with the information gain algorithm.  
 
Table 5.1: Summary of the dataset 
Rank IG Value Attributes Type Description 
1 0.863473 Externalsascore  Continuous Contains binary class prediction 
where value ‘1’ if the emails is 
spam and value ‘0’ if the email is 
normal. 
2 0.774079 Externalsabinary  Categorical Value of SpamAssasin’s score. 
3 0.707139 URLnumlink  Continuous Number of links in URLs in an 
email message. 
4 0.669168 Bodyhtml  Categorical Determines if the email had an 
html part. ‘1’ if the email contains 
html part, ‘0’ otherwise. 
5 0.609389 URLnumperiods  Continuous Determines number of periods in 
URLs in an email message. 
6 0.413923 Sendnumwords  Continuous Number of words in email sender. 
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Table 5.1: continued 
Rank IG Value Attributes Type Description 
7 0.410465 URLnumexternallink  Continuous Determines number of external 
links in URLs in an email message. 
8 0.388836 Bodynumfunctionwor
ds  
Continuous Number of functions word in the 
email’s body, such as account, 
suspended and etc. 
9 0.305396 Bodydearword  Categorical Specify if the email contains the 
word “dear”. Value ‘1’ if the email 
had word “dear”, ‘0’ otherwise. 
10 0.26253 Subjectreplyword Categorical Binary value ‘1’ if the ‘verify’ 
word presence in the email’s 
subject. ‘0’ otherwise. 
11 0.239928 Sendunmodaldomain Categorical Binary value ‘1’ specifying the 
domain of the sender is not the 
modal domain in an email, ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
12 0.236486 Bodynumwords  Continuous Number of body’s word in email 
13 0.223582 Bodynumchars  Continuous Number of characters in email 
body. 
14 0.209478 Bodymultipart  Categorical Defines value ‘1’ if the email body 
had a multipart, ‘0’ otherwise. 
15 0.188858 URLnumip  Continuous Number of IP addresses in URLs in 
an email message 
16 0.167831 Subjectrichness  Continuous The ‘richness’ of words in an 
email’s subject which measured as 
follows: ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݎ݄݅ܿ݊݁ݏݏ ൌ
ேೢ೚ೝ೏ೞ
ே೎೓ೌೝೌ೎೟೐ೝೞwhere, ௪ܰ௢௥ௗ௦ and 
௖ܰ௛௔௥௔௖௧௘௥௦ are the total number of 
words and the total of characters in 
an email’s subject. 
17 0.152108 URLip  Categorical Binary value ‘1’ to show an 
existence of IP address in the email 
message. ‘0’ otherwise 
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Table 5.1: continued 
Rank IG Value Attributes Type Description 
18 0.079708 Subjectbankword  Categorical Binary value ‘1’ if the ‘bank’ word 
presence in email’s subject. ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
19 0.071806 URLwordloginlink  Categorical Binary value ‘1’ to show an 
existence of word ‘login’ in URLs. 
‘0’ otherwise. 
20 0.062774 URLwordherelink  Categorical Binary value ‘1’ to show an 
existence of word ‘here’ in URLs. 
‘0’ otherwise 
 
Table 5.2 shows the three datasets derived from the email features. The top 10 
features of each type of dataset are selected based on information gain value for 
phishing email classification derived from different parts of the email properties. The 
structural properties used for generating profiles are selected from the email body 
features, the email header features, the URL features and the external features. In our 
approach, we have instead selected to use 20 features which reflect the different 
characteristics of the data types.  
Based on the information gain value, we classified the 20 email features shown 
in Table 5.2 into three types of datasets defined as follows: 
1) Select the top 10 features for binary or categorical data (Cat10); 
2) Select the top 10 features for continuous data (Cont10); and 
3) Select the top 10 features for mixed data (categorical and continuous) (Mix10). 
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Table 5.2: Datasets with different type of data 
Rank Cat10 Cont10 Mix10 
1 Externalsabinary Externalsascore Externalsascore 
2 Bodyhtml URLnumlink Externalsabinary 
3 Bodydearword URLnumperiods URLnumlink 
4 Subjectreplyword Sendnumwords Bodyhtml 
5 Sendunmodaldomain URLnumexternallink URLnumperiods 
6 Bodymultipart Bodynumfunctionwords Sendnumwords 
7 URLip Bodynumchars URLnumexternallink 
8 Subjectbankword Bodynumwords Bodynumfunctionwords 
9 URLwordloginlink URLnumip Bodydearword 
10 URLwordherelink Subjectrichness Subjectreplyword 
 
5.2.4 Profiling Clustering Algorithm 
Our work considers using continuous and categorical data inherent in the email 
messages to profile the activities of the phishing emails. We developed techniques to 
automatically obtain the optimal number of group profiles. In the existing approaches, 
k-means clustering algorithm was used to profile phishing emails [70][71][72]. 
However, k-means clustering approach cannot handle both continuous and categorical 
variables and attributes. In the proposed approach, we enhanced the two-step clustering 
algorithm [111] and used it to handle the continuous and categorical data. The two-step 
clustering algorithm uses the agglomerative hierarchical clustering method in the 
clustering step to automatically determine the optimal number of clusters in the input 
data. This algorithm is selected because it is designed to handle very large datasets.  Let 
ܨ denotes feature vector of the training set in the form of ሺݔሻ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௡ሻ 
where ݔ௜ א ݒ݈ܽሺ݅ሻ is the value of the ith attribute of feature vectors ݔ. The ݔ௜ value for 
each feature are summarized in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Range value for each feature in datasets 
 
5.2.5 Constructing Feature Matrix 
In this section, we discuss the process we used for constructing feature matrix 
for the datasets. Let ܧ and ܨ denote the emails and the feature vector space respectively: 
ܧ ൌ ሼ݁ଵǡ ݁ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݁ேሽ            (3) 
ܨ ൌ ሼ ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ǥ ǡ ெ݂ሽ            (4) 
where ܰ is the total number of emails and ܯ refers to the size of the feature vector. Let 
ݔ௜௝ be the value of a jth feature on ith document. Therefore, the presentation of each 
dataset ܦ  is given as follows: 
ܦௗ ൌ ൛ݔ௜௝ൟȁͳ ൑ ݅ ൑ ܰǢ ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ܯǢ ݀ א ሺܥܽݐͳͲǡ ܥ݋݊ݐͳͲǡܯ݅ݔͳͲሻ  (5) 
For example, the feature matrix for the Cat10 dataset consists of 10 features ܨ௜ǡ ͳ ൑
݅ ൑ ͳͲ for all phishing and normal emails. Note that Cat10 dataset consists of 10 
categorical/binary values ranging from 0 to 1. So, each dataset for Dcat10, Dcont10 and 
Dmix10  consists of:  
ࡲ࢏ Cat10 ࢞࢏  Cont10 ࢞࢏  Mix10 ࢞࢏  
ܨଵ Externalsabinary ሼͲǡͳሽ Externalsascore ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Externalsascore ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
ܨଶ Bodyhtml ሼͲǡͳሽ URLnumlink ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Externalsabinary ሼͲǡͳሽ 
ܨଷ Bodydearword ሼͲǡͳሽ URLnumperiods ሼͲ̱ͳሽ URLnumlink ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
ܨସ Subjectreplyword ሼͲǡͳሽ Sendnumwords ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Bodyhtml ሼͲǡͳሽ 
ܨହ SendunModaldomain ሼͲǡͳሽ URLnumexternallink ሼͲ̱ͳሽ URLnumperiods ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
ܨ଺ Bodymultipart ሼͲǡͳሽ BodynumFunctionwords ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Sendnumwords ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
ܨ଻ URLip ሼͲǡͳሽ Bodynumchars ሼͲ̱ͳሽ URLnumexternallink ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
଼ܨ  Subjectbankword ሼͲǡͳሽ Bodynumwords ሼͲ̱ͳሽ BodynumFunctionwords ሼͲ̱ͳሽ 
ܨଽ URLwordloginlink ሼͲǡͳሽ URLnumip ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Bodydearword ሼͲǡͳሽ 
ܨଵ଴ URLwordherelink ሼͲǡͳሽ Subjectrichness ሼͲ̱ͳሽ Subjectreplyword ሼͲǡͳሽ 
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Dcat10={ externalsabinary, bodyhtml, bodydearword, subjectreplyword, 
sendunmodaldomain, bodymultipart, URLip, subjectbankword, URLwordloginlink, 
URLwordherelink}. 
Dcont10 = {externalsascore, URLnumlink, URLnumperiods, sendnumwords, 
URLnumexternallink, bodynumfunctionwords, bodynumchars, bodynumwords, 
URLnumip, subjectrichness}  
Dmix10 = {externalsascore, externalsabinary, URLnumlink, bodyhtml, 
URLnumperiods, sendnumwords, URLnumexternallink, bodynumfunctionwords, 
bodydearword, subjectreplyword}.  
 
5.2.6 Two-Step Clustering Algorithm 
In this section we give a brief description of the two-step clustering algorithm. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the two-step algorithm components. The steps for the two-step clustering 
algorithm are as follows:  
Step 1: (Distance similarity) Compute the distance similarity using the log-likelihood 
function. 
Step 2: (Cluster membership assignment) Allocate data points according to log-
likelihood functionǡ ܮܮሺ݇ሻ to its closest centre and obtain kth cluster. 
Step 3: Compute the initial number of clusters. 
Step 4: (Stopping criterion) Decide the number of final clusters. 
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Figure 5.2: Two-step cluster algorithm components 
 
5.2.6.1 Distance Similarity Computation  
The algorithm computes the distance similarity using the log-likelihood 
function. The log-likelihood distance similarity is a probability based distance between 
two clusters. It is related to the reduction in log-likelihood as two clusters are joined into 
one cluster. In computing log-likelihood, normal distributions for continuous variables 
and multinomial distributions of categorical variables are assumed. Also the variables 
are assumed to be independent of each other and so are the cases. Let ௜ܸ in Eq. 6 and ୳ 
in Eq. 7 be the distance for clusters iand clusters u respectively, where, 
௜ܸ ൌ െ ௜ܰ ቀσ ଵଶ ൫ߪො௜௝ଶ ൅ ߪො௝ଶ൯ െ
௣
௝ୀଵ σ σ
ே೔ೕ೗
ே೔ 
ே೔ೕ೗
ே೔
௔௖ೕ
௟ୀଵ
௤
௝ୀଵ ቁ       (6) 
௨ܸ ൌ െ ௨ܰ ቀσ ଵଶ ൫ߪො௨௝ଶ ൅ ߪො௝ଶ൯ െ
௣
௝ୀଵ σ σ
ேೠೕ೗
ேೠ 
ேೠೕ೗
ேೠ
௔௖ೕ
௟ୀଵ
௤
௝ୀଵ ቁ      (7) 
Accordingly, the difference between clusters iand clusters u can be defined as݀ሺ݅ǡ ݑሻ ൌ
௜ܸ ൅ ௨ܸ െ ழܸ௜ǡ௨வ. Let ௭ܸ be the distance similarity between cluster݅ and clusterݑ 
whereݖሺݖ ൌ ݅ǡ ݑǡ ۃ݅ǡ ݑۄሻ. Here, ۃ݅ǡ ݑۄindicates the index that represents a cluster formed 
by combining cluster݅ and clusterݑ where, 
ழܸ௜ǡ௨வ ൌ െ ழܰ௜ǡ௨வ ൬σ ଵଶ ൫ߪොழ௜ǡ௨வ௝ଶ ൅ ߪො௝ଶ൯ െ
௣
௝ୀଵ σ σ
ேಬ೔ǡೠಭೕ೗
ேಬ೔ǡೠಭ 
ேಬ೔ǡೠಭೕ೗
ேಬ೔ǡೠಭ
௔௖ೕ
௟ୀଵ
௤
௝ୀଵ ൰(8) 
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The first part in Eq. 8, െ ௭ܰ σ ଵଶ ൫ߪො௭௝ଶ ൅ ߪො௝ଶ൯
௣
௝ୀଵ  measures the dispersion of 
continuous variables,ܽ ௝ܾሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݌ሻ, where ݌ is the total number of continuous 
variables used in the datasets for all numbers of data ( ௭ܰ) in cluster ݖ. Hereߪො௭௝ଶ  is the 
estimated variance of the jth continuous variable in cluster z while ߪො௝ଶ is the estimated 
variance of the jth continuous variable across the entire dataset. An estimated variance 
is the average of the squared differences from the mean value for continuous variables. 
The term ߪො௝ଶis added to circumvent a deteriorating condition for ߪො௭௝ଶ ൌ Ͳ. When ߪො௭௝ଶ  is 
used, ݀ሺ݅ǡ ݑሻ would be declining in the log-likelihood function after merging cluster݅ 
and clusterݑ.  
The second part in Eq. 8, െ ௭ܰ σ σ ே೥ೕ೗ே೥ 
ே೥ೕ೗
ே೥
௔௖ೕ
௟ୀଵ
௤
௝ୀଵ   is used as a measure of 
dispersion for all categorical variables, ܽ ௝ܿሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݍሻ where ݍ is the total number 
of categorical variables used in the datasets. Here 
ே೥ೕ೗
ே೥  represents the mean of the l
th 
category variable in cluster z, where ௭ܰ௝௟ is the number of records in cluster z whose jth 
categorical variable takes the lth category for the number of data in cluster z, ௭ܰ. Then, 
the cluster with the smallest distance ݀ሺ݅ǡ ݑሻ is merged in each step. The log-likelihood 
function, ܮܮሺ݇ሻ for the step with kth clusters is calculated as follows: 
ܮܮሺ݇ሻ ൌ σ ௭ܸ௞௭ୀଵ             (9) 
where the ܮܮሺ݇ሻ function can be understood as a distribution within the clusters. 
Cluster membership for each object is assigned deterministically to the closest cluster 
according to the distance measure used to find the clusters. The deterministic 
assignment may result in unfair estimates of the cluster profiles if the clusters overlap. 
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5.2.6.2 Computation of the Initial Number of Clusters 
The number of clusters can be automatically determined using two phase 
estimator in Two-Step clustering algorithms. The first phase can be prepared by using 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In this 
approach, we use BIC as the first estimator because it results in a good initial estimate 
of the maximum number of clusters. The BIC is computed as follows: 
ܤܫܥሺ݇ሻ ൌ െʹܮܮሺ݇ሻ ൅ ݎሺ݇ሻ ܰ          (10) 
where ݎሺ݇ሻ ൌ ݇൛ʹ݌ ൅ σ ൫ܽ ௝ܿ െ ͳ൯௤௝ୀଵ ൟ such that ݍ is the total number of categorical 
variables (ܽ ௝ܿ) used in the datasets, ݌ is the total number of continuous variables used 
in the dataset and ݇ is the cluster number.  
Then the ratio change in BIC at each consecutive merging step relative to the 
first merging step decides the initial estimate. Let ݀ܤܫܥሺ݇ሻ is the change that results 
between ݇ clusters and ሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ cluster model where, ݀ܤܫܥሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܤܫܥሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ െ
ܤܫܥሺ݇ሻǤ Then, the ratio of BIC changes with respect to the changes of the two clusters 
is defined as follows: 
ܴܤܭሺ݇ሻ ൌ ௗ஻ூ஼ሺ௞ሻௗ஻ூ஼ሺଵሻ                                                                                    (11) 
Note that if ݀ܤܫܥሺͳሻ ൑ Ͳ, then the number of clusters is set to 1 and the second stage is 
omitted. Otherwise, the initial estimate for the ݇ clusters is the smallest number for 
which ܴܤܭሺ݇ሻ is smaller than the threshold value ߠଵ. 
The second phase uses the ratio of distance measures,ܴሺ݇ሻ for kth clusters and 
defined as follows: 
ܴሺ݇ሻ ൌ ோ஻௄ሺ௞ሻோ஻௄ሺ௞ାଵሻ            (12) 
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where, ܴܤܭ is the ratio of BIC changes for  cluster. We compute the same ratio with 
the following cluster, ሺ ൅ ͳሻ in Eq. 12. Finally, compare the two largest  ratios. 
Assume that the value for the threshold is Ʌଵ ൌ ͳǤͳͷ.  If the largest  ratios are more 
than 1.15 times than the second largest  ratios, we select the cluster with the largest  
ratio as the optimal number of clusters. Otherwise, from the two clusters with the 
largest  values, we select the one with the larger number of clusters as the optimal 
cluster.  
The concept is illustrated using the information given in Table 5.4. The two 
largest values of ܴሺ݇ሻ are (ܴሺ͸ሻ ൌ ʹǤͺʹ͹ሻ and (ܴሺͻሻ ൌ ͳǤ͹ͷͳሻ. Therefore the ܴ ratios 
are calculated as, ோሺ଺ሻோሺଽሻ ൌ
ଶǤ଼ଶ଻
ଵǤ଻ହଵ ൌ ͳǤ͸ͳͷ. Assume that the threshold value, ߠଵ ൌ ͳǤͳͷ. 
Therefore, the ܴ ratio 1.615 is larger than the threshold value ͳǤͳͷ. As a result, 6 is 
selected as the optimal number of clusters. 
 
Table 5.4: Two-step clustering  
࢑ ࡮ࡵ࡯ሺ࢑ሻ ࢊ࡮ࡵ࡯ሺ࢑ሻ ࡾ࡮ࡷሺ࢑ሻ ࡾሺ࢑ሻ 
1 85389.657 
2 63367.912 -22021.745 1.000 1.648 
3 50004.675 -13363.237 0.607 1.385 
4 40356.122 -9648.553 0.438 0.816 
5 28536.087 -11820.035 0.537 1.421 
6 20220.546 -8315.541 0.378 2.827 
7 17279.012 -2941.534 0.134 0.898 
8 14003.789 -3275.223 0.149 0.872 
9 10245.876 -3757.913 0.171 1.751 
10 8099.452 -2146.424 0.097 0.924 
11 5776.634 -2322.818 0.105 1.082 
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In summary, this algorithm is sensitive to the choice of threshold value ሺߠሻ to 
determine the initial number of clusters. A large value of ߠ can result in a large number 
of initial clusters while small value can produce artificial clusters. Moreover, the 
number of clusters defined by this algorithm is not diverse for a large number of data 
[112].  
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Figure 5.3: Phishing profiling classification model 
 
5.2.7 Algorithm for Profiling Phishing Emails 
The proposed phishing profiling approach consists of two stages. The first stage 
is profiling email-born phishing activities, where profiles are generated based on 
clustering algorithm's predictions. Thus, clusters become elements of profiles. We then 
employ a clustering algorithm as clustering predictions in phishing emails. These 
predictions are further utilized to generate complete profiles of these emails. The 
number of profiles to be used in the earlier stage is crucial for the effectiveness of this 
model. The second stage is a classification of emails. The profiles generated from the 
profiling stage are used to train the classification algorithm where it supposed to predict 
the unknown class label based on the input data. Therefore, the key objective of the 
profiles is to ‘train’ the classification algorithm for better generalization capability 
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where it can predict the class label accurately for unknown records. Figure 5.3 is a 
schematic representation of the proposed ProPhish algorithm. The algorithm has 5 
steps, each step is described below: 
Step 1: (Initialization). Let ܺ௜ be the corresponding input value for the algorithm such 
that, 
ܺ௜ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵǡ ݔ௜ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௜ேሻ           (13) 
where ݔ௜ is the value of attribute ith in the email and ܰ is the total number of attributes 
in the email datasets. Let the cluster number set to be ݇ ൌ ͳ and ratio size, ܴܵሺͳሻ ൌ ͲǤ 
In this approach, the continuous variables are represented asǡ ܽ ௝ܾሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݌ሻ where 
݌ is a total number of continuous variable used in the datasets within cluster݇. Thus, the 
categorical variable is denoted as ܽ ௝ܿሺ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݍሻ  where ݍ is a total number of 
categorical variables. 
Step 2: Compute the distance similarity using log-likelihood function. We apply Eq. 6 
to 9 to find the log-likelihood function value, ܮܮሺ݇ሻ for the kth cluster. 
Step 3: Cluster membership assignment: Allocate the log-likelihood ǡ ܮܮሺ݇ሻሺ݇ ൌ
ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡݓሻ at its closest center. Next, we apply the computation of the initial number of 
the cluster section to obtain kth cluster model, ܥ௞ ሺ݇ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ ǡ ݓሻ, where w is the 
optimum number of clusters and the size of each clusterሺܰܥ௞ሻ. For each cluster model 
ܥ௞, we calculate the percentage of cluster size ൫ܲሺ݇ሻ൯ for the largest and the smallest 
clusters. The percentage of the largest clusters ൫ܲሺ݇௠௔௫ሻ൯ and the smallest clusters 
൫ܲሺ݇௠௜௡ሻ൯ are computed as follows: 
ܲሺ݇௠௔௫ሻ ൌ ேሺ௞೘ೌೣሻே Ǣ ܲሺ݇௠௜௡ሻ ൌ
ேሺ௞೘೔೙ሻ
ே          (14) 
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where N represents the total datasets, ܰሺ݇௠௔௫ሻ  and ܰሺ݇௠௜௡ሻ are the size of the largest 
cluster and the size of the smallest cluster respectively. 
Step 4: (Stopping criterion). The ratio size ሺܴܵሻfor the largest and smallest values of 
ܴܵሺ݇ሻ for each cluster is computed as follows: 
ܴܵሺ݇ሻ ൌ ௉ሺ௞೘ೌೣሻ௉ሺ௞೘೔೙ሻ            (15) 
We compute the same ratio size forሺ݇ െ ͳሻ clusters, untilܴܵሺ݇ሻ ൎ ܴܵሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ. 
Finally, we select a cluster model with the larger number of clusters as optimal. For 
example, Table 5.5 shows the ratio size value for 11 clusters. Assume that it consists of 
ܰ ൌ Ͷ͹ͺ͸emails. Hence, the two values that satisfy ܴܵሺ݇ሻ ൎ ܴܵሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ are when the 
cluster size is 10 where ܴܵሺͻሻ ൌ ͵͸Ǥ͹ͷ and ܴܵሺͳͲሻ ൌ ͵͸Ǥ͹ͷǤ As a result, 10 is selected 
as the optimum number of clusters. 
 
Table 5.5: Clustering uses ratio size 
࢑ ࡺሺ࢑࢓࢏࢔ሻ ࡺሺ࢑࢓ࢇ࢞ሻ ࡼሺ࢑࢓࢏࢔ሻ ࡼሺ࢑࢓ࢇ࢞ሻ ࡾࡿሺ࢑ሻ 
2 2,059 2,727 43.02 56.98 1.32 
3 407 2,751 8.50 57.48 6.76 
4 382 1,878 7.98 39.24 4.92 
5 377 1,878 7.88 39.24 4.98 
6 179 1,874 3.74 39.16 10.47 
7 171 1,874 3.57 39.16 10.96 
8 102 1,874 2.13 39.16 18.37 
9 51 1,874 1.07 39.16 36.75 
10 51 1,874 1.07 39.16 36.75 
11 25 1,871 0.52 39.09 74.84 
 
Step 5: (Profiles Prediction Result). To construct profiles, the result generated by the 
clustering algorithm is used. Let us denote the dataset, ܦ ൌ ൛ݔ௜௝ൟwhere ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡݓ 
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and ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡܯ. The cluster model ensemble in this data set will be denoted by 
ܥ ൌ ሼܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܥ௪ሽ  where, for each cluster model ܥ௜, the data set ܦ is a disjoint union 
of the classes in this clustering so that ܥ௜ ൌ ൛ܥଵ௜ǡ ܥଶ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ܥ௪௜ ൟ and ܦ ൌ ܥଵ௜ ׫ ܥଶ௜ ׫ ǥ׫ ܥ௪௜  
for all ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡݓ where ݓ is the optimal number of clusters generated by the clustering 
algorithm.  
Table 5.6 consists profile prediction for dataset ܦ௠௜௫ଵ଴. Given ܦ௠௜௫ଵ଴ have 10 
optimal number of clusters, ܥଵ଴Ǥ So, attribute for dataset mix contain of DMix10 = 
{externalsascore, externalsabinary, URLnumlink, bodyhtml, URLnumperiods, 
sendnumwords, URLnumexternallink, bodynumfunctionwords, bodydearword, 
subjectreplyword}. 
 
Table 5.6: Profiles prediction for dataset ୫୧୶ଵ଴ 
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5.3 Performance Analysis 
In this section, we present the analysis and performance evaluation of the 
proposed approach and compare it with the Modified Global Kmeans (MGKmeans) 
algorithm [76] to demonstrate its effectiveness in profiling phishing emails. We will 
first present the experimental setup in profiling emails. Then, we discuss the results of 
the experiments. 
 
5.3.1 Experimental Setup 
For our experiment, we used datasets from Khonji’s anti-phishing studies 
website [113]. We then used Weka [114] to test the performance of the approaches. This 
test centers on supervised data where we assumed that the data sets are classified into 
ham and phishing data. The data set consists of 4150 ham emails and 2687 phishing 
email. Firstly, we split the data into 70:30 ratio sizes (training and testing) as used in 
[108][109]. The size of training data is 4786 and each testing set is approximately 2051. 
We generated three datasets denoted by Cat10, Cont10 and Mix10. Each 
document in the testing data has been pre-classified into a unique class to evaluate the 
clustering accuracy of each clustering algorithm. For the evaluation of the accuracy and 
effectiveness of the profiles, all datasets used the same number of testing and training. 
This means, all profiles are generated from training data by using a clustering algorithm. 
Next, the profile is used to train the classification algorithms. Finally, the testing set is 
used to obtain the performance characteristics. In order to assess the proposed clustering 
algorithm, we run the following sensitivity tests: 
(a) Sensitivity to data type: To evaluate the proposed algorithm thoroughly, we 
tested different types of dynamically generated data type: binary/categorical, 
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continuous and mixed. We then generated fix a number of cluster size (profiles) 
for Cat10, Cont10 and Mix10 datasets. We used 10 clusters, as a training data to 
determine the performance of the proposed algorithm to different data type.  
(b) Sensitivity to data size: We used the same number of cluster size (profile) to test 
the performance of the proposed algorithm to various numbers of testing data 
size from smallest to largest value. In order to maintain the equality among two 
types of profiles, we generate 10 numbers of profiles from each clustering 
algorithm. This is to investigate the effect of over fitting issues. 
(c) Sensitivity to cluster size: With the aim to measure the sensitivity of the 
proposed algorithm on the cluster size, we tested all datasets to a diverse number 
of clusters generated by MGKmeans and ProPhish algorithm. 
In order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed clustering algorithm, we 
used the following four performance metrics: false positive (FP, ham email wrongly 
classified as phishing), and false negative (FN, phishing email wrongly classified as 
ham) as discussed in Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4). For comparison reasons, we report 
accuracy metrics which are very significant to compute the number of correctly 
classified emails using the proposed algorithm. If the accuracy value is high, the 
performance of the proposed algorithm is very effective in order to detect phishing 
email. Additionally, both FN and FP metrics are very important in measuring the 
effectiveness of security justification approaches. For instance, FP could have 
considerable negative values on the utility of detection and protection algorithm. This is 
because examining them takes time and resources. If the rate of FP is high, users might 
disregard them. The error rate metric is important to inspect the over fitting issues. 
Model over fitting is when a good model that fit the training data too well, but have a 
118 
 
poorer generalization error than a model with higher training error. Once the data 
become too large, the error rate begins to increase. The errors committed by a 
classification model are generally caused by training errors and generalization errors. 
Training errors are the number of misclassification errors committed in training records, 
while generalization error is the expected error of the model on previous unseen records. 
A good classification model must fit the training data well and classify the unseen 
record accurately. Therefore, a good classification model must have low error rate as 
well as generalization error. 
 
5.3.2 Classification Algorithm Used 
We ran a series of tests to ProPhish and MGKmeans using classification 
algorithm. We choose to use AdaBoost and Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) 
because these are the simplest and most commonly used classification methods. Also, 
they have the capability to handle tokens and associated probabilities according to the 
user’s classification decisions. We used the default setting for the classification 
algorithms in our initial preliminary testing: 
(a) AdaBoost (AB) - The Boosting method is a stable method for improving the 
performance of any particular classification algorithm. It is a fairly new structure 
for constructing a highly accurate classification rule by joining many simple and 
moderately accurate hypotheses into a strong one. This method was initially 
presented in [115]. 
(b) Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) – SMO is an iterative algorithm for 
solving the optimization problem by breaking problems into a series of smallest 
possible sub-problems, which are then solved analytically. It was invented by 
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John Platt [116] at Microsoft Research. This method efficiently solves the 
optimization problem which arises during the training of support vector 
machines using libsvm tool. 
 
5.4 Result and Discussion 
We carried out extensive experiments and compare the proposed algorithm with 
the Modified Global Kmeans (MGKmeans). In this section, we discuss the results of the 
experiments. 
 
5.4.1 Cluster Size Selection 
In this experiment, we find the best number of clusters of the proposed approach 
and Modified Global Kmeans (MGKmeans). After that, we tested the two algorithms 
for different types of dataset: Cat10, Cont10 and Mix10.  
 
5.4.1.1 Cluster Size Selection Using MGKmeans Algorithm 
Features are collected according to the features defined in Constructing Feature 
Matrix section (Section 5.2.5). We used mixed data type where all binary value features 
are transforming to numerical value ranging from 0 to 1. Then, the evaluation of the 
current feature subset is carried out using MGKmeans algorithm. The performance is 
evaluated using the MGKmeans objective function value ( ௞݂) on the feature subset. ௞݂ is 
a mean value of distance between features and centroid value, ݃௜ for all data and 
computed as follows: 
௞݂ሺݔଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௞ሻ ൌ ଵே σ ݉݅ ௝݊ୀଵǡǥǡ௞ฮݔ௝ െ ݃௜ฮ
ଶே௜ୀଵ         (16) 
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where ݔ௝  represents the centroid value for all k clusters. The stopping criterion to select 
the optimal number of clusters is calculated as follows: 
 ௙ೖషభି௙ೖ௙భ ൏ ݐݒȁ ଵ݂ ് Ͳ           (17) 
where  is the tolerance values and ଵ is the corresponding value of the objective 
function in Eq. 16.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Objective function values vs tolerance values 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the association between the objective function values ሺ ௞݂ሻ and 
the tolerance valuesሺݐݒሻ. We found that the bigger the cluster size, the smaller ௞݂ value 
it will have. This is because it is denser to the centroid value. We then calculated ௞݂ over 
a range of tolerance value ሺݐݒሻ and discovered that ݐݒ achieved constant value of 0.16 
when ݐݒ ൒ ͲǤͲ͵.  
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Figure 5.5: Objective function values vs the number of clusters 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between ௞݂ and the number of clusters. The 
result shows that when ௞݂is 0.16, the number of clusters is 3. These figures indicate that 
a good clustering has a good balance between objective function values, the tolerance 
value and the number of clusters. As a result, the optimal number of clusters using 
MGKmeans for this dataset is achieved with 3 clusters. 
 
5.4.1.2 Cluster Size Selection Using ProPhish Algorithm 
In this experiment, we studied the relationship between the ratio size with the 
number of clusters executed on feature subset. We calculated the ratio size of each 
cluster, where ratio size is the split value between the size of the largest cluster and the 
smallest cluster.  
Figure 5.6 shows the result of the experiment. The result shows that the ratio 
size value is constant when the number of clusters is greater than 9 such that ሺͻሻ ൌ
͵͸Ǥ͹ͷ and ሺͳͲሻ ൌ ͵͸Ǥ͹ͷ. The optimal number of a cluster must have a balance ratio 
size between the largest and the smallest clusters. This is to ensure that each cluster is 
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well diverse for the datasets. Therefore, the optimal number of clusters using Prophish 
is 10. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Ratio size value vs cluster size 
 
5.4.2 Sensitivity Test 
In this section, we study the false positive and the false negative rates of the 
ProPhish and MGKmeans algorithms.  
 
5.4.2.1 Sensitivity to False Positive and False Negative 
In the experiment, we fixed the number of clusters to 10. Figure 5.7 shows the 
false positive rates (y-axis) for ProPhish and MGKmeans under the AdaBoost and SMO 
classification algorithms as a function of the datasets (x-axis). The results show that the 
proposed algorithm achieves lower false positive rates for all datasets, as compared to 
the MGKmeans algorithm. For the Cat10 dataset and the Mix10 dataset, the false 
positive rates for the MGKmeans algorithm under both SMO and AdaBoost is about 
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90% worse than the proposed algorithm. For the Cont10 dataset, the false positive rates 
for the MGKmeans algorithm range from 60% to 80%. 
  
  
Figure 5.7: False positive rate 
 
The trend for the false negative rates is similar to the false positive rates. Figure 
5.8 shows the false negative rates (y-axis) for ProPhish and MGKmeans under the 
AdaBoost and SMO classification algorithms as a function of the datasets (x-axis).  
From the data on the graph, we observe that the proposed algorithm achieves 
substantially lower false negative rates for all datasets as compared to the MGKmeans 
algorithm. The false negative rates of the proposed algorithm for Mix10 dataset SMO is 
nearly zero while under AdaBoost is less than 5%, whereas it is about 95% under 
AdaBoost and about 99% under SMO for the MGKmeans algorithm. For the other 
datasets, the trends are the same as that of the false positive rates. 
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Figure 5.8: False negative rate 
 
Overall, the results show that the proposed algorithm has substantially lower false 
negative and false positive rates as compared to the MGKmeans algorithm. This is 
because the proposed algorithm is capable of handling large data sets which have a 
variety features either categorical, continuous or both values. Moreover, all data types 
(categorical data, continuous data and mixed data) along with the data integrity 
collectively are extremely effective in profiling phishing email. 
 
5.4.2.2 Sensitivity to Error Rate 
In this experiment, we measured the error rate as a function of the data set size 
for Prophish and MGKmeans algorithms for Cat10, Cont10 and Mix10 datasets. Figure 
5.9 shows the result of the experiments.  
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Figure 5.9: Sensitivity to data size 
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In the experiment, we set the number of clusters to 10. The results show that the 
proposed algorithm has substantially low error rates for all data sets under both 
classification algorithms. As the number of data in the testing data increased, the error 
rate remains low for the proposed algorithm. The result provides some assurance that 
the proposed algorithm (ProPhish) can overcome the over-fitting issues with low error 
rate. Over-fitting happens when a model begins to remember training data rather than 
learning to generalize from trend. The possibility of over-fitting exists because the 
criterion used for training the model is not the same as the criterion used to judge the 
effectiveness of a model. To be exact, a model is typically trained by exploiting its 
performance on some set of training data. However, its effectiveness is determined not 
by its performance on the training data, but by its ability to perform well on unseen data. 
As the number of data in the testing data increased, the error rate maintains low for our 
proposed algorithm. Even though we train the algorithm using 10 profiles, it did not 
degrade the performance of the classification algorithm because it generalizes well in 
the testing data and improved the clustering accuracy. Yet, we believe that the optimal 
number of clusters chosen is crucial in order to increase the accuracy and efficiency of 
the filtering results. 
 
5.4.2.3 Sensitivity to Cluster Size 
In this section, we analysed the predictive accuracy of ProPhish and MGKmeans 
algorithms as the number of clusters vary. Table 5.7 shows the results of the experiment 
for Cat10, Cont10 and Mix10 datasets under the two classification algorithms (i.e., 
Adaboost and SMO).  In the experiment, we varied the number of clusters from 3 to 15. 
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Table 5.7: Performance evaluation sensitivity to cluster size 
  Adaboost Sequential Minimal Optimization  
Dataset Number of 
clusters 
ProPhish MGKmeans ProPhish MGKmeans 
Cat10 
3 98.4 97.9 98.1 52.5 
5 98.4 97.9 99.2 98.5 
10 98.4 86.1 98.4 88.3 
15 97.1 98.8 98.4 98.6 
Cont10 
3 90.2 31.9 95.6 64.2 
5 94.3 70.9 95.3 77.0 
10 96.1 35.0 54.8 39.5 
15 94.8 87.4 89.3 87.3 
Mix10 
3 88.9 96.5 98.3 98.7 
5 89.3 54.1 98.4 98.6 
10 98.0 54.2 98.7 54.4 
15 98.9 98.4 98.7 98.4 
 
For the Cat10 dataset, the proposed algorithm is slightly better than MGKmeans 
algorithm when using the Adaboost classification algorithm. However, under SMO 
algorithm, the performance of the proposed algorithm ranges from 1% to 47% 
depending on the cluster size. For the Cont10 dataset, the proposed algorithm performs 
better than the MGKmeans algorithm in the range of 9% to 65% under Adaboost 
algorithm. For SMO algorithm, the performance improvement of the proposed 
algorithm over the MGKmeans algorithm is in the range of 2.3% to 28%. For the Mix10 
dataset, the performance improvement of the proposed algorithm over the MGKmeans 
algorithm under Adaboost is in the range of 0.5% to 45%, while under SMO algorithm 
the range is 0.3% to 45%. In general, the proposed algorithm tends to perform better 
than the MGKmeans algorithm for the cluster size equal to or less than 10. As the size 
of the cluster exceeds 10, the performance of the two algorithms tends to converge. 
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5.5 Chapter Summary 
Phishing e-mail is an emerging problem nowadays and solving this problem has 
proven to be very challenging. In this chapter, we proposed phishing email profiling and 
classification model by formulating the profiling problem as a clustering problem using 
various features in the phishing emails as feature vectors. We proposed profiling email-
born phishing (ProPhish) algorithm for selecting an optimal number of clusters based 
on ratio size value. The proposed algorithm is then compared with the MGKmeans 
clustering approach on different type of data. The experiment results showed that the 
classification accuracy of ProPhish algorithms is improved by adopting ratio size 
procedures for selected number of clusters. The sensitivity test results showed that the 
proposed algorithm demonstrates better results as compared to MGKmeans algorithm. 
We plan to investigate how we can integrate Kmeans and Two-Step clustering approach 
to improve clustering accuracy. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Trackback Framework  
In this chapter, a trackback framework of a phishing email is presented. We focused on 
the structure and behaviour of phishing email for the feature selection approach. 
Initially, the selected features were tested on the trackback system to generate phishing 
profile using Maximum Dependency Algorithm (MDA). Phishing emails are split into a 
group of phishers constructed by the MDA algorithm. Then, the forensic analysis is 
implemented to identify the type of phisher against already assumed group of attacker 
either single or collaborative attacker. The performance of the proposed framework is 
compared over various types of features. The result shows that the email header 
information is the best feature for tracking and classifying the attacker. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Organized crime is defined as illegal activities done by collaborative links which 
usually pretend to be legal businesses. The escalating number of organized crime causes 
a vital risk to financial organization and has been studied by many researchers from 
several grounds of taught[4][51][78][107][2]. According to U.S national incidence 
130 
 
report, 1 in 90 users lost their money due to phishing, which totalled to $483 million 
between year 2004 to 2009 [7]. Generally, high income returns are the key motivation 
of the organized crime to launch attack. Though, some of them may also be inspired by 
their group ideology and political view. Moreover, the continuous development of 
electronic commerce opens new insight for the criminals to exploit free resources 
toward establishing their illegal activities. Due to this, cybercrime cause modest distress 
to Internet user thru phishing attack by luring their victims to a bogus website and 
deceived them to reveal credential information. At present, tracking the phisher who 
uses identity concealment techniques is very challenging. Phisher always covers their 
tracks by impersonating using fake identities, redirecting users to another server, or 
modify the email header information. 
The main problem addressed in this chapter is how to efficiently tracing 
phishing email activities. Recently, the concept of tracking phishing email used 
honeypot to track the phisher activities have been discussed in [77][78][117][79][54]. 
However, honeypots can only track activity that interacts with it which makes it static 
selection of features that need to be set earlier. The system cannot capture the attack 
activity against the systems unless the attacker interacts with the honeypot. The present 
work is motivated by the work of [78] and complement this study in many ways. 
Chandrasekaran et al. [77] submitted false credential to phishing sites as phoneytokens. 
The main idea is to identify phishing sites based on the response of fake input. The 
PHONEY prototype sits between a user’s Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) and Mail User 
Agent (MUA) where it processes each arriving email from phishing attacks. They tested 
on 20 different phishing emails focusing on URL and form features. However, many 
phishing email attacks are created without form and hyperlinks which show that this 
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technique still have flaws in classification. Our work differs from [77] in such a way 
that we focused on structural of email for forensic analysis and did not use any 
phoneytoken to track phishing activity. Also, we use various phishing email features to 
to generate phishing profile using a clustering algorithm, whereas work [77] did not do. 
Gajek et al. [78] discussed forensic framework for profiling and tracing phishing 
activity in phishing network. The main idea is to fill their database with fingerprinted 
credentials (phoneytokens) which could lure phishers to a fake system that simulate the 
original service. Then, the phoneypot pretends to be the original service in order to 
profile phishers’ behaviour. This approach causes phishers to spend more time and 
resource to acquire financial benefit and increases the risks to track phishers. They are 
interested in tracing the phisher’s agents and not in the technical means used by 
phishers. Our approach is different in such a way that our work did not use any 
phoneytoken. Work by [78] derive three classes of phishing profiles; non-phisher, 
definite phisher and potential phisher. Meanwhile, we categorized phisher into two 
types; single attack and collaborative attack. 
In this chapter, a framework for trackback phishing email based on clustering 
and the similarity measurement approach to track email-born phishing activities are 
proposed. Clustering phishing attack related research is usually concentrated on the 
structure of the email properties based on significant features such as hyperlink [71][72] 
and DNS[54][82]. In this chapter, we follow a different approach. Our selection of 
features is dynamic where user could test on a different set of data. The key ideas are to 
track the phishing activity in email and profile type of phisher either single or 
collaborative attacker. In the proposed trackback framework, we apply clustering 
techniques using Maximum Dependency Algorithm presented by [88] to generate group 
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of phishers from selected feature vector. We cluster phishing emails based on various 
phishing email features specifically phisher’s behaviour. Behaviour-based feature can 
be extracted from characteristics of email where phishers normally have their own 
signatures [107][103][118]. We represent header-based, body-based, URL-based and 
behaviour-based feature as a set of unsupervised feature vector identified in the phishing 
email that could be useful for clustering. Therefore, a phisher’s class can be expected to 
show a collection of different activities. We use ten-fold cross validation to test the 
precision of phisher group that have been identified. Our major contributions are 
summarized as follows: 
1. We propose a framework for trackback phishing email. 
2. We propose a phishing feature based on structural of email extracted from phishing 
emails.  
3. We discuss the implication and the relative importance of the feature selection to 
ensure that the phishing trackback system works well. 
4. We provide empirical evidence that our proposed framework reduces the false 
positive rate and false negative rate with the highest precision value. 
 
6.2  Phishing Email Trackback Framework 
In this section, we discuss the proposed framework for trackback phishing email. 
The architecture, the phishing feature extraction and selection processes are introduced.  
 
6.2.1 Feature Extraction and Trackback Process 
A high level description of the implementation of tracking phishing email is 
shown in Figure 6.1. The first phase is to perform the feature selection approach to 
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select a subset of relevant features to be used in the construction of the model. The 
feature selection approach has been discussed in Chapter 4. The most informative 
features are selected using a learning model and a classification algorithm. Then, the 
dataset is split into selected training and testing ratios. The training data were used to 
train the clustering algorithm while the testing data to estimate the error rate of the 
training classifier.  
The next phase is profiling the attacker using the clustering algorithm. Based on 
the training data of the feature selection phase, the profiling algorithm phase is 
generated to create phishing profiles. The profile produced is used to train the 
classification algorithm where it is supposed to forecast the unidentified class label into 
normal or phishing email. The detailed description of this phase has been discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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Figure 6.1: Trackback Process 
 
In this chapter, the trackback framework based on clustering algorithm and 
similarity measurement is proposed (phase 3). The first step is to extract email features 
from the collection of the phishing email. In this step, the phishing email is already 
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selected by the profiling phase. The next step is the email analyser phase. We propose 
different phishing trackback model by implementing clustering algorithm using the 
phishing email as feature vectors. Then, we generate the group of attacker based on 
clustering prediction. This group of attacker is sent to the next step which is forensic 
backend. We then applied similarity measurement in forensic backend step to smooth 
the phishing group in order to categorize the attacker into the single or collaborative 
attacker. The detailed description of these steps is discussed later. 
 
6.2.2 Feature Extraction and Selection 
In this section, feature set description and feature selection approach are 
explained. Typically a phisher contacts a victim through emails. Hence, we consider all 
parts of email as features. The structural of email to be considered are email’s header, 
the email’s subject and email’s content. Phishers have diverse ways of attack. In one 
circumstance, phishers may lure their victims by inserting images, malicious file or link 
in the form which can safely detour anti-phishing techniques. When the user clicked the 
hyperlink, this will lead them to a bogus site. Different group of phisher might insert a 
different fake link which will redirect the user to a phishing site. Others may send email 
from different email server or different attachment file. Thus, we want to identify 
groups based on their behaviour which could be extracted from the emails 
characteristics. Phisher’s behaviour characteristics extracted from the structure of the 
emails are generated. These characteristics are then reflected as features that will 
correspond to the proposed trackback framework. Based on the characteristics collected, 
the data clustering approach would provide the relationships between the features in the 
phishing emails and their pre-specified classes.  
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6.2.3 Feature Set Description 
We extracted 34 features from the Nazario phishing email dataset [96]. All 
features extracted from the email dataset are categorized into four categories; nine 
header-based features, nine behaviours-based features, eight URL-based features and 
eight body-based features. The features are listed in Table 6.1. We believed that the 
phisher’s profiles should be able to distinguish between different groups [119][112]. For 
example, an email may have the attachment files, hyperlink and others. However, there 
are also groups of phisher that may have different subclasses of these features. 
 
Table 6.1: List of features used 
Features Data type Description 
Header (9) 
dmidinvalid2 
 
Binary 
 
The binary data denotes if the message-ID field has 
been forged by the phisher. Note that this feature has 
been used in [107] 
dayattack text Represent the day of the attack. 
daynight text Represent the time of the attack either am (morning) 
or pm (night). 
sendunmodaldomain Binary Represents the similarity of domain name extracted 
from an email sender with domain message-ID. If both 
domain name and domain message-ID are the same, 
set the value 0. Otherwise, set the value 1 to indicate 
the email is abnormal. 
timezone Text  Indicate the geographical location where the email 
comes from.  
hostname Text  Indicate the attacker’s computer host name. 
senderipaddress Text Indicate the attacker IP address. 
by_domain Text Indicate the domain name server used by the attacker. 
server_country Text Indicate the country name where the email comes 
from. 
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Table 6.1: continued  
Features Data type Description 
behaviour (9) 
Unique_Sender 
 
Binary 
 
Specifying if the phisher sends email from different 
Domain Message-id (DMID). Value ‘1’ if the number 
of DMID is greater than 1 for each email sender, ‘0’ 
otherwise. This feature has been proposed by 
[107][103]. 
Unique_Domain Binary Specifying behaviour of the phisher if they send 
emails from more than 1 domain mail server, ‘0’ 
otherwise. This feature has been proposed in our 
previous work [107][103]. 
Attack_URL Binary Define if the phisher modus operandi using URL. ‘1’ 
if the lure method using a URL, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Attack_virus Binary Define if the phisher modus operandi through a virus. 
‘1’ if the email contains a virus, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Attack_text Binary Define if the phisher modus operandi used text. ‘1’ if 
the lure method using text only, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Attack_form Binary Define if the phisher modus operandi used forms. ‘1’ 
if the email contains forms, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Attack_image Binary Define if the phisher modus operandi using image. ‘1’ 
if the email contains images, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Attack_email Binary Define if the phisher attacks using forwarded email. 
‘1’ if the email contains an email address, ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
Attacksector Text Define the phisher attack’s sector: payment, financial, 
eCommerce, credit union, advertisement, card, virus, 
miscellaneous or survey. 
URL (8) 
Hyperlink_hiddenlink 
 
Binary 
 
Determine if visible link is similar with hidden link. 
Value is given ‘1’ if the visible link is not similar with 
the hidden link, ‘0’ otherwise.  
URL_scheme Text  Specifying type of URL scheme which is extracted 
from the hidden URL address. Types of URL schemes 
are http, https, FTP, mailto or no scheme. 
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Table 6.1: continued 
Features Data type Description 
URL_portnum Numerical Specifying URL port number which is extracted from 
the hidden URL address such as port 80, 81 and others 
URL_ip Binary Define if URL contains an IP address. The value of 
this feature is ‘1’ if the URL contains an IP address, 
otherwise value ‘0’ is given. 
URL_encoded Binary Specifying if the hidden hyperlink contains encoded 
link. The value of this feature is ‘1’ if the hidden 
hyperlink contains “%” symbol, otherwise value ‘0’ is 
given. 
URL_redirect Binary Specifying if the hidden hyperlink redirects victim to 
another link.  The value of this feature is ‘1’ if the 
hidden hyperlink contains “*” symbol and “redirect” 
word, otherwise value ‘0’ is given.  
URL_returnvalue Binary Specifying if the hidden hyperlink contains hidden 
URL that return value to the sender.  The value of this 
feature is ‘1’ if the hidden hyperlink contains “?” 
symbol, otherwise value ‘0’ is given. 
URL_sub2domain Binary Specifying if the hidden hyperlink contains hidden 
URL that return value to the sender.  The value of this 
feature is ‘1’ if the hidden hyperlink contains “?” 
symbol, otherwise value ‘0’ is given. 
Body (8) 
subjectblacklist 
 
Binary 
 
Defines binary feature represents the presence of 
blacklist words in the subject of an email which 
included in bags of words in [94]. If the email subject 
contains the blacklist word, the email is abnormal and 
set the value 1.  
hypertextblacklist Binary Defines binary feature represents the presence of 
blacklist words in the hypertext in the email body. 
htmlcontent Binary Define if the emails have html content. ‘1’ if the email 
contains html, ‘0’ otherwise. 
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Table 6.1: continued 
Description Description Description 
textcontent Binary Defines binary feature represents the presence of 
blacklist words in the hypertext in the email body 
which includes the word: click here, bank, renew, 
dispute, login, sign, update, resolution, activate, 
unsuspended [94] 
imagecontent Binary Define if the emails have image content. ‘1’ if the 
email contains images, ‘0’ otherwise. 
appcontent Binary Define if the emails have application content. ‘1’ if the 
email contains an application, ‘0’ otherwise. 
multipartcontent Binary Define if the emails have multipart content. ‘1’ if the 
email contains multipart, ‘0’ otherwise. 
language Text  Define language used in the emails. i.e English, 
Spanish 
 
6.2.4 Constructing Feature Vector 
In this section, we discuss the process we used for constructing phishing feature 
vector for the datasets. Let ܧ and ܨ denote the emails and the feature vector space 
respectively: 
ܧ ൌ ሼ݁ଵǡ ݁ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݁ேሽ            (1) 
ܨ ൌ ሼ ଵ݂ǡ ଶ݂ǡ ǥ ǡ ெ݂ሽ            (2) 
where ܰ is the total number of emails and ܯ refers to the size of the feature vector. Let 
ݔ௜௝ be the value of a jth feature on ith document. Therefore, the presentation of each 
dataset ܦ  is given as follows: 
ܦௗ ൌ ൛ݔ௜௝ൟȁͳ ൑ ݅ ൑ ܰǢ ͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ܯǢ ݀ א ሺ݄݁ܽ݀݁ݎǡ ܾ݄݁ܽݒ݅݋ݑݎǡ ݑݎ݈ǡ ܾ݋݀ݕሻ(3) 
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For example, the feature vector for the header dataset consists of nine features 
ܨ௜ǡ ͳ ൑ ݅ ൑ ͻ for all phishing emails. Note that header dataset consists of nine binary 
and text data. So, the dataset for Dheader consists of:  
Dheader={ sendunmodaldomain, dmdinvalid2, dayattack, daynight, timezone, 
hostname, senderipaddress, by_domain, server_country}. 
The Dheader feature set is loaded into the email analyser module. This 
configuration is dynamic where the rule sets could be configured with whatever 
features (rule) desired for a given email data. Upon receiving these datasets, the email 
analyser will apply a clustering algorithm approach on the generated analysis data to 
produce a group of phisher. Then, the phisher groups are submitted to the forensic 
backend for further action. 
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Figure 6.2: Maximum Dependency Algorithm (MDA) components 
 
6.2.5 Maximum Dependency Algorithm (MDA) 
In this section, we give a description of the Maximum Dependencies Algorithm 
(MDA) [87]. A schematic representation of the MDA is shown in Figure 6.2. MDA is 
selected as the clustering algorithm to generate a group of phishing profile, ܳ௣௣. The 
MDA algorithm clusters the attributes based on the maximum dependency degree of 
attributes. The accurate selection of clustering attributes denotes by the higher degree of 
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dependency. The phishing profiles generated based on clustering algorithm's predictions 
are set to be the elements of profiles. These predictions are further utilized to generate 
complete profiles of phishing emails. Note that this work differs than [87] where we 
incorporated forensic backend phase for tracking attacker purposes. Let ܺ௜ be the 
corresponding input value for the algorithm such that, 
ܺ௜ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵǡ ݔ௜ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௜ேሻ           (4) 
where ݔ௜ is the value of attribute i in the email and ܰ is the total number of attributes in 
the unsupervised datasets. The steps for the email analysis phases are as follows:  
Step 1: (Compute the distance similarity). Compute the distance similarity using the 
maximum dependency degree of attribute. 
Step 2: (Allocate cluster membership). Allocate cluster membership according to the 
maximum dependencies degree of attributesܽ௜ with respect to all ௝ܽ, where ݅ ് ݆. 
Step 3: (Select maximum dependency degree). Select maximum dependency degree of 
each attribute based on Marczeweski–Steinhaus (MZ) metric [120] [121] [122]. 
Step 4: (Split data). Split data to decide the final clusters based on maximum 
dependencies degree value.  
Step 5: (Forensic trackback). To classify attacker into single or collaborative attack 
using email header information.  
 
6.2.5.1 Compute Distance Similarity 
The initial step in the email analyser is deals with the computation of the 
similarity of each attribute. The similar classes for the set of data, ܰ can be obtained 
using the process of grouping objects based on having the same series of attribute values 
of ܽ௜ א ܣ in information system, ܵ ൌ ሺܰǡ ܣǡ ܸǡ ݂ሻ.  
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6.2.5.2 Allocate Cluster Membership  
The second step deals with the determination of the dependency degree of each 
attribute. The degree of dependency attributes can be determined using Marczeweski–
Steinhaus (MZ) metric. Given two subsets ܤǡ ܥ ك ܰ where the distance ܤ and ܥ is 
defined as ݀ݒሺܤǡ ܥሻ ൌ ȁ஻׫஼ȁିȁ஻ת஼ȁȁ஻׫஼ȁ  where the symmetric difference between two sets ܤ 
and ܥ is shown in equation: 
݀ݒሺܤǡ ܥሻ ൌ ሺ஻׫஼ሻିሺ஻ת஼ሻሺ஻׫஼ሻ ൌ ͳ െ
ȁ஻ת஼ȁ
ȁ஻׫஼ȁ           (5) 
The metric reaches maximum value of 1 if subsets ܤ and ܥ are disjoint. However, if 
subset ܤ and ܥ are identical, the metric maximum value is 0.  
 
6.2.5.3  Select Maximum Dependencies Degree 
The third step deals with selecting the maximum dependency degree. After all 
dependency degrees is computed, the clustering attribute will be selected based on the 
dependency value. Attribute with the highest maximum degree of dependency value is 
the most accurate (higher of accuracy of the approximation) to be selected as clustering 
attribute. The justification is that the higher the degree of dependency of attributes, the 
more accurate in selecting clustering attribute. 
Let ܵ ൌ ሺܰǡ ܣǡ ܸǡ ݂ሻ be an information system and let ܤand ܥ be any subsets of 
ܣ. If ܤ depends totally on C, then ߙ௕ሺܺሻ ൑ ߙ௖ሺܺሻ , for every ܺ ك ܰ. Consider the 
following example in Table 6.2. The dataset is an email feature extracted from the 
phishing dataset [113]. There are ten email sender ሺȁܰȁ ൌ ͳͲሻ with five categorical-
valued attributesሺȁܣȁ ൌ ͷሻ; behaviour_attack_URL (BAU), behaviour_attack_virus 
(BAV), behaviour_attack_text (BAT), behaviour_attack_form (BAF), 
behaviour_attack_image (BAI). All attributes have two values which are 0 and 1. 
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Table 6.2: Phishing dataset from khonji dataset [113] 
Email BAU BAV BAT BAF BAI 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 1 
3 1 1 0 1 1 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 1 
6 1 0 0 1 1 
7 0 0 1 1 0 
8 1 0 0 0 1 
9 0 0 0 1 0 
10 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Firstly, we obtained the similar classes made by the indiscernibility relation of 
split classes of objects. Due to this, a partition of an object can be accomplished. The 
example of attribute partition is shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
a. ܺሺܤܣܷ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͷǡ͸ǡͺሽǡ ܺሺܤܣܷ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሼͶǡ͹ǡͻǡͳͲሽǡ 
ܰȀܤܣܷ ൌ  ൛ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͷǡ͸ǡͺሽሼͶǡ͹ǡͻǡͳͲሽൟǤ 
b. ܺሺܤܣܸ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ሽǡ ܺሺܤܣܸ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሼͶǡͷǡ͸ǡ͹ǡͺǡͻǡͳͲሽǡ 
ܰȀܤܣܸ ൌ  ൛ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ሽሼͶǡͷǡ͸ǡ͹ǡͺǡͻǡͳͲሽൟǤ 
c. ܺሺܤܣܶ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሼ͹ǡͳͲሽǡ ܺሺܤܣܶ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͶǡͷǡ͸ǡͺǡͻሽǡ 
ܰȀܤܣܶ ൌ  ൛ሼ͹ǡͳͲሽሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͶǡͷǡ͸ǡͺǡͻሽൟǤ 
d. ܺሺܤܣܨ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሼ͵ǡ͸ǡ͹ǡͻሽǡ ܺሺܤܣܨ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡͶǡͷǡͺǡͳͲሽǡ 
ܰȀܤܣܨ ൌ  ൛ሼ͵ǡ͸ǡ͹ǡͻሽሼͳǡʹǡͶǡͷǡͺǡͳͲሽൟǤ 
e. ܺሺܤܣܫ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ሼʹǡ͵ǡͷǡ͸ǡͺሽǡ ܺሺܤܣܫ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሼͳǡͶǡ͹ǡͻǡͳͲሽǡ 
ܰȀܤܣܫ ൌ  ൛ሼʹǡ͵ǡͷǡ͸ǡͺሽሼͳǡʹǡ͸ǡ͹ǡͺǡͻǡͳͲሽൟǤ 
Figure 6.3: Partitions of attributes 
 
Then we apply the degree of dependency formula [88] defined by ݀݀ ൌ
σ ห஻ሺ௑ሻห೉אಿȀ಴
ȁேȁ  where ܤ and ܥ are any subsets of attributeܣ. The attribute dependencies of 
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attribute ܥ on ܤ, ܤ ֜ௗௗ ܥ is shown in Figure 6.4. After that, we performed the similar 
calculation to all attributes and generated the dependency value in Table 6.3. 

ܤܣܸ ֜ௗௗ ܤܣܷǡݓ݄݁ݎ݁݀݀ ൌ
σ ȁܤܣܸሺܺሻȁேȀ஻஺௎
ȁܰȁ ൌ
ȁሼͳǡʹǡ͵ሽȁ ൅ ȁሼ׎ሽȁ
ͳͲ ൌ
͵
ͳͲ 
ܤܣܶ ֜ௗௗ ܤܣܷǡݓ݄݁ݎ݁݀݀ ൌ
σ ȁܤܣܶሺܺሻȁேȀ஻஺௎
ȁܰȁ ൌ
ȁሼ͹ǡͳͲሽȁ ൅ ȁሼ׎ሽȁ
ͳͲ ൌ
ʹ
ͳͲ 
ܤܣܨ ֜ௗௗ ܤܣܷǡݓ݄݁ݎ݁݀݀ ൌ
σ ȁܤܣܨሺܺሻȁேȀ஻஺௎
ȁܰȁ ൌ
ȁሼ׎ሽȁ ൅ ȁሼ׎ሽȁ
ͳͲ ൌ
Ͳ
ͳͲ 
ܤܣܫ ֜ௗௗ ܤܣܷǡݓ݄݁ݎ݁݀݀ ൌ
σ ȁܤܣܫሺܺሻȁேȀ஻஺௎
ȁܰȁ ൌ
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ͳͲ ൌ
ͷ
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Figure 6.4: Dependency degree of attributes 
 
Table 6.3: Dependencies degree value for all attributes 
Attributes Degree of dependency, ࢊࢊ 
BAU BAV 
0.3 
BAT 
0.2 
BAF 
0 
BAI 
0.5 
BAV BAU 
0.4 
BAT 
0.2 
BAF 
0 
BAI 
0 
BAT BAU 
0.6 
BAV 
0.3 
BAF 
0 
BAI 
0.5 
BAF BAU 
0 
BAV 
0 
BAT 
0 
BAI 
0 
BAI BAU 
0.4 
BAV 
0 
BAT 
0.2 
BAF 
0 
 
6.2.5.4  Split Data 
The final step is splitting the data. The divide and conquer method are selected 
for object splitting. In order to obtain further class, the method is applied iteratively. 
Based on the dependencies degree value, the highest value which is 0.6 occurs in 
attributes BAT (BAU). Thus, attribute BAT is selected as the first possible clustering 
attribute. Follow by BAU that have 0.5 dependencies degree value as a second possible 
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cluster. This method stops after it reaches pre-determined number of clusters based on 
user condition. Figure 6.5 shows the data splitting based on dependencies degree value. 
 
 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9 7,10
1,2,3,5,6,8 4,9 7,10
Email Data
First cluster
Second cluster
 
Figure 6.5: Phishing Email splitting 
 
To construct the attacker group, the result generated by the clustering algorithm 
is used. Let us denote the set of data, ܰ ൌ ൛ݔ௜௝ൟwhere ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡݓ and ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡܯ. 
The cluster model ensemble in this data set will be denoted by ܥ ൌ ሼܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܥ௪ሽ  
where, for each cluster model ܥ௜, the data set ܰ is a disjoint union of the classes in this 
clustering so that ܥ௜ ൌ ൛ܥଵ௜ǡ ܥଶ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ܥ௪௜ ൟ and ܰ ൌ ܥଵ௜ ׫ ܥଶ௜ ׫ ǥ׫ ܥ௪௜  for all ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡݓ 
where ݓ is the number of class. The phishing group feature is then stored in a phishing 
profile database, ܳ௣௣. 
 
6.2.6 Forensic Backend 
In this section, we present the forensic backend procedure which will classify 
the phisher into single or collaborative attack. Let ܵ݌ be the set of attributes stored in a 
phishing profile database ܳ௣௣that identifies known group of phishers. The phisher 
profile information was passed by the email analysis phase to the forensic backend 
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phase. Upon receiving these profiles, the forensic backend process will apply the 
forensic filtering algorithm to the generated analysis data. We extracted extra features 
from email header for the group of phisher which is then used to track the attacker. The 
email header information that can be considered are time of attack, date of attack, 
country (based on time zone), domain name server, attacker’s IP address, attacker’s 
email address and email’s attachment name. Alternatively, each group of attacker will 
be refined into two categories that are single or collaborative attacker. We apply 
similarity measurement to smoothen the phishing profile in order to categorize the 
attacker into single or collaborative attack.  
 
Algorithm: Forensic filtering algorithm 
Input: phishing profiles with class attributes 
Output: Classify a group of attacker 
Begin: 
Step 1: Compute the similarity measurement, ߙ௜௝ of 
item, ܰ 
Step 2: Produce prediction 
End 
Figure 6.6: Forensic filtering algorithm 
 
The forensic filtering algorithm uses the known group of attackers to make 
predictions the unknown preferences for another attacker. The essential hypothesis of 
this algorithm is that two attackers who have similar behaviours will act on other items 
similarly. Figure 6.6 shows the generalized forensic filtering algorithm which consists 
of two steps that are compute the similarity measurement and produce prediction.  
First, the similarity measurement is calculated using Euclidean Distance as it is 
often used to compare profiles of user across variables. The Euclidean distance between 
146 
 
two attackers ݄ܲ݅ݏ݄݁ݎଵ and ݄ܲ݅ݏ݄݁ݎଶ is defined as ݁ሺ݌݄݅ݏ݄݁ݎଵǡ ݌݄݅ݏ݄݁ݎଶሻ ൌ
ටσ ൫ݔ௣௛௜௦௛௘௥భ െ ݔ௣௛௜௦௛௘௥మ൯
ଶ
௜אே , where ܰ is the number of data. The numerical 
difference for each corresponding attribute of the attacker ݄ܲ݅ݏ݄݁ݎଵ and ݄ܲ݅ݏ݄݁ݎଶ is 
measured. Then, combine the square of the differences in each data into a whole 
distance. This square function normalizes the distance similarity score to a value 
between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 show that two attackers might cooperate together 
while value 0 means that two attackers do not work together. Finally, we refined each 
group of attacker into two categories: single attack or collaborative attacker. Moreover, 
we are able to track the origin of the attacker by looking into detail the email header 
information. Thus, actions are taken based on the forensic backend result where may 
comprise having trackback server to alert the email system regarding the violation.  
 
6.3 Performance Analysis 
In this section, we present the analysis and performance evaluation of the 
proposed framework and test it on a series of dataset of various features. We will 
present the experimental setup in the clusters phishing email. Then, we discuss the 
results of the experiments.  
 
6.3.1 Experimental Setup 
For our experiment, we extracted 34 features from the Nazario phishing email 
dataset [96]. We then used Maximum Dependency Degree (MDA) [88] as the clustering 
algorithm because it performed well for categorical data. For forensic backend phases, 
we adapt the Euclidean Distance similarity measurement to classify attacker into the 
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single or collaborative attacker. We used the default setting for both algorithms in our 
initial preliminary testing. This experiment is tested on unsupervised dataset which to be 
clustered by the clustering algorithm. The dataset consists of 3185 phishing email. 
Four datasets are generated denoted by a header-based, body-based, url-based 
and behaviour-based. Each dataset has been pre-classified into groups of attacker to 
evaluate the predicted cluster by the clustering algorithm. All datasets used ten-fold 
cross validation for evaluation purposes. In order to measure the proposed trackback 
framework, we run the following tests: 
a) Maximum dependency value: To assess the proposed framework systematically, 
we tested on various forms of structural of email features: header-based, body-
based, url-based and behaviour-based. We have then grouped the phishing 
email for each the dataset into a fix number of splits. 
b) Split size selection: To test the performance of the clustering algorithm to 
various numbers of data splitting. We used one to five data splitting information 
to determine the performance of clustering algorithm to different type of 
features. 
c) Forensic analysis: With the aim to classify attacker into single or collaborative 
attack, we proposed forensic features extracted from email headers. We tested 
all datasets with the proposed forensic email features. Note that, each dataset has 
been pre-classified into groups of phisher by the clustering algorithm. 
In order to measure the performance of the proposed trackback framework, we 
used the standard measures, such as precision, recall, and F-measure as well as the false 
positive and the false negative rate which has been discussed in Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 
4). The precision metrics are very significant to compute the number of correctly 
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classified emails using the proposed framework. The performance of the proposed 
framework is very effective in order to track phishing email if the precision value is 
high. FPR and FNR metrics are significant in assessing the effectiveness of trackback 
framework. FPR can have negative values on the effectiveness of detection algorithm. 
This is because examining them takes time and resources. If the rate of FPR is high, 
users might disregard them. A good trackback framework must fit the phishing profile 
well and classify the unseen record accurately. Therefore, a good trackback framework 
must have low both FPR and FNR value to avoid misclassification. 
 
6.3.2 Classification Algorithm  
We ran a series of tests using classification algorithms to behaviour-based, 
header-based, body-based and URL-based features with pre-determined class by the 
clustering algorithm. AdaBoost, Naïve Bayes and Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
algorithm are selected because these are the frequently used classification methods. The 
default setting is set for the classification algorithms in the initial preliminary testing:  
(a) AdaBoost (AB) - The Boosting method is an established method for enhancing 
the performance of any classification algorithm. It joined simple and moderately 
accurate hypothesis into highly and accurate classification rule [103]. 
(b) Naïve Bayes - Naive Bayes classifier is using estimator classes. Numeric 
estimator precision values are chosen based on analysis of the training data.  
(c) Hidden Markov Model (HMM) - Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical 
tool used for modelling generative arrangements categorized by a set of varied 
sequences. Moreover, the HMM can be used to model stochastic processes 
where the unsupervised class of the system is governed by a Markov process and 
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the supervised sequences of system have an underlying probabilistic 
dependence. Generally, HMM is used for a varied range of programs, including 
gene detection, profile checks, multiple sequence arrangement and monitoring 
site identification. 
 
6.4 Result and Discussion 
Comprehensive experiments of the proposed trackback framework on various 
phishing email features on different machine learning classifier are carried out. In this 
section, we discuss the results of the experiments. 
 
6.4.1 Maximum Dependencies Degree Value 
This section discussed the maximum dependency degree for behaviour-based 
feature, header-based feature, body-based features and URL-based features.  
 
6.4.1.1 Behaviour-based Features 
The degree dependency attributes of behaviour-based features is summarized in 
Table 6.4. There are nine behaviour-based features: behaviour_US (BUS), 
behaviour_UD (BUD), behaviour_attack_URL (BAU), behaviour_attack_virus (BAV), 
behaviour_attack_text (BAT), behaviour_attack_form (BAF), behaviour_attack_image 
(BAI), behaviour_attack_email (BAE), behaviour_attack_sector (BAS). Note if there are 
two similar highest MDA value, we select the next highest MDA value among same 
attributes until the draw is broken.  
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Table 6.4: Maximum dependency matrix of behaviour-based features 
BUD BAU BAV BAT BAF BAI BAE BAS 
BUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.020 
BUS BAU BAV BAT BAF BAI BAE BAS 
BUD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BUS BUD BAV BAT BAF BAI BAE BAS 
BAU 0 0 0.020 0.280 0 0.051 0 0 
BUS BUD BAU BAT BAF BAI BAE BAS 
BAV 0 0 0.590 0.280 0 0.132 0 0.080 
BUS BUD BAU BAV BAF BAI BAE BAS 
BAT 0 0 0.590 0.020 0 0.091 0 0 
BUS BUD BAU BAV BAT BAI BAE BAS 
BAF 0 0 0.590 0.020 0.280 0.133 0 0.070 
BUS BUD BAU BAV BAT BAF BAE BAS 
BAI 0 0 0.590 0.120 0.280 0 0 0.060 
BUS BUD BAU BAV BAT BAF BAI BAS 
BAE 0 0 0.590 0.020 0.280 0 0.134 0.070 
BUS BUD BAU BAV BAT BAF BAI BAE 
BAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
From Table 6.5, the highest maximum degree of dependency of attributes which 
is 0.59 occurs in BAV, BAT, BAI, BAF and BAE. The second maximum dependency 
degree occurs in attribute BAV, BAI, BAF and BAE. The third maximum dependency 
degree occurs in attribute BAF and BAE. Thus BAE is selected as clustering attribute 
because the MDA value is 0.134 which is higher than BAF maximum dependency 
value. The split group of phishing attack based on behaviour based is shown in Table 
6.6. Figure 6.7 illustrates the distribution of a phishing group based on behaviour-based 
features for number of splitting data from one to four. Five groups of attacker are 
created after four split for behaviour-based feature. 
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Table 6.5: Split group of phishing attacker based on behaviour feature 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Numbers of split groups for behaviour-based features 
 
6.4.1.2 Header-based Features 
The degree dependency values for header-based features are summarized in Table 6.6. 
The nine header features are h_sendunmodaldomain (HSD), h_dmidinvalid2 (HDI), 
h_dayattack (HDA), h_daynight (HDN), h_timezone (HTZ), h_hostname (HHN), 
h_senderipaddress (HSI), h_by_domain (HBD), h_server_country (HSC). The splitting 
information for a group of attacker based on header feature is shown in Table 6.7. 
Figure 6.8 shows 54 groups of attacker based on four splitting data for header based 
features. 
 
2500
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2800
2900
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3100
3200
split1 split2 split3 split4
C5
C4
C3
C2
C1
Split number MDA value Degree Attribute 
1 0.134 Is a degree attribute 8 
2 0.133 Is a degree attribute 6 
3 0.132 Is a degree attribute 4 
4 0.12 Is a degree attribute 7 
5 0.091 Is a degree attribute 5 
6 0.051 Is a degree attribute 3 
7 0.002 Is a degree attribute 1 
8 0 Is a degree attribute 2 
9 0 Is a degree attribute 9 
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Table 6.6: Maximum dependency matrix of header-based features 
 HDI HDA HDN HTZ HHN HSI HBD HSC 
HSD 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.02 
 HSD HDA HDN HTZ HHN HSI HBD HSC 
HDI 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 
 HSD HDI HDN HTZ HHN HSI HBD HSC 
HDA 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 
 HSD HDI HDA HTZ HHN HSI HBD HSC 
HDN 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.01 
 HSD HDI HDA HDN HHN HSI HBD HSC 
HTZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 
 HSD HDI HDA HDN HTZ HSI HBD HSC 
HHN 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 
 HSD HDI HDA HDN HTZ HHN HBD HSC 
HSI 0 0 0 0 0.12 0 0 0.03 
 HSD HDI HDA HDN HTZ HHN HSI HSC 
HBD 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.03 
 HSD HDI HDA HDN HTZ HHN HSI HBD 
HSC 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.7: Split group of phishing attacker based on header feature 
Split number MDA value Degree Attribute 
1 0.018 Is a degree of attribute 7 
2 0.012 Is a degree of attribute 9 
3 0.005 Is a degree of attribute 8 
4 0.004 Is a degree of attribute 1 
5 0.004 Is a degree of attribute 4 
6 0.003 Is a degree of attribute 2 
7 0.003 Is a degree of attribute 3 
8 0.002 Is a degree of attribute 6 
9 0.001 Is a degree of attribute 5 
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Figure 6.8: Numbers of split groups for header-based features 
 
6.4.1.3 URL-based Features 
The degree dependency attributes of URL-based features can be summarized in 
Table 6.8. There are eight URL features: URL_scheme (URLS), URL_portnum (URLP), 
URL_ip (URLIP), URL_encoded (URLE), URL_redirect (URLR), URL_returnvalue 
(URLV), URL_sub2domain (URLD), URL_hyperlink_hiddenlink (URLH).  
 
Table 6.8: Maximum dependency matrix of URL-based features 
 URLS URLP URLIP URLE URLR URLV URLD 
URLH 0 0.04 0.32 0 0.03 0 0 
 URLH URLP URLIP URLE URLR URLV URLD 
URLS 0 0.93 0.32 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLIP URLE URLR URLV URLD 
URLP 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLP URLE URLR URLV URLD 
URLIP 0.05 0.07 0.08 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLP URLIP URLR URLV URLD 
URLE 0 0.06 0.04 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLP URLIP URLE URLV URLD 
URLR 0.05 0.06 0.11 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLP URLIP URLE URLR URLD 
URLV 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 
 URLH URLS URLP URLIP URLE URLR URLV 
URLD 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 
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The splitting information for a group of attacker based on URL feature is shown 
in Table 6.9. The first split is based on attribute 2 which is then followed by attribute 1 
for the second split. Lastly, Figure 6.9 shows eleven groups of attacker based on four 
split is created for URL-based features. 
 
Table 6.9: Split group of phishing attacker based on URL feature 
Split number MDA value Degree Attribute 
1 0.178 Is a degree of attribute 2 
2 0.056 Is a degree of attribute 1 
3 0.031 Is a degree of attribute 6 
4 0.028 Is a degree of attribute 4 
5 0.015 Is a degree of attribute 5 
6 0.01 Is a degree of attribute 3 
7 0.005 Is a degree of attribute 8 
8 0.004 Is a degree of attribute 7 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Numbers of split groups for URL-based features 
 
6.4.1.4 Body-based Features 
The degree dependency attributes of body-based features can be summarized in 
Table 6.10. The body features are body_subjectblacklist (BSB), body_hypertextblacklist 
(BHB), body_textcontent (BTC), body_htmlcontent (BHC), body_imagecontent (BIC), 
body_appcontent (BAC), body_multipartcontent (BMC), body_language (BL). Table 
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6.11 summarized the split information for body-based features. Figure 6.10 shows five 
groups of attacker based on four split for body-based features. 
 
Table 6.10: Maximum dependency matrix of body-based features 
 BHB BTC BHC BIC BAC BMC BL 
BSB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BSB BTC BHC BIC BAC BMC BL 
BHB 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 
BSB BHB BHC BIC BAC BMC BL 
BTC 0 0 0.16 0 0.01 0 0 
BSB BHB BTC BIC BAC BMC BL 
BHC 0 0 0.84 0 0.01 0 0 
 BSB BHB BTC BHC BAC BMC BL 
BIC 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 
BSB BHB BTC BHC BIC BMC BL 
BAC 0 0.35 0.84 0.84 0.12 0 0.01 
BSB BHB BTC BHC BIC BAC BL 
BMC 0 0.35 0.84 0.84 0.12 0.01 0.03 
BSB BHB BTC BHC BIC BAC BMC 
BL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.11: Split group of phishing attacker based on body feature 
Split number MDA value Degree Attribute 
1 0.31 Is a degree of attribute 7 
2 0.307 Is a degree of attribute 6 
3 0.121 Is a degree of attribute 4 
4 0.025 Is a degree of attribute 3 
5 0.002 Is a degree of attribute 5 
6 0.001 Is a degree of attribute 2 
7 0 Is a degree of attribute 1 
8 0 Is a degree of attribute 8 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Numbers of split groups for body-based features 
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6.4.2 Split Size Selection 
MDA algorithm implements divide-conquer method using hierarchical tree for 
splitting the object. The technique is used recursively to obtain further cluster. At 
subsequent iterations, the leaf node having more objects is chosen for further splitting. 
The algorithm stops when it arrives at a pre-determined number of clusters. Figure 6.11 
exhibits the precision result tested on our phishing trackback framework for different 
size of splitting. Feature vector for this analysis were prepared for all datasets using 
various types of email features. It was interesting to notice that behaviour-based feature 
outperformed others features with 100% precision value tested on the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm. This result also shows that the URL information does not help in tracking 
phisher as it has lowest precision value tested on three classifiers: Adaboost, HMM and 
Naïve Bayes.  
In general, the proposed framework capable to track various types of email 
features. Still, the selection of features to be track is crucial in order to identify groups 
of attackers. The selection number of split also important to assure the high precision 
solution. The result shows lower precision for split 4 and 5 which means that split 3 in 
the best split for the datasets. Though, this is subjective and is pre-determined based 
either on user requirement or domain knowledge. Table 6.12 shows the results of our 
analysis in detail. Behaviour based, header based and body based features achieved 
lowest False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) value tested on the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm.  
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Figure 6.11: Precision value for various numbers of splits 
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Table 6.12: FN and FP rate for various numbers of split 
Split Number 
1 2 3 4 5 
Feature Algorithm FN FP FN FP FN FP FN FP FN FP 
Behaviour 
AdaBoost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.03 0.22 0.13 0.05 
HMM 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.03 0.97 0.13 0.87 0.41 0.59 
Naïve Bayes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Header 
AdaBoost 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.86 0.08 
HMM 0.05 0.95 0.08 0.92 0.34 0.66 0.94 0.06 0.99 0.01 
Naïve Bayes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Body 
AdaBoost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.91 
HMM 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.17 0.83 
Naïve Bayes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
URL 
AdaBoost 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.51 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.15 
HMM 0.07 0.93 0.08 0.92 0.07 0.93 0.69 0.31 0.70 0.30 
Naïve Bayes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
 
6.4.3 Forensic Analysis Process 
In this section, we considered header feature set to deliver the forensic process. 
 
6.4.3.1 Forensic Features 
 In our analysis, we well-thought-out the characteristics of header emails that 
could be extracted to track phisher. Based on the characteristics collected, the data 
cluster result provide the relationships between the forensic features and the pre-
specified group of attacker. Table 6.13 shows ten header-based features that are 
proposed to run the forensic procedure. We run the forensic analysis on WEKA to 
calculate the Euclidean Distance similarity measurement for each dataset. The attribute 
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declaration is shown in Figure 6.12. Note that, the attribute class was determined by the 
email analysis phase previously. 
 
Table 6.13: Header features for forensic process 
Header Features Descriptions 
Sender email Represents the email sender information. 
Day Show the day of the attack; Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday, Saturday or none. 
Time Represents time of the attack in HH: mm: SS format 
Timezone Specify timezone the origin of the email. This feature might be useful to 
show the location of email sender. 
Sender IP address Define the IP address of sender. 
Domain_name Define the domain name of sender extracted from the sender email address. 
Country Define the country where the attack come from extracted from sender email 
information (if any) 
Domain 
Message-ID 
Define the domain message-id from the message-id tags. 
Attachment name  Specify the attachment name or files that attacker use to bait their victim. 
 
@attribute sender_email string 
@attribute day {Wed, Thu, Fri, Sun, Sat, Tue, Mon, none}  
@attribute time date HH:mm:ss 
@attribute timezone { -400 , -500 , -600 , -300 , -200 , 100 , 500 , -100 , 90 , 900 , 300 , 
800 , none , -700 , 200 , 400 , 600 , 0 , -800 , 1100 , -80 , 330 , 20 , -30 , -70 , 53 , 60 , -
60 , 530 , 40 , 700 , -900 , -50 , 1000 , 80 , 1300 , 1200 , -40 , -4 }  
@attribute sender_ip string 
@attribute domain_name string 
@attribute country { none , kr , hk , uk , pt , cl , ph , au , de , tw , it , jp , dk , br , pl , ru , 
nl , ms , nz , cn , my , si , hu , pe , fr , us , tt , sg , es , eu , ca , ar , at , ro }  
@attribute DMID_new string 
@attribute attachment string 
@attribute class {1,2,3,4}  
Figure 6.12: Example of header-based feature declaration 
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6.4.3.2 Distribution Type of Attacker  
In the experiment, we fixed the number of split into four splitting. Then, we 
calculate the similarity measurement on pre-determined group in dataset behaviour, 
body, header and URL features constructed by the clustering algorithm. Table 6.14 
shows the number of single attack, collaborative attack as well as number of incorrectly 
clusters for each group of attacker. Note that group with a single attribute is considered 
as a single attacker. The behaviour features consist of four classes, body features with 
five classes, header with fifty-four classes and URL with eleven classes 
 
Table 6.14: Summary of forensic analysis of various email features 
 Class Collaborative 
attack 
Single 
attack 
Number of incorrectly 
clustered 
Percentage 
Behaviour 
1 3083 1 1 0.03% 
2 74 1 1 1.33% 
3 13 1 1 7.14% 
4 11 1 1 8.33% 
Body 
1 500 1 1 0.20% 
2 0 1 0 0.00% 
3 2663 1 1 0.04% 
4 15 1 1 6.25% 
5 2 1 1 33.33% 
Header 
1 0 1 1 50% 
2 36 1 1 2.70% 
3 26 1 1 3.70% 
4 67 5 5 6.94% 
5 0 1 0 0.00% 
6 0 1 0 0.00% 
7 0 1 0 0.00% 
8 1 1 1 50% 
9 0 1 0 0.00% 
10 0 1 0 0.00% 
11 4 86 4 4.44% 
12 34 706 34 4.59% 
13 23 177 23 11.50% 
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Table 6.14: continued 
Header 
Class Collaborative 
attack 
Single 
attack 
Number of incorrectly 
clustered 
Percentage 
14 67 1843 67 3.51% 
15 0 1 0 0.00% 
16 2 1 1 33.33% 
17 6 1 1 14.29% 
18 0 1 0 0.00% 
19 0 1 0 0.00% 
20 1 1 1 50% 
21 0 1 0 0.00% 
22 0 1 0 0.00% 
23 10 1 1 9.09% 
24 0 1 0 0.00% 
25 2 3 2 40% 
26 2 1 1 33.33% 
27 2 1 1 33.33% 
28 1 4 1 20% 
29 2 0 0 0.00% 
30 0 1 0 0.00% 
31 0 1 0 0.00% 
32 2 3 2 40% 
33 1 1 0 0.00% 
34 0 1 0 0.00% 
35 2 1 1 33.33% 
36 2 1 1 33.33% 
37 0 1 0 0.00% 
38 0 1 0 0.00% 
39 2 1 1 33.33% 
40 0 1 1 33.33% 
41 2 1 1 33.33% 
42 0 1 0 0.00% 
43 0 1 0 0.00% 
44 0 1 0 0.00% 
45 5 1 1 16.67% 
46 3 2 2 40% 
47 0 1 0 0.00% 
48 3 1 1 25% 
49 2 1 1 33.33% 
50 0 1 0 0.00% 
51 0 1 0 0.00% 
52 2 1 1 33.33% 
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Table 6.14: continued 
 Class Collaborative 
attack 
Single 
attack 
Number of incorrectly 
clustered 
Percentage 
Header 53 0 1 0 0.00% 
 54 0 1 0 0.00% 
URL 1 21 2 2 8.70% 
2 1962 1 1 0.05% 
3 999 1 1 0.10% 
4 2 88 2 2.22% 
5 8 1 1 11.11% 
6 76 2 2 2.56% 
7 1 0 0 0.00% 
8 12 1 1 7.69% 
9 1 0 0 0.00% 
10 1 1 1 50% 
11 1 4 1 20% 
 
The distribution of single and collaborative attack for all features is shown in 
Table 6.15. The result shows that the proposed trackback framework manages to 
distinguish type of attacker either single or collaborative attack by implementing the 
similarity measurement algorithm. We found that the header information is the best 
feature that could be used for trackback the attacker because it is more precise as 
compared to other features. Among 3185 phishing email, 9.8% are collaborative 
attacker which they normally share the same domain name, attachment and timezone. 
This also proof that the group of attacker who attack using the same server and same 
attachment files come from the same location. 
 
Table 6.15: Distribution of single and collaborative attack 
Feature Collaborative attack Single attack 
Behaviour 3181 4 
Body 3180 5 
Header 312 2873 
URL 3084 101 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
Trackback phishing email is an evolving problem and solving this problem has 
proven to be very challenging. In this chapter, we proposed phishing trackback by using 
clustering and similarity measurement approach. First, we formulate the trackback 
framework as a clustering problem using selected features in the phishing emails as 
feature vectors. The proposed framework is then tested on different type of feature set. 
Then, the distance similarity for each attribute in class is calculated to classify the 
attacker either single or collaborative attacker. The experiment results show that the 
email header information is the best features for forensic analysis. We plan to 
investigate other clustering algorithm and similarity measurement that could be 
integrated with our proposed trackback framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion and Future 
Directions                                       
 
This thesis focused on solutions for phishing detection issues in email messages. In this 
chapter, we will review the contributions and findings of the thesis. Then, we are going 
to discuss our future directions and other potential research problems in phishing.  
 
7.1 Conclusion 
Phishing attack has grown in number and complexity. Phishers have become 
more creative with lots of tricks and strategies to conduct a sophisticated phishing 
attack. Online banking and payment service provider are the most targeted victims 
which facing financial loss due to a phishing attack. So, it is a must to find the best 
solution to fight phishing attack. The phishing email detection issues have drawn a lot 
attention for many researchers and the installation of malicious detection devices in 
email servers as a safety measure. Yet, the phisher could easily overcome the filter set 
by anti-phishing techniques. Moreover, most of these phishing detection approaches are 
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based on a static decision which causes the increase number of false positives. Some of 
them depend only on a blacklist and whitelist database, text based and URL-based 
approach. Chapter two will provide thorough investigations on existing techniques 
proposed by other authors and listing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. We offer a well-defined taxonomy of phishing detection. Referring to the 
analysis and discussion, we propose our solutions to overcome the phishing detection 
problem in phishing messages. This taxonomy can be used by other researchers to know 
existing research, challenge and future expectation of phishing detection. 
Our first research problem is to filter phishing messages from phishing email. 
We proposed a hybrid feature selection (HFS) algorithm for extracting behaviour-based 
feature from email header information. This approach mines the attacker behaviour 
from the email’s header. Recently, various feature selection approaches have been 
introduced which work on content-based approach [26][51][53][52] structural 
characteristic of email [94] and behaviour-based approach [64][59][28][95] to assist 
phishing detection mechanism. Yet, content-based classification does not seem to be the 
best approach because phishing messages usually look similar to the normal emails. The 
behaviour-based approach work on detecting abnormal activities based on log-based by 
mining the traffic on live data. However, attackers tend to use more sophisticated 
techniques from time to time that make them difficult to detect. We proposed hybrid 
feature selection approach by using new behaviour-based features that are Unique 
Sender (US) and Unique Domain (UD). We analyse email header information, 
particularly the sender email and email message-ID tags in order to evaluate the attacker 
behaviours. Then, we mine the attacker behaviours by considering whether the sender 
sends emails from more than a single domain (US) and if the domain name is used by 
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more than one sender’s domain (UD). By looking into an attacker’s pattern, we notice 
that phishing email has a tendency to come from more than one domain. Furthermore, 
domain server that manages more than one type of domain email could show abnormal 
activities as well. The result shows that the proposed hybrid feature selection approach 
is effective in identifying and classifying a phishing email. We explain the basic system 
components and general processing steps in Hybrid Feature Selection Algorithm. 
Finally, we discuss the classification outcome of the selected classifier for different sets 
of data with a varying split percentage number of phishing and ham emails. 
The second problem is to detect phishing messages based on profiling and 
clustering techniques. In the first problem, we already contribute hybrid feature 
selection algorithm (HSF) for selecting most significance features to detect phishing 
messages. For the second problem, we formulate the profiling problem as a clustering 
technique using features present in the phishing emails as feature vectors. Then, we 
generate profiles based on clustering predictions. These predictions are further utilized 
to generate complete profiles of the emails. Recently, there have been many approaches 
to detect and prevent phishing attacks like using multi-tier classifier [9], anti-phishing 
toolbars [42][44][43][40][41], scam website blockers [46][47][48] and profiling 
phishing messages [71][72][75][70]. Our proposed phishing profiling algorithm 
(ProPhish) which is capable to select an optimal number of clusters based on ratio size 
value. The algorithm works by selecting the optimal number of clusters based on ratio 
size procedures by integrating it with a Two-Step clustering algorithm. Unlike Prophish 
algorithm, Two-step clustering algorithms are sensitive to the choice of threshold value 
and initial number of clusters. Cluster membership for each object is assigned 
deterministically to the closest cluster according to the distance measure used to find the 
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clusters. The deterministic assignment may result in unfair estimates of the cluster 
profiles if the clusters overlap. We carried out extensive experimental analysis of the 
proposed algorithm to evaluate its effectiveness to various factors such as sensitivity to 
the type of data, number of data sizes and cluster sizes. The experiment results showed 
that the classification accuracy of ProPhish algorithms is improved by adopting ratio 
size procedures for selected number of clusters. 
For the final problem, we provide a phishing trackback framework in order to 
find out either the attack is coming from the single or collaborative attack.  The 
framework consists of two parts: cluster the attacker by applying the clustering approach 
and forensic backend for tracking purposes. For the forensic backend process, we used 
similarity measurement to identify the single or collaborative attack. It is a simple 
solution and easy to implement where it allows automated detection of phishing email. 
Most of the current trackback framework solely relies on fake token (phoneytoken) 
generated by the system to detect and prevent phishing attacks. However, the 
phoneytoken is not the best solution because it can only track activity that interacts with 
it which makes it static selection of features that need to be set earlier. Our work differs 
from [79] in such a way that we did not use any phoneytoken to track phishing activity. 
The capability of the proposed framework is studied experimentally. The results of 
various simulation experiments using several phishing email features show that the 
proposed framework is highly effective to identify the group and origin of phisher.  
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7.2  Future Directions 
We discussed our future research directions that correspond to the phishing 
problems in this thesis. To ensure that we can prevent the phishing attack, there are 
chances to improve the proposed solutions and exploring other potential issues. 
 
7.2.1 Automated Feature Selection Setting 
In the future, we plan to use automated feature selection settings for extracting 
phishing email. The feature selection objective is to find a subset of features that can 
give higher accuracy when running by the classifier. Although feature selection can lead 
to improve classifier performance, this depends on the classifier used. The idea is to 
explore more additional features especially in the email headers to improve the phishing 
classification and detection. In extracting features, other researchers disregard the email 
header information. However, this information is valuable in order to mine the potential 
features of attacker behaviour. The challenge is to ensure that the new features manage 
to filter and detect phishing email accurately.  
 For accurate phishing detection, the automatic settings have to consider feature 
normalization process. Feature normalization was based on the values resulting from 
instances where some value is very large. Furthermore, the feature normalization 
process needs to apply in various instances including categorical attributes. We intend 
to improve the normalization process by considering various instances in order to build 
an independent and automatic filter of detecting phishing emails. The automated 
mechanism can update the classifier if it notices new features from inbound phishing 
emails. To test the practical relevance of the proposed phishing detection and feature 
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selection algorithm, we plan to implement and test the algorithm in actual deployment 
environments. 
 
7.2.2 Profiling Attacker 
For future works, we plan to expand the research by applying our proposed 
profiling algorithm to real-world network configuration and testing the approach on live 
data. The profiling attacker process should be done dynamically only when a phishing 
email is detected. This sorting process could make the profiling procedure more 
effective instead of checking on all incoming email. We also target to adapt the 
proposed profiling approach in webmail server applications. By doing this, we can 
persistently profile the phisher behaviour and construct criminal records. For the time 
being, the profiling algorithm may be suitable to be used by the phishing trackback 
framework to trace the attacker back to its origin. 
 
7.2.3 Trackback Mechanism 
There is a need to specify the best clustering approach and similarity 
measurement in order to achieve better trackback result. If the clustering approach and 
similarity measurement works well together, we could produce a reliable forensic 
outcome.  The framework needs to be flexible because every phishing message may 
have a different set of features as the attacker always changed their modus operandi. 
Then, it is tested iterative to justify the consistency of the framework. 
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